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1. Summary of the main results and conclusions 
1.1. The purpose of this survey 
The battle against unemployment in Europe must be conduc-
ted from both the supply side (the key phrases here are 
moderate increase of real wages, improved adaptability of 
the markets, the single internal market, the promotion of 
innovation, etc.) and the demand side (particularly private 
and public investment, tax reduction, etc.). 1 There is no 
longer any real dispute about a recommendation in this 
general form, but perhaps there are differences concerning 
the weight which economic policy should attribute to indi-
vidual measures and the employment effects to be expected 
from them. Above all there is uncertainty as to how insti-
tutional changes on the labour market, e.g. more fixed-term 
contracts, more flexible working time arrangements, etc., 
would affect the level of employment. In principle, the ques-
tion of labour market flexibility covers the adaptability of 
real wage costs and wage structures, as well as labour mo-
bility (in terms of location and skills), the flexibility of 
working hours and the organization of work input. In order 
to obtain at least a rough indication, backed by empirical 
evidence, the Commission of the European Communities 
organized two special surveys in the Member States. The 
first survey, the results of which have already been published, 
was addressed to employees in Europe, and the second 
survey to companies. 2 , 3 
1.2. Employee survey (summary) 
- If they could choose, more European employees than in 
the earlier 1977 survey would today prefer an increase 
in wages to a general reduction in working hours (62 % 
compared with 42 % in 1977). Nevertheless, about one-
third of employees in Europe are more interested in 
shorter working hours than in higher pay. 
- Approximately one in four of the European workers 
now in full-time employment would voluntarily forgo a 
corresponding part of his income, if he could choose his 
normal working time (in 19 % of cases between 30 and 
34 hours and in 6 % of cases under 30 hours a week). 
Even if these percentages are perhaps slightly exagger-
ated, since not all respondents may have fully considered 
the implications of such a reduction in working hours 
(the question assumed that the hourly wage would re-
main the same), there is still potentially a considerable 
number of workers who are interested in new forms of 
part-time working. 
Summary of the main results and conclusions 
- Amongst those primarily in favour of higher pay a large 
proportion is interested in working shorter hours. Per-
haps they see greater prospects of achieving both an 
improvement in real incomes and a reduction in working 
hours - with no threat to job security - if they accept 
more flexible arrangements on the labour market. More 
than half of all European employees are prepared to 
accept a more flexible organization of working hours. 
Over one-third would be prepared to work in the eve-
nings and on Saturdays, if in return the total yearly 
working hours are reduced. 
Workers display great solidarity with their companies 
when times are hard (voluntary temporary wage cuts) 
and are very interested in payment by performance (in 
each case over half those questioned). 
- This shows that European workers - or at least the 
majority of them - are much more flexible, innovative 
and performance-minded than is frequently alleged. 
1.3. Survey of employers in the industry 
(summary) 
- On average, European industrial companies judged the 
present size of their work-force as still somewhat too 
large, except in the Netherlands and the Federal Republic 
of Germany. The excess of workers in European industry 
applies almost exclusively to unskilled workers and office 
and sales staff. Skilled workers and especially technicians 
and technologists are in short supply (mentioned by 5 
and 16 % of European industrial companies respect-
ively). This supports the view that vocational training 
and advanced training should be stepped up. 
- When asked why they did not employ more labour at 
present, companies put as the first reason the insufficient 
level of demand for their products. Linked to this, many 
companies also considered price competitiveness was too 
low (second most important reason). The remaining most 
frequently mentioned reasons were, in order, non-wage 
labour costs, insufficient flexibility in hiring and shedding 
labour, rationalization and/or introduction of new technol-
ogies, and shortage of adequately skilled applicants. 
- Companies were then asked what institutional changes 
on the labour market would be most likely to persuade 
them to employ more labour over the next 12 months 
than they are at present planning to do. Their answers 
were in this order: shorter periods of notice and simpler 
legal procedures in case of redundancies and dismissals, 
more fixed-term contracts, better trained job-seekers, 
wider wage differentials, greater emphasis on productivity 
in determining wages and salaries, lower starting salaries 
and more flexible working hours. However, companies 
13 
Employment problems: views of businessmen and the workforce 
considered that a reduction in standard weekly working 
hours, even if it did not increase costs, and more sharing 
in company profits would have relatively little effect in 
increasing employment. 
- If the institutional changes which firms consider impor-
tant were made on the labour market, companies stated 
that they would revise their employment plans for the 
next 12 months upward by just under 3 %. In the nine 
member countries included in the survey (i.e. excluding 
Denmark, Portugal and Spain) this could mean 750 OOO 
or so more jobs in industry alone. 
- Only just over one-quarter of European industrial com-
panies are fully satisfied with their present working time 
arrangements. In the course of the next year or two, 
approximately half of European industrial firms are 
planning to introduce more flexible working hours. This 
is mainly because of economic considerations, most im-
portantly in order to use plant more intensively and to 
adjust more easily to demand changes. Companies feel 
that employees' preferences are not generally against 
such changes. This can be confirmed by the results of 
the EC employee survey, which showed that over half 
those questioned (55 %) would prefer, in agreement with 
their firms, to allocate a fixed number of working hours 
per month, or even per year, flexibly between working 
days, instead of having to work the same number of 
hours each day. However, readiness to accept evening or 
Saturday work would depend on whether annual work-
ing hours were reduced to compensate. 
- Around 40 % of industrial firms in Europe consider that 
some of their full-time jobs could be split into part-time 
jobs without significant economic disadvantages for the 
company. This gives a total calculated potential of some 
800 OOO full-time jobs which could be split (i.e. some 
3,3 % of all full-time jobs) in the nine member countries 
surveyed. It is another question whether workers in jobs 
which companies consider can be split would also be 
prepared to share them, and if they were, whether ad-
ditional workers with the same skills could be found. 
However, as the EC employee survey demonstrated, ap-
proximately 6 % of full-time workers in the Community 
would be interested in working for fewer than 30 hours 
a week, even if this were associated with a corresponding 
loss of pay. 
1.4. Survey in the retail and wholesale trades 
(summary) 
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In both the retail and wholesale trades, the firms sur-
veyed expect only a slight increase in their work-forces 
at Community level over the next 12 months. The in-
crease in employment resulting from the anticipated 
growth in turnover is thus too small to be able on its 
own to make any significant contribution to solving the 
labour market problem. This emphasizes once again the 
need for additional measures on the labour market. 
- The three key measures that would induce firms in the 
distributive trades to take on more staff than planned 
are: lower starting pay, shorter periods of notice and 
simpler legal procedures in the event of redundancies and 
dismissals, and wider wage differentials. More flexible 
working-time arrangements are also regarded, particu-
larly in the retail trade, as being of major importance 
for the level of employment (ranked fourth; in France, 
actually marked first). In contrast to industry, the item 
better trained job-seekers was marked only in the lower 
half of the list. Obviously, the distributive trades have 
fewer problems than industry in finding suitably skilled 
workers; firms in the distributive trades - and no doubt 
also in other service sectors - regard changes in wage 
structure as being more important. The retail trade -
like the wholesale trade - also attaches much less signifi-
cance than industry to more frequent use of temporary 
contracts; this may be due to the fact that, in the retail 
trade at any rate, the proportion of workers on tempor-
ary contracts is already relatively high (5 % compared 
with 2 % in industry). 
- By contrast, the distributive trades and industry are 
both equally sceptical of the impact which a reduction in 
standard weekly working hours - even if cost-neutral -
and a functional improvement in public employment offices 
would have on the level of employment: firms in the 
distributive trades consider that both measures would 
have relatively little direct effect on employment. 
- If the changes on the labour market desired by firms in 
the distributive trades were put into effect, retailers 
would revise their employment plans for the next 12 
months upwards by 3,2 % and wholesale firms theirs by 
2,5%. 
- The retail trade in particular believes there is still con-
siderable scope for splitting full-time jobs into part-time 
jobs, while the relevant proportion indicated by whole-
salers is about the same as in industry (6, I % of full-time 
jobs in the retail trade as against 2,7 % in the wholesale 
trade). It must be borne in mind here, however, that in 
the distributive trades, particularly the retail trade, a 
large proportion of total employment is already ac-
counted for by part-time workers (36 % in the retail 
trade and I I % in the wholesale trade compared with 
6 % in industry). Nevertheless, even if the number of 
full-time jobs which firms think could be split is expressed 
as a proportion of all jobs, there is still considerable 
potential available in the retail trade (3,9 % compared 
with 2,4 % in the wholesale trade and 2,9 % in industry). 
- One-third of European retailers think that changes are 
needed in shop opening hours. The main change preferred 
is complete liberalization of opening hours. Only among 
smaller retail firms (fewer than 20 employees), just one-
fifth of whom thought opening hours should be changed, 
was a maximum limit of weekly opening hours the main 
change preferred. 39 % of retailers thought that more 
flexible opening hours would have a positive impact on 
employment and only 7 % thought they would have a 
negative impact. Nevertheless, the retail trade ranked this 
point eighth amongst the 12 proposed changes. However, 
there were distinct differences between countries. It was 
precisely in those member countries in which shop open-
ing hours in the retail trade are already the most liberal 
(e.g. Belgium) that the desire for greater flexibility and 
also the expected impact on employment were greatest. 
This lends weight to the assumption that the lack of 
practical experience with more flexible shop opening 
hours is in many cases, for example in the Federal Repub-
lic of Germany and the Netherlands, partly to blame for 
the widespread scepticism of firms on this point. 
1.5. Conclusions 
- The results of the survey have shown that the interests 
of firms and those of employees in achieving greater 
flexibility on the labour market (in particular, new forms 
of working time and pay that is geared to both individual 
skills and to business profits) do not necessarily have to 
be in conflict with one another. As far as more flexible 
working hours are concerned, interest seems to be greater 
among employees than among employers. Obviously, 
many employees regard greater influence over their indi-
vidual working hours as a desirable increase in control 
over their working lives. Many employees would also 
accept unusual working hours (e.g. working on some 
evenings and occasionally on Saturdays) if there was no 
loss in income and if total annual working hours were 
reduced. 
- In contrast to the argument frequently put forward in 
public discussion, it is not so much the absolute wage 
and salary level, but rather non-wage labour costs which 
firms regard as inhibiting employment. Many firms also 
indicated that the wage structure discouraged them from 
employing more workers. Lower starting pay and wider 
wage differentials are regarded as desirable, especially in 
the retail and wholesale trades and hence, it might be 
supposed, in the other branches of the service sector, 
too. Employees surveyed indicated their willingness to 
be paid according to their individual skills. Thus, in the 
author's opinion, a compromise on this subject is possible 
between employers and employees. This would be made 
Summary of the main results and conclusions 
all the more easy if non-wage labour costs are reduced 
by the government through appropriate cuts in taxes and 
social security charges. 
Especially in industry, and, within industry, particularly 
in the technical trades, a lack of skills on the part of job 
applicants is an important obstacle to an improvement 
in employment. Training and further retraining must 
therefore be stepped up even more, particularly in the 
technical trades. If the labour market authorities were 
to receive more rapid and more specific information from 
industry as to what skills are required, training measures 
could be better geared to the needs of firms. The employ-
ment impact of a functional improvement in public em-
ployment offices would then probably be greater than 
anticipated by firms in the survey. 
- Another important finding to be brought out by the 
survey is the untapped potential for part-time jobs. The 
desire of employees for more part-time working fits in 
quite well, at least on an aggregate level, with the scope 
which firms have to offer more part-time jobs. Although 
the provision of additional part-time jobs would essen-
tially bring down the number of registered unemployed 
to a fairly small extent, since those concerned are partly 
drawn from the 'latent reserve' (e.g. discouraged workers 
and women at home), greater use should nevertheless be 
made of this possibility. In so doing, however, it must 
be ensured that part-time workers are not placed at a 
disadvantage compared with full-time workers as regards 
promotion opportunities, social security and retirement 
pensions. 
- The arrangements for - voluntary - part-time working 
and shorter working weeks should also involve new ways 
of taking account of the needs of the different categories 
of employees in the firm (e.g. working hours which are 
a compromise between half-time and full-time work; 
temporary part-time work with the possibility of going 
back to full-time work later on). The employee survey 
showed that about one-third of the respondents were 
very much interested in a reduction in working hours, 
even if this meant a loss of pay. The main preference 
expressed was for weekly working hours that were some-
where between traditional part-time work (i.e. half-day 
work) and full-time work. There should therefore be 
closer examination of the possibilities of creating differ-
ent types of part-time jobs, particularly jobs with average 
weekly working hours of around 30 hours. 
- Given the constraints within a firm, this desire for shorter 
and more flexible working hours can probably only be 
realized if the whole work process is organized differently 
from today. New rules governing working hours would 
have to be introduced in firms, dissociating individual 
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hours from company hours to a far greater extent than 
is normal today, e.g. in the form of a rolling four-day 
week (within a company working week of 5, 6 or 7 days). 
The more efficient use of the capital stock would provide 
the opportunity for reducing personal working hours 
without affecting costs. Such arrangements would prob-
ably allow an individual to achieve an appreciable re-
duction in working hours without a correspondingly 
large cut in income. Besides the advantage for these 
people already in employment, who would thus come 
nearer to their ideal working hours, this would probably 
produce a sizeable number of additional jobs. According 
to the results of the company survey in industry and 
commerce, the maximum possible employment effects of 
greater flexibility on the labour market (including the 
splitting of full-time jobs) could be at around 6 % of the 
number of people currently employed. The quantitative 
effect will be the higher the greater the extent to which 
overtime work is compensated by more leisure time in 
other periods - which should not cause problems within 
a flexible working time regime - rather than by extra 
pay. 
- An essential precondition for the success of such meas-
ures is that a positive demand trend must be anticipated 
by firms. This is not only evident from circular-flow 
theory considerations, but is also recognized by firms 
themselves. In industry, 'demand' ranks first amongst 
the reasons why more workers are not being employed 
at present. This is also the reason why, in its strategy for 
more employment, the Commission has always emphasi-
zed the need for an appropriate demand trend. Micro-
economic measures to improve structural adjustment 
and a macroeconomic policy of growth and employment 
must go hand in hand. Subject to this condition, a cost-
neutral rearrangement and reduction of individual work-
ing hours could produce positive employment effects. 
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- It will probably be more difficult to reconcile the desire 
of firms for shorter periods of notice and simpler legal 
procedures in the case of redundancies and dismissals on 
the one hand, and the right of employees to protection 
on the other. The stronger economic growth is and hence 
the more openings there are on the labour market for 
the individual employee the easier it should be to rec-
oncile the two points of view. The more favourable 
employment opportunities as a whole are, the easier it 
will be within firms to introduce more flexible arrange-
ments for recruiting and dismissing employees. The ex-
tent to which the opportunities on the labour market are 
exploited will then depend largely upon the mobility of 
the individual employee. These considerations emphasize 
once again the need for strong economic growth. 
- Company profit-sharing has so far been seen mainly 
from the point of view of staff motivation and the distri-
bution of income and wealth. Any direct effects it may 
have in increasing employment are viewed as being rela-
tively slight by industrial firms; however, such effects 
might be somewhat greater in the wholesale and retail 
trades, according to the survey results. Undoubtedly, 
company profit-sharing helps to stabilize numbers em-
ployed in times of temporarily declining profits, since a 
proportion of wage costs then to some extent becomes 
a variable rather than a fixed cost. However, greater 
efforts should be made to find forms of profit-sharing 
that create greater incentive to increase employment in 
firms than the survey results suggest; examples might 
include tax incentives such as those under discussion at 
present in the United Kingdom. Employees' reactions to 
the introduction of more profit-oriented components in 
the system of remunerations were generally positive. 
About half of employees in the survey would be prepared 
to accept such arrangements even if this were associated 
with temporary wage cuts; some 20 % were undecided 
and around 30 % opposed them. 
2. Results of the employee survey 
2.1. Methodology 
The survey was carried out in all 12 Member States by 
leading national survey institutes (within the framework of 
the Eurobarometer surveys); it was coordinated by Faits et 
opinions, Paris, (the annex contains the names of the insti-
tutes involved). Unlike the company survey, the results of 
the employee survey are based on personal interviews and 
not on written questions. In Spain and Portugal, the survey 
was carried out in January/February 1986, and in the other 
10 Member States in the spring of 1985. Because the ques-
tions were asked on different dates, each of the following 
tables show the results for the Community as a whole on 
the basis of both the 10 Member States (EUR 10) and of all 
12 Member States (EUR 12). Around I OOO persons were 
questioned in each member country, giving a total of around 
12 OOO for the Community as a whole. The percentages 
shown in Tables I to 12 do not, however, relate to all 
respondents but only to employed wage and salary earners. 
In addition, Tables 13 and 14 give the results for the unem-
ployed and for schoolchildren/students (16 to 24 year-old 
age group). The number of cases and the structure of the 
sample ensure that the overall results are representative for 
each of the Member States and for the European Com-
munity as a whole. However, the results for individual 
groups of employees, i.e. when differentiated by age, income, 
etc., were shown only for the Community as a whole, and 
not for each of the member countries, because the number 
of national cases did not seem large enough in some sub-
groups. Because the dates on which the questions were put 
in Spain and Portugal were not the same as in the other 10 
Member States, it seemed advisable to base the sub-group 
results on EUR 10 only. But since the results for Spain and 
Portugal do not differ substantially from those for EUR 10, 
these detailed results should also give an accurate picture of 
the situation in the Community of Twelve. 
2.2. Detailed results of the employee survey 
2.2.1. In most member countries there is at present greater 
interest in wage increases than in a general reduction 
of working hours (see Table I and Graphs I and 2) 
The majority of the European workers questioned (62 %) 
would - if they had the choice - prefer a wage increase 
to a reduction in working hours in the next pay round. 
But almost one-third of those questioned (30 %) are more 
interested in shorter working hours than in more money; 
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the remaining 8 % showed no clear preference for either of 
the alternatives. 
Compared with an earlier survey on the same subject (1977), 
the desire for higher pay has clearly increased, probably 
because real incomes have risen very little over the last four 
years (in 1977 51 % of employees set more store by shorter 
working hours than higher wages; 42 % took the opposite 
view and 7 % were undecided). Today's lower preference for 
a general reduction of working hours is apparent in all 
income groups, particularly in the lower quartile of the 
income pyramid (see Graph 2). 
The most recent survey indicates clear differences in prefer-
ences from one Member State to another: workers in Portu-
gal, Ireland, the United Kingdom and Greece show far 
higher than average interest in wage increases. On the other 
hand, the majority of workers in Denmark, and also in the 
Netherlands, are more interested in shorter working hours 
than in more money (see Table I and Graph I). 
The preference for more free time is greater among higher 
earners than among those in the lower income groups: 62 % 
of European workers in the lower quartile of the income 
pyramid prefer an increase in wages or salary, compared 
with 56 % in the upper quartile. There seems to be a higher 
degree of uncertainty amongst low earners as to whether 
they could 'afford' shorter working hours. Only 22 % were 
definitely in favour; the remaining 16 % showed no clear 
preference for either of the alternatives, compared with only 
5 % or 6 % undecided in the other income brackets. The 
differences in answers are also slight when broken down by 
sex, age, and occupation of those questioned. The results of 
the survey tally almost exactly in the private sector and in 
the public service. But the difference between the answers 
of full-time and part-time workers is somewhat greater. As 
is to be expected, interest in more free time is greater among 
persons in 'normal' full-time employment (working between 
35 and 40 hours a week) than among part-time workers -
i.e. those working less than 30 hours a week (37 % compared 
with 24 %). Somewhat surprisingly, people who today work 
an average of over 41 hours a week are less interested in 
more free time (27 % compared with 37 %) than persons 
working a 'normal' full week (35 to 40 hours). 
2.2.2. Present working hours and ideal working hours do 
not coincide for almost half the workers in Europe. 
There is considerable potential for new forms of 
part-time work among persons at present in full-time 
employment (see Table 2) 
Over one-third of the workers questioned (36 % ) would like 
to work shorter hours than they do today, provided that 
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their hourly pay remained the same. Over half (57 %) are 
fully satisfied with present working time arrangements and 
only 7 % would rather work longer hours than today.4 As 
can be seen from Table 2 and 2a, there is a relatively large 
amount of interest in working between 30 and 34 hours a 
week - among men as well as women. At present on ly 
3,8 % of European employees work these hours, but 17 ,5 % 
would be interested in doing so . Those interested are almost 
exclusively people now in full-time employment (defined as 
an employee whose normal working time is 35 hours a week 
and above). A quarter of them would like shorter working 
hours, even if these were associated with losses of income. 
But in the main, the desired reduction is relatively small: 
19 % of full-time workers would like to work between 30 
and 34 hours a week; only 6 % of full-time workers would 
prefer to work under 30 hours a week (determined on the 
basis of the data in Table 3). 
In order to examine whether the wish to work shorter hours 
is greater among women than among men, Table 3 gives a 
breakdown of existing and desired working hours according 
to the sex of those questioned. 17 % of male full-time wor-
kers (96 % of all male employees within the Community) 
would prefer to work for under 35 hours - if hourly pay 
remained the same; the majority ( 14 % ) of these would prefer 
a working week of between 30 and 34 hours, and only 3 % 
would like to work for under 30 hours a week. 
35 % of female full-time workers (56 % of all female workers 
according to this survey) would like to work shorter hours, 
with 24 % wishing to work between 30 and 34 hours and 
11 % under 30 hours. Shorter working hours continued to 
arouse greater interest among women than among men, 
although only around one in ten of today's full-time women 
workers would prefer to work part-time (under 30 hours) . 
Part-time workers are predominantly happy with their work-
ing hours; on balance only a small proportion of them -
men and women - wanted to work longer hours (see Table 
3). There are only a few cases of people working part-time 
against their will; of the workers in the Community who 
work for under 20 hours a week (7,5 % of all employees), 
one in four (23 %) would like to work longer hours, but 
only 12 % would want to work full time. 14 % of the group 
of part-time workers who work between 20 and 24 hours a 
week (4,8 % of all employees) would prefer to work even 
shorter hours, while 25 % would prefer to work slightly 
longer hours, and 19 % would like to work full-time. One-
third of the group of part-time workers who work between 
25 and 29 hours a week (2,8 % of all persons in employment) 
would prefer shorter working hours and only 14 % would 
prefer to work longer. A similar picture emerges in the group 
of employees who work between 30 and 34 hours a week; 
this includes the 29 % of respondents who would rather 
work shorter hours, compared with the mere 10 % who 
would prefer longer weekly working hours (see Table 3). 
The answers to the first two questions - more pay or more 
free time and the correspondence between actual and desired 
working hours - on the whole fit in very well with one 
another. Admittedly, the desire for a general reduction of 
working hours has decreased since 1977 (see Graph 2). 
Nevertheless, there is still a substantial group of workers -
Results of the employee survey 
approximately one-third - who are very keenly interested 
in shorter working hours and in return are prepared to forgo 
increases in income or even to accept some financial losses. 
Usually, ideal working hours are only some 5 hours shorter 
than the hours worked today. However, there are sti ll 6 % 
of full-time employees who would prefer to work under 30 
hours a week. As the company survey has shown, manage-
ments feel that a considerable proportion of full-time jobs 
in industry and commerce can be split into part-time jobs 
with no disadvantages to the company (3 ,3 % in industry, 
6, I % in retailing and 2,7 % in wholesaling). The more 
flexibly the work process is organized, the easier it will be 
to realize in practice the additional potential employment 
which can be derived from such individual cuts in working 
hours - by converting full-time jobs into part-time jobs, or 
by reducing working time in other ways. This is probably 
the easiest way of bridging the gap between company and 
personal working hours (e.g. in the form of a rolling four-
day working week in industry). Even if all the employees 
who spoke out in favour of shorter working hours with the 
same hourly pay, were perhaps not fully aware of the finan-
cial implications, and even if the part-time jobs on offer do 
not match those sought in terms of occupational skills, the 
survey results indicate that considerable employment effects 
are still possible. They suggest that unions, management and 
governments could make a greater effort than in the past to 
redistribute the volume of work: this should be done on a 
voluntary basis and be tailored more closely than hitherto 
to the needs of companies and individual workers. 
2.2.3. Over half of European workers would accept changes 
in daily working hours (see Table 4) 
40 % of European workers consider that no change should 
be made in the system of working the same number of hours 
per day. But almost as many (38 %) would prefer to be able 
to work an agreed number of hours per month, but to vary 
the number of hours worked per day to fit in with their own 
needs and those of the employer. One in seven employees 
(15 %) would , if he had the choice, plump for the even more 
flexible arrangement of working an agreed number of hours 
per year, to be varied for each working day or month in 
accordance with personal preferences and possibilities within 
the company. 
Overall this shows a surprisingly high proportion of workers 
who are ready - within certain limits - to work flexible 
hours . The differences in answers are only slight when 
broken down by sex, income and union membership. Broken 
down by occupation and age , the differences are somewhat 
greater : executives are readier to accept more flexible work-
ing hours than manual workers (64 % compared with 51 % ). 
The answers of salaried workers lie somewhere between 
these two groups (59 %). Older people ( over 55 years of age) 
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are much less interested in flexible working hours than 
younger workers up to 39 years of age (39 % compared with 
59 %). 
When broken down by Member State the differences in 
answers are again marked. The Greeks and Belgians in 
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GRAPH 3: Main results of EC employee survey by Member State 
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2.2.4. Evening or Saturday work popular if this reduces 
total yearly working hours (see Table 5) 
Over one-third of workers (38 %) would welcome working 
one Saturday a month or five weekday evenings until 22.00 
if in return annual working hours were reduced by 5 % (this 
is equivalent to some 2 hours less a week or 2 weeks more 
annual holiday). Only 34 % are against such an arrange-
ment. A relatively large proportion of those questioned 
(28 %) has no definite opinion as yet, but in principle has 
no objection to this more flexible arrangement of working 
hours. 
Readiness to accept such more flexible arrangements of 
working hours seemed to be higher than average among the 
Irish, French and Greeks (53, 47 and 46 %). But on the 
whole, national differences in the answers are relatively 
small. 
A comparison of the answers to this and the preceding 
question reveals a certain discrepancy : although 53 % of all 
employees consider it advantageous to be able to divide their 
working hours flexibly over a month or even a year, only 
38 % are prepared to extend these more flexible working 
hours to occasional evening or Saturday working. 
This difference becomes even plainer if the individual ans-
wers are compared : only 55 % of the respondents in favour 
of working hours being divided more flexibly over the whole 
year were prepared to work evenings (5 times a month until 
22.00) or one Saturday a month; of the respondents who 
prefer working hours to be shared out on a monthly basis, 
even fewer (46 %) would agree to evening and Saturday 
working. Clearly, many people who were otherwise receptive 
to the more flexible arrangement of working hours con-
sidered evening and especially weekend work to be too great 
a restriction, and one which could not be compensated by 
additional holiday time. 5 On the other hand, approximately 
one quarter of those employees who, in principle, wish to 
work the same number of hours each day were attracted by 
the prospect of more annual holiday and in exchange would 
also agree to work evening and weekends (see Table 6) . 
2.2.5. Great readiness to accept temporary wage cuts, if 
the company is in difficulty (see Table 7) 
Approximately half the workers questioned in the Com-
munity consider that it is right for wages and salaries to be 
cut temporarily, if their company is in difficulty - provided 
that, once the firm has recovered, the workers have a corre-
sponding share in the profits. Only 29 % of those questioned 
were against such an arrangement; another fifth were unde-
cided . 
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The Dutch, the French and the Irish showed above-average 
readiness to accept that pay should depend more on the 
success of the company (64, 63 and 61 % respectively) . 
Belgium was the only country where the opponents of such 
an arrangement outnumbered those in favour (45 % com-
pared with 39 %; 16 % undecided) ; in the Federal Republic 
of Germany a rather large proportion of the wo,kers ques-
tioned were at present unable to give a definite answer 
(36 %). A breakdown by socio-demographic features , in-
cluding union membership, revealed only small differences. 
2.2.6. Profit-sharing not very widespread (see Table 8) 
In 1984 only one in six European employees (16 %) received 
a bonus or other form of share in profits . Even if confined 
to workers employed in private industry, the proportion, 
21 %, is relatively small. The fact that profit sharing can 
increase the ties between the worker and his company is 
shown by the following figures : of the workers who in 1984 
received a share in profits, 62 % were ready to accept a 
temporary cut in wages if their company was in difficulty; 
for other workers, this proportion was only 50 % . 
2.2. 7. Great interest in payment by performance 
(see Table 9) 
Over half the workers questioned (56 %) took the view that 
payment should be based not only on occupation, but also 
on personal performance. Just over a quarter (27 %) took 
a different view and argued that where the occupation was 
the same, the pay should generally be the same. More execu-
tives than other workers favoured payment by performance 
(75 % compared with 57 % of salaried workers and 52 % of 
manual workers). 
Interest in payment by performance is particularly pro-
nounced among those employees who were very strongly in 
favour of forgoing part of their income if the company was 
in difficulty (provided that profits were shared when the 
firm was doing better again) . 71 % of them are interested in 
payment related to personal performance, compared with 
only 43 % of those who opposed the sharing of profits and 
losses (see Table I 0) . 
2.2.8. Varying views on pay differences in the employee's 
place of work ( see Table 11) 
When asked whether pay differences where they worked 
correctly reflected the differences in personal performance, 
only 16 % answered with a definite affirmative and a further 
25 % considered the differences to be more or less sufficient. 
One-third of those questioned thought that it was too diffi-
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cult for them to give a definite answer to this question. But 
a quarter (26 %) thought the differences were too small, 
the proportion being the same in the different groups of 
employees (defined by sex, age, household income, occu-
pation and union membership) . Percentages varied more 
widely only when the answers were broken down by member 
country : France was the country where the differentiation 
of pay by personal performance was most frequently felt to 
be insufficient (35 %). The Danes showed themselves to be 
most satisfied (only 14 % gave the answer 'insufficient'): in 
Belgium and Ireland, too, the percentage of those questioned 
who felt that pay differences in their own company were 
insufficient was smaller than the Community average (18 % 
in each case instead of 26 % for the Community as whole). 
Employees in the public sector were on the whole only 
slightly more dissatisfied with wage and salary differences 
than employees in the private sector (29 % compared with 
25 % in the private sector). But if we confine ourselves to 
the respondents who had declared themselves in favour of 
payment by individual performance - 56 % in both the 
private and the public sector - an interesting difference 
emerges : in the private sector 44 % of these respondents 
considered pay differences to be sufficient and 30 % con-
sidered them insufficient; but in the public sector the answers 
were definitely more unfavourable (only 33 % answered 
'sufficient' and 38 % ' insufficient' ; see Table 12). 
2.2.9. The unemployed are even more prepared to work 
flexible hours than persons at present in employment 
(see Table 13) 
Five of the six questions asked were also put to a representa-
tive cross-section of unemployed people in the Community : 
in the main their answers differed only slightly from those 
of the employees. The only point worth mentioning is that 
a slightly higher proportion of unemployed persons would be 
prepared to work one Saturday a month or five evenings a 
month until 22.00 (42 % in favour and 27 % against, corn-
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pared with the percentages for persons now in employment 
of 38 % in favour and 34 % against) . On the other hand, 
the unemployed are somewhat less ready than persons now 
in employment to accept temporary wage cuts if the com-
pany is in difficulty (42 % compared with 51 %). Nor are 
they as interested in payment being related more closely to 
personal performance (50 % of the unemployed, compared 
with 56 % of those now in employment). However, it should 
be borne in mind that the percentage of unemployed people 
who were unable to answer these two questions was con-
siderably higher (17 % and 13 % respectively) than the per-
centage of employed people (6 % for each of the two ques-
tions) . 
Survey of young people, who have not yet entered working life 
( 16 to 24-year-old age group; see Table 14). As in the case 
of the unemployed, young people's answers differ relatively 
little from workers' answers . However, one feature is the 
greater interest of young people who have not yet entered 
working life, in flexible working hours: only 25 % (compared 
with 39 % of young workers in the same age brackets), 
prefer to work the same number of hours each day, while 
46 % (compared with 42 %) prefer a fixed number of work-
ing hours each month and 18 % (compared with 15 %) a 
fixed number of hours each year, to be allocated according 
to personal preferences and the possibilities within the com-
pany. Young people who are still undergoing training, are 
also clearly more interested in flexible working arrangements 
than employees of the same age group. With regard to 
solidarity with the firm (temporary reduction in wages when 
the company is in difficulty) and interest in payment being 
based on performance, rather than on the position, young 
people - like the unemployed - had somewhat greater 
reservations than persons in employment (45 % compared 
with 51 % in the case of pay cuts and 53 % compared with 
56 % in the case of payment by performance). But here too 
- as in the case of the unemployed - it must be borne in 
mind that there was a larger proportion of respondents 
who, perhaps because they had no work experience, were at 
present unable to give a definite answer. 
3. Company surveys 
3.1. Labour market survey in industry 
3.1.1. Methodological remarks 
The national institutions which carry out the monthly EC 
business surveys were responsible for the technical execution 
of the company survey (see annex). Altogether some 8 OOO 
industrial firms took part in the survey, which was carried 
out at the end of 1985. The results were weighted by size 
of company and main manufacturing activity, so that any 
deficiencies in the sample could be smoothed out. The large 
number of cases and the method of data processing ensure 
that the survey results are representative of European indus-
try. In the annex a breakdown of the survey results by size 
class within the main industrial groups is presented. 
Apart from Spain and Portugal which were not yet members 
of the Community when the survey wa,s designed, all the 
Member States except Denmark took part. 
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3.1.2. The present size of the work-force: Too many un-
skilled workers - but a shortage of technicians and 
technologists (see Table 15 and Graphs 4 and 5). 
On average for the Community, European industrial firms 
consider that the present size of their work-force is still 
slightly larger than needed, although the number of persons 
employed in European industry declined by some 20 % 
between 1972 and 1985. While 27 % of European industrial 
firms indicated that the present size of their work-force was 
too large, 11 % reported that it was smaller than needed 
and the remaining two-thirds or so that the present size of 
the work-force was about right. The excess of workers in 
European industry applies almost exclusively to unskilled 
workers (balance + 32)6 and - to a lesser extent - to 
office and sales staff ( + 19). 6 Shortages actually exist at 
Community level in filling specialized jobs ( - 5)6 and in 
particular jobs for technic;ians and technologists ( - 16). 6 
Broken down by member country, the scope for increased 
employment in industry is a t present higher than the Com-
munity average in the Netherlands and the Federal Republic 
GRAPH 4: Assessment of staff size in manufacturing industry by Member State 
% balances• 
- 30 
- 22 Staff size too small 
- 20 
- 10 -6 
0 NL 
10 8 8 
20 
30 
40 Staff size too big 
so 
60 
1 Differences of the percentage shares 'larger than needed' and 'smaller than needed'; for details sec Table IS. 
,Sour~: EC survey on employment and labour market, 198S/86, industry. 
EUR9 
16,S 
30 
- 20 
10 
B F 
0 
10 
18 20 
30 
38 40 
so 
58 60 
23 
Employment problems : views of businessmen and the workforce 
of Germany; in both countries the present size of the work-
force is considered as too small on the whole (balance 
- 22 and - 6 in the Federal Republic of Germany)6 • The 
Netherlands is the only Community country with a shortage 
of office and sales staff in industry ( - 5); 6 the only slight 
surplus is here among unskilled workers ( + 6). 6 In Luxem-
bourg, firms state the size of their work-force as about right; 
in the United Kingdom, Ireland and Greece, only a slight 
majority of companies describe the size of their work-force 
as too high ( + 4 in Ireland and +8 in Greece). 6 Far more 
industrial firms consider their work-force is too large, es-
pecially Italy ( + 58), 6 France ( + 38)6 and Belgium ( + 18). 6 
3.1.3. The trend of numbers employed in European industry 
is still weak (see Table 16 and Graph 6) 
On average for the Community, more firms reduced the size 
of their work-force in 1985 than increased it (32 % 'up' 
compared with 42 % 'down '; balance - 10). This negative 
result is largely determined by the downward employment 
trend in Italy (balance - 66), France (balance - 37) and -
to a far less extent - Greece (balance - 12). In all the other 
member countries the numbers employed in industry rose 
in 1985, especially in the Federal Republic of Germany, the 
Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg. 7 
GRAPH 5: As.wssment of staff size in manufacturing industry 
by occupational category at Community level 
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According to this survey, the expected average trend over 
the next 12 months for European industry is that employ-
ment will continue to decline slightly again mainly because 
of continuing labour-shedding in Italian and French indus-
try. But it must be borne in mind that when the survey was 
carried out (November/December 1985), the decline in oil 
prices and the associated effects on growth and employment 
were not yet clearly discernible. So there is every reason 
to believe that European industrial firms will adjust their 
employment plans upward in 1986. However, even then 
the overall employment trend would still be unsatisfactory. 
Hence the need to ensure that in future each percentage point 
of production growth has the effect of creating substantially 
more employment. The present survey may offer some poin-
ters in this respect. 
3.1.4. Why are no more people being employed at present 
- from the companies' point of view (see Table 17 
and Graph 7a/b) 
Companies give as the first reason the present and expected 
level of demand (coefficient 128).8 The corresponding coef-
ficient is higher than the average in Italy (154) 8 and the 
United Kingdom (153) . 8 Far fewer companies in the Nether-
lands and Greece blame the lack of demand for not having 
taken on more labour (coefficient 85 and 79 respectively). 8 
The data do not permit an accurate appraisal of the extent 
to which insufficient demand is perceived by the companies 
as more of a structural problem (e.g. due to saturation or 
an out-of-date range of products) or is primarily due to 
insufficient competitiveness on prices. But there is no doubt 
that in many branches the relatively high costs in Europe 
are an important factor. Companies give as the second most 
important reason for not being able to recruit more people 
the fact that price competitiveness is perceived to be insuf-
ficient (coefficient 99). 8 , 9 The Netherlands (coefficient 57)8 
and the Federal Republic of Germany (81)8 are the only 
countries where this reply is below the average. 
The third most important reason given for the Community 
as a whole is non-wage labour costs such as employers' social 
security contributions, sick pay, company pension schemes, 
etc. (95). 8 In some member countries - the Federal Republic 
of Germany is one of them - non-wage labour costs amount 
to almost 45 % of total labour costs and are equivalent to 
about 80 % of the direct remuneration for work done . In 
the view of firms , the adverse effect of non-wage labour 
costs on the level of employment is above the average in 
Belgium (153),8 Italy (138),8 Ireland (1 24) 8 and France 
( 115). 8 The German figure corresponds exactly to the Com-
munity average (95) .8 The United Kingdom (43),8 Luxem-
bourg (61) 8 and the Netherlands (62) 8 are at the lower end 
of the scale on thi s point. 
On the other hand, a far smaller proportion of European 
industrial firms blame direct wage and salary costs for not 
employing more people (74; 8 sixth most important reason 
of the 10 given) . The United Kingdom is the only country 
where direct wage costs clearly prevent more firms from 
employing extra labour than non-wage labour costs . In line 
with their usually higher share of wage costs, firms in the 
consumer goods industries and small and medium-sized 
companies in general feel direct and indirect labour costs to 
be more of an obstacle to recruiting additional workers, 
than does industry as a whole, on average. 
Firms considered insufficient flexibility in hiring and shedding 
labour as scarcely less important than non-wage labour 
costs: it is usually difficult and costly to dismiss workers or 
take new ones on as required (coefficient 92; 8 fourth most 
important reason of the 10 given) . Large companies (with 
more than 1 OOO employees) put forward this argument 
somewhat less frequently than small and medium-sized com-
panies. Insufficient flexibility in hiring and shedding labour 
was judged to be especially serious in Italy ( 151 ), 8 France 
(129) ,8 Belgium (113), 8 Greece (112) 8 and Ireland (100). 8 
The corresponding proportion in the United Kingdom (33) 8 
is the lowest. 
Company surveys 
Companies place only in fifth position the fact that the 
number of persons employed declines or at least does not 
increase as a result of rationalization and/or introduction of 
new technologies (84), 8 while public discussion often alleges 
that this is the prime cause of falling employment. This 
survey result coincides with empirical findings 10 that grow-
ing firms (i .e. those in which the work-force is increasing) 
are usually at least as active in rationalization as firms which 
are contracting or standing still. Although rationalization in 
growing firms can have the effect of shedding some types of 
Jabour, it is often only the precondition for expanding total 
employment in the firm , as a result of improved market 
prospects. 
An insufficient profit margin due to the high level of other, 
non-labour costs is seventh of the reasons given by firms 
(62). 8 In Italy in particular, the high cost of financing and 
other non-labour costs deter firms from expanding their 
work-force (1 I 5). 8 This cost component in particular is likely 
to be reduced in Europe because of the downward trend of 
interest rates and the cheaper imports resulting from lower 
oil prices and from the fall in the value of the dollar. 
Although 43 % of European industrial companies refer to 
the shortage of adequately skilled applicants as an important 
GRAPH 6: Employment trends in 1985 and 1986 in manufacturing indmtry by Member State 
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GRAPH 7a: Reasons for not employing more people in manu-
facturing industry at Community level (order 
given by assessment of companies which is ex-
pressed by coefficient) 
Coefficient of importance1 
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1 The coefl"icicnt ranks responses from O - all companies consider a particular 
reason to be 'not important' - to 200 - all companies consider a particular 
reason to be 'very important'; for details see Table 17. 
Sovrc~: EC survey on employment and labour market, 198S/86, industry. 
or even very important reason for not employing more 
people, this is only the eighth in importance of the 10 reasons 
given (coefficient 58). 8 According to company statements, 
the shortage of suitably skilled applicants is higher than the 
average in the Federal Republic of Germany (78),8 Belgium 
(67)8 and the Netherlands (65) . 8 In all the member countries 
there is a particular shortage of suitably skilled applicants 
in the capital goods industries; this coincides with the earlier 
reference to the shortage of technicians, technologists and 
skilled workers. 
In the opinion of the managers questioned the increase in 
sub-contracting of work (coefficient 20;8 ninth position) and 
insufficient productive capacity (coefficient 18;8 I 0th pos-
ition) are not very important reasons for not employing 
more people. 
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3.1.5. What changes in the labour market- independently 
of other factors such as demand - would be most 
likely to induce industrial firms to revise their em-
ployment plans upward? (see Tables 18 and 19 and 
Graph 8a/b) 
Most firms put shorter periods of notice and simpler legal 
procedures at the top of the list ( coefficient 84, I) . 11 Italian, 
Greek and Belgian companies in particular expect that such 
measures would increase employment. Firms clearly feel that 
they would be much readier to take on more workers if there 
was a prospect of being able to dismiss them again in a 
recession if they proved unsuitable, without long drawn-out 
and costly procedures. 
Companies saw the second most important change as being 
able to conclude more fixed-term contracts (coefficient 
70,8).11 21 % of European industrial companies expect this 
to have a significantly positive impact on their level of 
employment and a further 34 % expect at least a marginally 
positive impact. The expectations of German and Italian 
firms in particular (coefficients 95 and 94 respectively) 11 are 
higher than the average. Many industrial firms in the other 
member countries would also be ready to employ more 
people if they could appoint them on fixed-term contracts. 
However, the expectations of British, Dutch and Irish indus-
trial companies with regard to the effects on employment 
are lower than the Community average. The number of 
people currently working on a fixed-term contract basis 
in European industry is equivalent to only 2,2 % of total 
employment in industry. In the United Kingdom, the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany and in Luxembourg this percent-
age is lower than average (1 ,8 %, 1,9 % and 1,4 %). The 
higher proportion in Greece (5,9 %) is mainly due to the 
relatively large number of season-workers in the Greek food 
industry (see Table 24). 
Companies quote the greater use of fixed-term contracts 
almost as frequently as better trained job-seekers (coefficient 
70,7) 11 as a factor which is likely to have positive employ-
ment effects . According to company answers, a 'training 
offensive' seems particularly necessary in Italy (129), 1 1 Lux-
embourg (120) , 11 Greece (I 06) , 11 the Federal Republic of 
Germany (88) 11 and Belgium (84). 11 
Equally high on the list of company requirements is wider 
wage differentials (coefficient 67, 1; 11 fourth of the 12 
points) . In the view of Italian, Greek, Belgian and German 
industrial companies in particular, this would have a signifi-
cantly positive impact on employment. In the United 
Kingdom, Ireland and France, however, wider wage differ-
entials would not have significant positive effects on employ-
ment, according to companies' views. 
Company surveys 
GRAPH 7b: Reasons for not employing more people in manufacturing industry at Community level (% share of companies) 
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Somewhat surprisingly, companies see the greater emphasis 
on productivity in determining wages and salaries as only the 
fifth most important change in increasing employment plans 
for the Community as a whole (64,5). 11 However, there are 
wide differences between countries, Greece being the one 
extreme where companies see a chance for significant posi-
tive employment effects in case of a more productivity-
oriented wage policy (coefficient 165) 11 and the United 
Kingdom, the other extreme, where in the average of all 
industrial companies even slightly negative effects on the 
number of employed would be expected in this case (coef-
ficient - 8). 11 
Companies' answers are more homogeneous when consider-
ing whether lower wages/salaries for new starters would 
have a positive impact on the number of persons employed 
(coefficient 58,7; 11 sixth position) . In Italy (106), 11 Greece 
(99), 11 Luxembourg (73) 11 and Belgium (55) 11 this would 
induce more firms than the average to adjust their employ-
ment plans upward . On this point too , Dutch, British and 
Irish companies proved to be far more cautious (coefficients 
28, 11 38 11 and 38, 11 respecti vely). 
The next most important change, more flexible working time 
arrangements, results in a similar country profile (coefficient 
58,1; 11 seventh position) . This would induce roughly half of 
European industria l companies to revi se their employment 
plans upward and only 3 % of companies would be more 
likely to expect a negative effect on employment. British and 
Irish companies are again more scep tica l in their assessment 
of the resultant employment prospects. 
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GRAPH 8a: Importance of changes in the labour market in 
manufacturing industry at Community level ran-
ked according to expected impact on employment 
plans 
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Source: EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86, industry. 
Companies consider that the reduction of redundancy entitle-
ment (54,9; 11 eighth place) would on the whole make a very 
limited contribution to the employment-creation aspect of 
economic growth. The main exceptions are companies in 
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Italy (106), 11 Belgium (88), 11 Greece (87) 11 and Germany 
(65), 11 which feel that this measure would have more value 
for their employment plans than do all European companies, 
on average. 
Companies in most member countries - apart from Italy 
and Greece - expect that more temporary employment sub-
sidies for employing unemployed persons who have particu-
lar difficulty in finding a job, e.g. young people and older 
workers, would have a small effect on employment (53,9; 11 
ninth place). 12 
Firms consider that better service from public employment 
offices (better advice to and care of job-seekers; coefficient 
39; 11 10th place) would have relatively little impact on 
increasing employment. The expectations of companies in 
France (9), 11 the United Kingdom (14), 11 Ireland (15) 11 and 
the Netherlands (24) 11 are particularly low. By contrast the 
expectations of Luxembourg (94) 11 and Italian (80) 11 as 
well as Belgian (53) 11 and German (52) 11 companies are 
somewhat higher than the European average. 
On balance, the opmton of firms is that a reduction in 
standard weekly working hours, even if - as the question 
assumes - it has no effect on company costs, would increase 
employment only marginally (43 % of European industrial 
companies expect this to have a positive effect on employ-
ment plans, but 19 % would be more likely to cut back on 
labour; coefficient 36, I, 11 i.e. penultimate position). Italian 
and Greek companies in particular are very sceptical of such 
a measure; on balance, Italian industry would actually expect 
a distinctly negative impact on the level of employment 
(coefficient -37). 11 Firms in Germany (74) 11 and Luxem-
bourg (75) 11 expect the most positive effects on the labour 
market. 13 
Most European industrial firms also consider that the intro-
duction of (more) profit-oriented components in contractual 
salaries (coefficient 34,2, 11 12th and last position) is rela-
tively unimportant for more employment. British (2) 11 and 
Italian firms (10) 11 in particular expect this to have scarcely 
any positive impact on their employment plans. This result 
is especially sobering because many commentators see the 
greater sharing of company profits as a key to more employ-
ment. This, it is usually argued, would reduce the fixed-cost 
character of labour costs and mean that firms would be 
less likely to face excessive labour costs when business was 
difficult. Profit-sharing would also, it is said, have a positive 
impact on workers' motivation and hence on productivity. 
But many British and Italian industrial companies in particu-
lar are clearly suspicious of the positive employment effects 
of profit-sharing.14 
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3.1.6. European industrial companies state that they would 
take on approximately 3 % more workers if the 
proposed changes were to take place on the labour 
market (see Table 20 and Graph 9) 
The survey results have shown that the changes which are 
considered most important and their probable effects on 
employment differ from one member country to another. 
(Table 19 summarizes the measures, broken down by na-
tional priorities.) However, most member countries consider 
the following to be particularly important: shorter periods 
of notice, more frequent use of fixed-term contracts, better 
trained job-seekers, wider wage differentials, greater empha-
sis on productivity in determining wages and salaries, lower 
starting salaries and more flexible working hours. 
If economic policy and the two sides of industry were to 
translate the proposed measures into reality, 44 % of Euro-
pean firms would be induced to revise upwards 15 their 
employment plans for the next 12 months; on balance, an 
adverse effect on the expected numbers employed 16 (see 
Table 20) would occur in only just under 10 % of companies. 
So the probable net effect would be to increase employment 
in industry by some 2,7 %, the increase ranging from I % 
in Luxembourg to 7,3 % in Greece. Admittedly, these insti-
tutional changes cannot by themselves do enough to reduce 
the unemployment problem but their potential contribution 
is considerable and roughly corresponds to the effect on 
employment of two good economic years in industry. Nor 
would the increases in employment caused by such insti-
tutional changes on the labour market merely be a once-
29 
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GRAPH 9: Expected net effect of proposed changes in the labour market on employment plans for the next 12 months in manufacturing 
industry by Member State1 
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and-for-all effect; they would tend to make growth perma-
nently more employment-creating. In future, each additional 
percentage point of growth would therefore be reflected in 
higher employment figures than it is today. Everything 
points to the fact - which is supported by the results of the 
survey in retail and wholesale trade - that such institutional 
changes on the labour market could also have a positive 
effect on employment outside industry. 
3.1.7. Working time arrangements could be improved in 
over two-thirds of European industrial companies 
(see Tables 21 and 22 and Graphs 10 to 13) 
Only just over one-quarter of European industrial com-
panies consider present working time arrangements to be 
fully satisfactory. More than half the firms (56 %) see scope 
for small improvements and a further 16 % actually see 
scope for considerable improvements. In France and 
Belgium in particular, more than the average number of 
firms feel that marked improvements in working time ar-
rangements are possible (26 % and 28 % respectively) . 
In the past two or three years, approximately half the indus-
trial companies in Europe have introduced flexible working 
time arrangements, but usually only on a small scale. In the 
Company surveys 
next one or two years approximately half the firms expect to 
make organizational changes so as to achieve more flexible 
working hours. Italian firms in particular are expecting to 
make sweeping changes in this area in the next one or two 
years. 
Where more flexible working hours have been introduced 
in the past, or are planned for the near future, the main 
intention is to use plant more intensively (63 % of com-
panies) . The second most important argument is also one of 
greater company efficiency: to adjust more easily to demand 
changes (51 % of companies). A fa r Jess important reason 
is to compensate for a reduction in standard weekly hours 
(31 % of companies). The Federal Republic of Germany is 
the only country where this reason carries substantia lly more 
weight (1984 collective agreements in the metal-working and 
printing industries). Only about one-quarter of companies 
cited employees' preferences as the main reason fo r introdu-
cing more flexible working hours. But as the employee 
survey showed, more flexible working hours - especially in 
conjunction with shorter annual working hours - arouse 
interest among a large proportion of workers. 
Where more flexible working time arrangements have not 
as yet been introduced and are not planned fo r the near 
GRAPH l O: Satisfaction with working 1111'811gements in European indmtrial companies by Member State' 
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GRAPH 11 : Flexi"bility of working time arnngemeats in industrial companies by Member State 1 
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Sourct: EC survey on cmploymcn1 and labour mark.cl, 1985/86, industry. 
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GRAPH 12: Maio reasons lor flexible working time arrange-
ments in manufacturing industry at Community 
level I ( only if flexible working time arrangements 
already introduced or planned) 
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GRAPH 13: Maio reasons against flexible working time ar-
rangements in manufacturing industry at Com-
munity level1 (only if no flexible working time 
arrangements already introduced or planned) 
Answers in% 
39,4 
40 
30 26,6 
19,4 
20 16,5 
10 
0 
Technical Existins Legal or Working Induced in-
and/or or- working contractual time prefer- crease of 
ganizational timear- restrictions cnces of cm- total cost 
problems rangements ployees per unit of 
already n ••. output 
ible enough 
1 For details see Table 22. 
Source : EC survey on employment and labour market, 198S/86. industry. 
Company surveys 
future, the main reason given is technical and/or organiza-
tional problems (39 % of companies) . A further 27 % of 
firms consider that existing working time arrangements are 
already flexible enough. Employees' preferences against 
more flexible hours are not generally seen as an important 
reason; this coincides with the employee survey, which 
showed that workers seemed to be even more receptive to 
new working time arrangements than company manage-
ments. 
3.1.8. 3 % of all full-time jobs in industry can be split into 
part-time jobs without significant economic disad-
vantages for the company (see Table 23 and Graph 
14). 
According to the appraisal of the managers questioned, full-
time jobs can be split into part-time jobs without significant 
economic disadvantages in 41 % of European industrial 
companies. This proportion ranges from I O % in Greece to 
60 % in France. As a proportion of all full-time jobs in 
industry, firms consider that 3,3 % of full-time jobs, i.e. 
some 800 OOO jobs in the Community as a whole can be split 
in principle without economic disadvantages to the company 
(e.g. two part-time workers instead of one full-time worker; 
three workers instead of two full-time workers, job-sharing 
models, etc.). The percentage ranges from 0,3 % in Greece 
to 5,9 % in France. The introduction of more part-time 
working by firms would probably arouse great interest 
among workers, as shown by the employee survey already 
published : according to that survey, about 6 % of today's 
full-time workers would prefer to work for under 30 hours 
a week, even if this were associated with a corresponding 
loss of pay. Table 24 shows how small the proportion of 
part-time jobs in industry still is today in the member 
countries. Apart from Italy and Greece, where part-time 
work in industry is still traditionally the exception (pro-
portion 0, 7 and 0,6 % respectively), the proportions are 
particularly low in Luxembourg (0 ,9 %) and Belgium 
(2,9 %). The United Kingdom is the only country where 
the proportion of part-time jobs is already considerable 
(13,2 %); in the Netherlands and France, too , the pro-
portions are higher than average (6,9 % and 6,4 % respect-
ively). Worth mentioning is the high proportion of part-time 
workers in the large British industrial companies with more 
than I OOO employees (15 %) whereas in the other member 
countries part-time work is relatively most frequent in small 
and medium-sized industrial companies. 
Various surveys have shown that part-time workers ' pro-
ductivity is usually above the average. They are also gener-
ally absent less frequently for sickness or other reasons. The 
disadvantage in employing part-timers is usually the greater 
cost of providing a job and of administrative expenditure. 
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GRAPH 14: Split of full-time jobs into part-time jobs pcmible or not in manufacturing industry by Member State1 
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Sourct : EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985-86. industry. 
But on balance, opinion on part-time jobs is usually favour-
able.1 7 
The new results of employee and company surveys should 
provide encouragement for giving more priority than in the 
past to the creation of part-time jobs. However, part-time 
workers must not lose out in terms of wages, career, social 
security cover and retirement pensions as compared with 
full-time workers . 
3.2. Labour market survey m the retail and 
wholesale trades 
3.2.1. Methodological remarks 
In addition to industry, the retail and wholesale trades were 
included in the investigation . This seemed appropriate, since 
some 15 % of all workers in the Community are employed 
in this field: approximately 9 % in the retail trade and about 
6 % in the wholesale trade . Apart from their own important 
role as employers, the distributive trades are also especially 
significant for the present investigation, since they can to 
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some extent be taken as representative of the private services 
sector generally. The retail trade represents the more con-
sumption-oriented services, while the wholesale trade which 
has more than half of its activities centred in production-
related fields, represents a large part of the predominantly 
industry-oriented services. The findings of this survey there-
fore may be applied beyond the field of distributive trades 
and provide at least a rough idea of how changes in the 
labour market might affect the overall private services sector, 
in which rather more than 40 % of all workers in the Com-
munity are currently employed (the public services sector 
accounts for a further 20 % or so of those employed). 
For budgetary reasons and time constraints, the survey of 
the wholesale and retail trades could be carried out only 
in those member countries in which there were already 
established groups of reporting firms . The retail trade survey 
therefore covered only five Member States (Belgium, France, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the 
United Kingdom); with the exception of the Netherlands, 
the same member countries took part in the wholesale trade 
survey. A list of the national institutions which carried out 
the survey in the different member countries is provided in 
the annex. As in industry, the results were weighted by size 
of company, so that any deficiencies in the sample could be 
smoothed out. 
3.2.2. Detailed findings of the survey in the retail trade 
3.2.2.1. The number of persons employed is expected to 
show only a slight increase in 1986 
Retail firms in the Community expect t4at they will be able 
to cope with the sharp rise in private consumer demand 
expected in 1986 largely without altering their staffing levels 
or at best by taking on only a few additional workers. The 
picture broken down by member country is as follows : the 
slight upward trend in employment noted in the British and 
Dutch retail trades in 1985 is expected to intensify somewhat 
in both countries. In Belgium too, where numbers employed 
marked time in 1985, firms are planning to increase their 
work-forces slightly. By contrast, the numbers employed in 
the Federal Republic of Germany are continuing to fall. In 
France too, firms are planning to cut back on their work-
forces in 1986 (see Table 25 and Graph 15). 
GRAPH 15: Employment trends in 1985 and 1986 in retail 
trade by Member State 
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Company surveys 
On average in the five member countries studied, therefore, 
and despite the anticipated cyclical upturn in sales this year, 
only a tiny increase in the numbers employed in the retail 
trade is expected - an increase which will be limited to 
larger firms (i.e. those employing more than 50 persons). 
This underlines the need for additional measures to increase 
employment, all the more so as there is unlikely to be a 
sharper growth in private consumption in the medium term 
than that experienced in 1986. 
3.2.2.2. Which changes on the labour market would 
prompt Community retail firms to take on more 
staff than currently planned? (see Tables 26 and 
27 and Graph 16) 
First place in the list of desiderata at the European level is 
taken by lower initial wage rates (coefficient 70,2). 11 Even 
in those member countries in which other reasons were 
seen as rather more important, this requirement is included 
amongst the three regarded as most important by firms . 
Retailers thus give greater weight to this point in their staff 
planning than industrial firms .18 
Second place is taken by shorter periods of notice and simpler 
legal procedures in case of redundancies and dismissals ( coef-
ficient 62, 7). 11 In almost all the member countries taking 
part, this reason appears in one of the first three places; only 
in the United Kingdom did it rank only fourth among the 
total of 12 points noted. As in industry, where firms most 
frequently saw this as having a favourable impact on em-
ployment, many retail firms see the possibility of more 
employment if they are given greater freedom in the recruit-
ment and dismissal of staff. The proportion of firms holding 
this view is above average in Belgium (79 %), in the Federal 
Republic of Germany (57 %) and in France (51 %); the 
corresponding proportions were smaller in the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom (35 % in both cases) .2 However, 
only 1,6 % of Community retail firms expected such a 
change to have a negative impact on numbers employed. 
Third place in the retail firms' list of priorities is taken by 
wider wage differentials (coefficient ~3,2) .11 Unlike the two 
points already mentioned, however, opinions in the member 
countries differ more widely on this point. In the Federal 
Republic of Germany, firms attach by far the greatest signifi-
cance to such a change in the labour market; it comes first 
in their list of desiderata (coefficient 95).11 Even the Dutch 
retail firms , which generally placed less emphasis on changes 
on the labour market than their counterparts in other mem-
ber countries, attach great importance to this point (second 
place; coefficient 31 ).11 By contrast, it ranked in the lower 
half of the list of priorities (ninth, eighth and seventh places 
respectively) in Belgium, France and the United Kingdom. 
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However, this must be qualified in the case of Belgium: even 
though a number of other points were clearly regarded as 
being even more important in Belgium, 61 % of Belgian 
retail firms still see this as having a positive impact on 
GRAPH 16a: Posmble changes in the labour market ranked 
according to expected impact on employment 
plans in retail trade at Community level 
Coefficient of importance I 
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Souru : EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86, retail trade. 
employment. In the case of Belgium, it is also particularly 
difficult to classify the changes in the labour market put up 
for discussion according to order of importance, since nearly 
all of them were regarded as very important. 
As expected, small firms (those with fewer than five em-
ployees) attach much less significance to wider wage differen-
tials than medium-sized and large firms (see Table 26). 
More flexible working time arrangements were regarded in 
France as the most important single measure. On average 
in the five member countries surveyed, this point ranked 
fourth (coefficient 49, 1).11 Firms in the United Kingdom 
and the Federal Republic of Germany placed it no higher 
than eighth in the list of priorities. A breakdown by work-
force size categories showed that the larger firms in the retail 
trade (those employing more than 50 workers) are most 
interested in a more flexible arrangement of working hours. 
In these larger firms , this point lies third at Community 
level, after 'lower initial wage rates ' and 'shorter periods of 
notice' . 
On average in the fi ve member countries surveyed, tempor-
ary employment subsidies took fifth place ( coefficient 
48,2), 11 with retail firms in the United Kingdom, in particu-
lar, attaching great importance to this point (second place 
in the United Kingdom). By contrast, German firms place 
this point only I 0th in order of importance; in Belgium and 
France too, it comes in the lower half of the priority scale. 
Community retail firms clearly expect more frequent use of 
temporary contracts to have less of an impact on employment 
than industrial firms (coefficient 45,8 11 and sixth position, 
compared with a coefficient of 70,811 and second position 
in industry). The main explanation for this is probably that 
temporary activities (for example, for coping with seasonal 
peak demand) are already common in the retail trade, so 
that retail firms see less need to extend them than industrial 
firms. (The proportion of temporary workers in the retail 
trade amounts to some 5 % , compared with approximately 
2 % in industry.) 
There are, however, considerable differences within the fi ve 
member countries surveyed : while this point was placed in 
12th, i.e. last position in the United Kingdom, it ranked 
fourth in the Federal Republic of Germany and France. 
The retail trade also attached little importance to the intro-
duction of (more) profit-oriented components in contractual 
salaries as a means of creating additional jobs (seventh 
position; coefficient 43,0) .11 However, the retail trade did 
anticipate a somewhat stronger employment effect from this 
measure than industry, which placed it last. Belgian retail 
firms in particular were in favour of pay being more profit-
oriented. At the opposite extreme were retailers in the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, only a small minority of 
whom thought that they would increase their employment 
as a result of such a measure (ranked in penultimate position 
in both member countries). 
More flexible shop opening hours were viewed as having a 
positive employment effect by 39 % of European retailers 
Company surveys 
and as having a negative employment effect by only 7 % . 
Even so, this point was ranked in only eighth position 
out of the 12 possible changes listed (coefficient 42,4).11 
Surprisingly, it was the retail trade in Belgium, where shop 
opening hours are at present already the most liberal among 
the five member countries surveyed, that was most in favour 
of introducing further flexibility . Exactly half the Belgian 
firms stated that, if opening hours were more liberal, they 
would revise their employment plans upwards, while only 
GRAPH 16b: Possible changes in the labour market and their expected impact on employment plans in retail trade at Community 
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GRAPH 16c: Changes in the labour market ranked according to expected impact on employment plans by company size class in retail 
trade at Community level 
(Hatched columns: all sizes) 
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4 % would cut back on staffing. Firms in France and the 
United Kingdom were also very much in favour of more 
flexible opening hours and on balance expected them to 
have a distinctly positive effect on employment. By contrast, 
retailers in the Federal Republic of Germany and the Nether-
lands , in both of which opening hours are comparatively 
short and in addition fixed, felt that liberalization would 
produce little or no increase in employment (in the Federal 
Republic of Germany, 27 % expected a positive employment 
effect and 14 % a negative employment effect; in the Nether-
lands, the corresponding figures were 17 % and I % ; most 
respondents thought that such changes would not have any 
effect on employment or felt unable to say what the effect 
would be). 
The great majority of retailers do not appear to regard 
inadequate training on the part of job applicants as a major 
obstacle to employing more people. Taking the average for 
the member countries, the question of better training level 
was ranked ninth (coefficient 42,2), 11 compared with third 
place in industry. Somewhat greater importance than the 
average for the retail trade in the five member countries was 
attached to this point in the Federal Republic of Germany 
and the United Kingdom (fifth position in both countries). 
By contrast, there does not seem to be any significant lack 
of suitable applicants in the Netherlands and in France. In 
the case of the Netherlands, the situation here differs dis-
tinctly from that in industry, with many Dutch industrialists 
having reported shortages of skilled workers . 
Retail firms saw even less reason than industry to revise 
their employment plans upwards if redundancy payments 
were reduced (coefficient 38,5; 11 I 0th position, compared 
with eighth position in industry). Belgium was an exception 
here, however, with this point being placed third. 
A reduction in standard weekly working hours, even if neutral 
in its effects on costs, would in the view of retailers have 
only a comparatively small positive effect on employment 
(36 % of retail firms would employ more staff than initially 
planned , compared with 6 % who would employ fewer; 
coefficient 34,4; 11 11 th position). Retailers in the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands responded more positively 
than average on this point (ranked sixth and seventh). Larger 
retail firms (employing more than 50 persons) were as a rule 
more inclined to recruit new staff if weekly working hours 
were cut than were medium-sized and in particular small 
firms (employing fewer than 20 people) . 
As was the case in industry, retail firms thought that func-
tional improvement a/further employment offices would pro-
duce only a small increase in the numbers they employ 
(coefficient 26,8; 1 1 12th, i.e. last, position). This point ranked 
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slightly higher in relative terms in the United Kingdom and 
amongst small firms (fewer than 20 employees) , coming 10th 
in both cases. 
3.2.2.3. Changes on the labour market could have the 
effect of increasing the retail trade employment 
plans (see Table 28 and Graph 17) 
If the changes regarded by firms as important were im-
plemented on the labour market, 39 % of retail firms in 
Europe believe they would revise their employment plans 
upwards for the next 12 months; only 1 % of firms would 
expect the opposite effect, i.e. a reduction in employment 
plans. 
The additional question on the net effect on employment 
plans indicated a potential 3,2 % increase in employment. 
The figure - expected by the companies - has to be 
regarded as a maximum, however, which could only be 
reached if all changes proposed by the businessmen were 
implemented fully. The highest percentage increase was ex-
pected in Belgium (7 %) and in the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands (both 5 %). The smallest employment effects in 
relative terms were expected in Germany and France (1 % 
and 2 % respectively) . This result is rather surprising in that 
a considerably larger percentage of firms in France and the 
Federal Republic of Germany were in favour of changes on 
the labour market than was the case in the Netherlands, 
for example. However, as the above-mentioned expected 
employment trends in firms showed, the present expected 
trend in employment over the next 12 months is upward in 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom in particular, 
while in the Federal Republic of Germany and in France 
cutbacks in employment are planned. This suggests that, 
where a positive employment trend is already underway, 
changes on the labour market designed to bring about 
greater flexibility can trigger a stronger percentage increase 
than in the case of stagnating or declining employment. 
Changes on the labour market therefore play more of a 
backup role; only where there is a combination of growth 
and changes on the labour market can a significant contri-
bution to reducing unemployment be expected. 
3.2.2.4. More than one-third of European retailers think 
the rules governing shop opening hours should 
be changed (see Table 29 and Graph I 8) 
A greater than average proportion of retailers in Belgium 
and the United Kingdom expressed dissatisfaction with ex-
isting shop opening hours (47 % and 46 % respectively). By 
contrast, only I O % of Dutch retailers, 29 % of German 
retailers and 34 % of French retailers were in favour of 
GRAPH 17: Expected net effect of proposed changes in the 
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changes. This result is surprising, since opening hours are 
at present already considerably longer and also more flexible 
in Belgium than in the Netherlands, for example. It is also 
evident from this question that firms which have already 
become accustomed to more flexible working hours or more 
flexible use of staff are much more in favour of even greater 
liberalization than firms that have no direct experience of 
such flexible arrangements. 
Company surveys 
In so far as firms do want changes, the form most often 
cited is for complete liberalizacion of opening hours (23 % of 
firms in France, 22 % in the United Kingdom and 19 % in 
Belgium). Only 2 % of firms in the Netherlands and JO % 
in the Federal Republic of Germany were in favour of 
complete liberalization. The second most frequently expres-
sed desire was for opening hours which, although at the 
discretion of individual firms, were not allowed to exceed a 
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maximum per week (19 % of all retail firms in the United 
Kingdom, 17 % in Belgium, but only 4 % in both the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the Netherlands and indeed only 
1 % in France). The compromise solution - with late open-
ing until 20.00 twice a week - was favoured by much fewer 
firms (10 % of retailers in Germany, 7 % in the United 
Kingdom and 5 % in Belgium, with no firms whatsoever in 
France and the Netherlands in favour of this arrangement). 
Broken down by size of firm, the figures show that, while 
larger retail firms (more than 50 employees) tended more 
than other companies to favour greater liberalization of 
opening hours (50 %), only 16 % of small firms and 32 % 
of medium-sized firms supported a change in opening hours. 
Among smaller retail firms (employing up to 20 persons), a 
maximum limit for weekly opening hours was preferred, 
while in the medium-sized firms (between 20 and 50 em-
ployees) and to an even greater extent in the larger firms 
complete liberalization of opening hours was preferred. 
3.2.2.5 . 6 % of full-time jobs in the retail trade could be 
split (see Table 30 and Graph 19) 
As in industry, 41 % of retail firms take the view that the 
existing number of full-time jobs could be split into part-
time jobs without this having any significant economic disad-
vantage for them. In spite of these identical figures, such a 
step would have a much greater impact on employment in 
percentage terms in the retail trade since a higher percentage 
of full-time jobs in retailing could be split in each firm 
(overall effect: 6,1 % of all full-time jobs compared with 
3, 1 % in industry). A qualifying factor, however, is that the 
proportion of part-time workers is already substantially 
higher in the retail trade than in industry (some 36 % com-
pared with some 6 %; see Tables 31 and 24). If the number 
of full-time jobs that firms reckon can be split are expressed 
as a proportion of the total number of employees, the 
disparity between the retail trade and industry narrows 
appreciably (3 ,9 % compared with 2,9 %). 
When broken down by Member State, the proportion of 
full-time jobs in retailing that can in principle be split ranges 
from 4, I % in the Netherlands to 7,3 % in the United 
Kingdom. The high figure for the United Kingdom is all the 
more significant in that the percentage of part-time jobs in 
retailing in that country is already above the average (50 % 
of all employees compared with 45 % in Belgium, 36 % in 
the Netherlands, 28 % in the Federal Republic of Germany 
and only 22 % in France). 
Generally speaking, the larger the firm, the greater the 
percentage of full-time jobs that could be split (7 % in firms 
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with more than 50 employees compared with around 4,5 % 
in small and medium-sized firms with fewer than 50 em-
ployees). 
3.2.3. Detailed findings of the survey in the wholesale trade 
3.2.3.1 . Number of employees expected to remain 
roughly unchanged in 1986 (see Table 32 and 
Graph 20) 
Taking the average for the four Member States that took 
part in the survey, the number of employees will rise only a 
little in 1986; it is only in the United Kingdom that employ-
ment, hitherto set on no more than a slightly upwards path, 
will be somewhat higher in 1986. By contrast, in the other 
Member States surveyed (Belgi11m, Federal Republic of Ger-
many and France), wholesale firms expect staff size to re-
main unchanged or, if anything, to dip a little in 1986. This 
picture - rise in the United Kingdom, no change or slight 
decline in the other three Member States - characterizes all 
the size categories in the wholesale trade without exception. 
GRAPH 20: :Employment treads in 1985 and 1986 in whole-
sale trade by Member State 
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3.2.3.2. What changes in the labour inarket would 
prompt wholesale firms to revise their employ-
ment plans upwards? (see Tables 33 and 34 and 
Graph 2la/b/c). 
The profile of replies is only slightly different from that for 
the retail trade. For this reason, only the differences - in 
relation to the retail trade and industry alike - will be 
examined. 
As in industry, firms in the wholesale trade expect shorter 
periods of notice and simpler legal procedures to have the 
most impact on employment (coefficient 70,5). 11 In second 
place, and only a little way behind, come lower initial wages/ 
salaries (coefficient 63,0). 11 Thus, for the first two positions, 
the order of priority is reversed. Both the wholesale and the 
. retail trade are in agreement as to the third most important 
change, wider wage differentiation (coefficient 50,9). 11 A 
reduction in redundancy payments (coefficient 49,7) 11 would 
lead more firms in the wholesale trade to revise their employ-
ment plans upwards than would be the case in industry and 
the retail trade (fourth position compared with eighth and 
tenth position respectively) . In Belgium particularly, the 
wholesale trade clearly regards such a step as being of major 
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GRAPH 21 a: Changes in the labour market ranked by whole-
sale trade enterprises according to expected 
impact on employment plans - Total wholesale 
trade at Community level (EUR S) 
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significance for its employment plans (placing it in second 
position). 
Wholesalers also expect more profit-oriented wage/salary ar-
rangements (coefficient 44,9) 11 to have a greater impact on 
employment than do retailers and firms in industry (fifth 
position compared with seventh and twelfth position respect-
ively). There are no differences between the retail and the 
wholesale trade when it comes to assessing the impact on 
total employment of more fixed-term contracts (coefficient 
44,8). 11 This result is a little surprising in so far as the 
proportion of employees on fixed-term contracts in the 
wholesale trade (2 %) is at the moment no higher than in 
industry, whereas the corresponding figure for the retail 
trade is over twice as high (4,9 %). As mentioned above, 
this change was ranked second by firms in industry, a large 
number of which clearly felt a need for workers on fixed-term 
contracts. In the wholesale trade, however, the generally low 
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GRAPH 21c: Changes in the labour market ranked according to expected impact on employment plans - by company size clus -
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GRAPH 21c: (cont.} 
Medium-sized companies II (20 to 50 em-
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priority attached to more fixed-term contracts is confined 
to smaller firms, while firms with 50 or more employees 
place this change in third position. 
Better trained job-seekers (coefficient 43,6) 11 would, it is 
true, prompt a slightly higher percentage of firms in the 
wholesale trade than in the retail trade to revise their employ-
ment plans upwards (seventh and ninth position respect-
ively). However, the discrepancy in relation to industry, 
where this point is ranked third, is considerable. Evidently, 
the distributive trades, i.e. both the wholesale and the retail 
trades, experience much Jess difficulty in finding suitably 
trained workers than firms in industry. Like industry, the 
wholesale trade expects temporary wage and salary subsidies 
(coefficient 43, I) 1 1 in respect of unemployed persons diffi-
cult to place in employment to bring about only a small 
increase in employment (eighth position in the case of the 
wholesale trade and ninth position in the case of industry). 
Once again, it is only in the United Kingdom that an above-
average number of firms expect this factor to have a positive 
impact on employment (placing it in second position). The 
wholesale trade attaches less importance where employment 
is concerned in more flexible working time (coefficient of 
38,7)11 than the retail trade and industry (ninth position 
compared with fourth and seventh position respectively); an 
exception here is France, where more flexible working time 
is seen by firms in the wholesale trade, as well as by their 
counterparts in industry and in the retail trade, as making 
an important contribution towards resolving the unemploy-
ment problem (second position). Although neutral in its 
impact on costs, a general reduction in weekly working hours 
(coefficient 31,4) 1 1 also has a fairly low ranking in the 
scale of priorities for the wholesale trade ( I 0th position: 
coefficient 33). 11 Further down the rankings we find func-
tional improvement of employment offices (last-but-one pos-
ition; coefficient 27,2) 11 and more flexible shop opening hours 
(last position, coefficient 23,2), 11 neither of which is expected 
by wholesale firms to have any marked impact on employ-
ment. In spite of the relatively low impact on employment, 
41 % of the wholesale firms surveyed did advocate a change 
in opening hours, sharing a preference for complete liberal-
ization. Although a functional improvement of employment 
offices is ranked very low down, it would probably be taking 
too narrow a view to assess this change solely in the light 
of the foreseeab le direct short-term impact on employment. 
3.2.3.3. Possible impact on employment of changes in the 
labour market deemed to be just as large in 
percentage terms in the wholesale trade and in 
industry (see Table 35 and Graph 22) 
If the changes in the labour market envisaged by wholesale 
firms were to occur, they would revise their employment 
Company surveys 
plans upwards by 2,5 %; in comparison, the potential impact 
on employment was given as 2,7 % in industry and 3, 1 % 
in the retail trade. These, it should be noted, are maximum 
figures that could be expected to materialize only if all of 
the measures deemed important by firms were adequately 
implemented. This though is unrealistic since the protected 
rights of today's employed and the possible employment 
opportunities for today's unemployed have to be weighed 
in the balance, and here the labour-market demands of 
business are certain to be whittled down. Nevertheless, it 
was again evident in the wholesale trade that , provided 
managements and unions show sufficient willingness to 
compromise, additional employment opportunities could be 
significant. 
GRAPH 22 : Expected net effect of proposed changes in the 
labour market on employment plans for the next 
12 months - wholesale trade by Member State 
k===f=j Up 
% shares 
Tendency(% share of companies) 
CJ No change2 
0 
45 
50 
45 55 59 68 68 
100 5 0 2 0 
UK B EUR 4 D F 
% change Intensity (expected quantitative change m ~.) 
5 
5 4 
UK B 
1 For details sec Table 35. 
2 Including no answer. 
2 
EUR4 D F 
Source EC survey on employment and labour market. 1985/86. 
ezz;I Down 
47 
Employment problems: views of businessmen and the workforce 
GRAPH 23: Shop opening hours 
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3.2.3.4. Scope for splitting full-time jobs in the wholesale 
trade somewhat less than in industry and appreci-
ably less than in the retail trade (see Table 37 
and Graph 24) 
Compared with a figure of 41 % for both industry and the 
retail trade, 29 % of wholesale firms take the view that some 
48 
of their present full-time jobs could be split into part-time 
jobs without this producing any significant economic disad-
vantage for them. The foreseeable potential quantitative 
impact on employment, measured as a percentage of full-
time jobs, is slightly smaller in the wholesale trade (2,7 %) 
than in industry (3,1 %) and much smaller than in the retail 
trade (6,1 %). These differences remain even if the full-time 
jobs that can be split are expressed as a percentage of the 
total number of those currently employed (2,4 % compared 
with 3,9 % in the retail trade and 2,9 % in industry). Clearly, 
the wholesale trade, which at the moment accounts in Eu-
rope for some 11 % of part-time employment (compared 
with some 36 % in the retail trade and some 6 % in industry; 
see Tables 38, 31 and 24), feels there is less scope for 
increasing this percentage share than industry and the retail 
trade. 
GRAPH 24: Split of full-time jobs into part-time jobs possible 
or not in wholesale trade by Member State! 
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A detailed analysis can be found in the Commission 's Annual Economic 
Report 1985- 86, ' A cooperative growth strategy for more employment ' , 
European Economy No 26. 
Results in brief have been published in European Economy, Supplement 
B, October 1985 (employee survey) and Supplement B, April 1986 (survey 
in industry). 
Like any instrument of empirical economic and social research, surveys 
have their strengths and weaknesses. One advantage over econometric 
models, which are mostly fairl y globa l in their approach, is that they allow 
the potential reactions of economic agents (employers and employed) lo 
policy actions to be identified. Ultimately, changes in the eco nomy as a 
whole are dependent upon such individua l decisions. A di sadvantage of 
the microeconomic approach of surveys is that they do not a lways ta ke 
macroeconomic rela tionships and repercussions full y into acco unt. T his 
is one of the strengths of econometric models such as the Compact model 
presented in this volume. The two investi ga ti ve approaches can therefo re 
complement each other very usefull y. 
4 These percentage figures are calculated on the base of the da ta presented 
in Table 3; employees not specifying either their personal or their pre-
ferred working hours (in total 11 %) have been excluded from these 
calculations. 
The survey does not reveal whether it is primaril y evening o r Sa turday 
work which deters around ha lf the advoca tes o f the more fl exible manage-
ment of wo rking hours. 
Proportion of companies with too la rge a work-fo rce less the propo rtio n 
of companies with too sma ll a work-force. 
Denmark , which did not take pa rt in thi s survey, also belo ngs to this 
group. 
The coefficient was calcula ted as twice the propo rt ion of·very impo rtan t' 
replies plus once the proportion of ' import ant ' replies. The maximum 
value of the indica tor is hence 200; thi s wo uld be reached if all fi rms 
considered the reason in question to be 'very importan t'. 
The coefficient here is based on the data of eight Member States only. 
since thi s question was no t asked in the U nited Kingdom. 
1° Cf. Deutsches Institut fur Wirt scha ft sforschung (DIW), S 1rnk111rberich1 
(Structu ra l report) , 1984, Berlin ; also: Werner Friedrich and Eugen 
Spitznagel, 'Wachstum, Beschaftigung und Investiti onsta tigkeit im Yer-
arbeitenden Gewerbe' (Growth, employment and investment acti vity in 
manufac turing industry) in Bei1riige z11r Arbeits111ark1- 1111d Beru/'sfo r-
schung, No 49, Nuremberg, 198 1. 
11 This coeffici ent was calcula ted by do ubling the proportion answering 
'significantly positi ve impact on yo ur employment plans fo r the nex t 12 
months' and counting once the proport ion answering 'positi ve impact'; 
the proportion answering 'nega tive impact' was ded ucted fro m the first 
two. This coeffi cient can therefore ra nge from + 200 to - I 00. 
1 2 Experiences on the German la bour market in the peri od 1974 - 76 
confirm thi s scepticism towards temporary employment subsidies for 
problem cases. At tha t time onl y 6- 8 % of companies made use of such 
subsidies. There were a lso clea r indica ti ons of ·mecha nica l effects' in tha t 
the subsidies were mainly cla imed by companies which were doing well 
and wo uld proba bly have taken on additiona l la bour anyway. Apa rt 
from the low effects, in terms of numbers, even such measures were 
also unsuccessful a t that time in the Federal Republic of Germany in 
persuading companies to give grea ter preference to handicapped or older 
workers (see Werner Friedrich and Eugen Spitznagel, loc. cit. ). 
13 In Germany companies planning to increase employment in the next 12 
months (32 %) ra nked cost-neut ra l shortening of wee kl y working ho urs 
eighth on the prio rity sca le. Companies planning to decrease their staff 
size in the next 12 mo nths (1 8 % ) attribute significan tl y higher employ-
ment effects to thi s measure (first place on the pri o rit y sca le). Thi s 
reenfo rces the argument tha t shortening o f weekl y working hours is a 
mo re suitable instrument fo r saving ex isting jobs ra ther than crea ting 
new ones. 
1 4 In the UK there may have been a change in companies· assessment of 
profit -sharing schemes in recent weeks. The method suggested in thi s 
year's government budget seems to have been welcomed by a la rge 
number of British businessmen. The proposed tax incenti ves could poss-
ibl y lead to a higher employment effect of profi t-sharing than was 
expected by businessmen when thi s survey took place a t the end of 1985 . 
Footnotes 
1 5 By an average of 7 % or so. 
16 By an average of just under 4 % . 
17 W. Friedrich and E. Spitznagel, 'Growth, employment and in vestme nt 
acti vity in manufacturing ind ustry', p. 13. 
18 In industry, lower initial wage rates came only sixth in the li st of prio rities 
(coefficient 58,7). 12 
19 The figures given in brackets represent the sum of the two types of 
positive replies (' signi fica ntl y positive impact· and ' litt le pos iti ve impact' ). 
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Table 1 
Increase in pay or shorter working time preferred? 
Question: If the choice were offered at the next wage round, which of the following possibilities would you prefer? 
I. Increase in pay, for the same hours of work as now 
2. No increase in pay but shorter working time 
? Don't know 
Community level (EUR 10) 
Total of all employees 
Sex 
- Men 
- Women 
Age (years) 
- Under 25 
- 25-39 
- 40-54 
- 55 and older 
Family income (income pyramid) 
- Lower quartile 
- Second quartile 
- Third quartile 
- Upper quartile 
Function 
- Manual worker 
- White collar/office worker 
- Executive/top management 
Union membership 
- Active member 
- Only paying member 
- Not member but sympathetic 
- Not member and not interested 
Weekly working time (hours) 
- Less than 25 
- 25-34 
- 35-40 
- 41 and more 
Sector 
- Public 
- Private 
Member countries 
- Belgium 
- Denmark 
- FR of Germany 
- Greece 
- Spain 
50 
61 31 
62 31 
60 31 
67 28 
59 34 
62 31 
59 25 
62 22 
65 29 
64 30 
56 39 
66 29 
59 34 
62 30 
62 32 
60 34 
61 32 
62 30 
69 24 
67 24 
59 37 
68 27 
61 33 
61 30 
58 36 
38 51 
56 30 
68 26 
64 31 
Total 
8 100 
7 100 
9 100 
5 100 
7 100 
7 100 
16 100 
16 100 
6 100 
6 100 
5 100 
5 100 
7 100 
8 100 
6 100 
6 100 
7 100 
8 100 
7 100 
9 100 
4 100 
5 100 
6 100 
9 100 
6 100 
11 100 
14 100 
6 100 
5 100 
Employee survey 
Table 1 ( continued) 
2 Total 
- France 62 34 4 100 
- Ireland 78 19 3 100 
- Italy 55 39 6 100 
- Luxembourg 58 36 6 JOO 
- The Netherlands 46 47 7 100 
- Portugal 82 II 7 100 
- United Kingdom 77 19 4 100 
European Community (EUR 12) 62 30 8 100 
Source: EC employee survey 1985/86. 
51 
Employment problems: views of businessmen and the workforce 
Table 2 
Present and desired working time 
Question: I. what is your present working time per week? 
2. You sometimes hear that not everyone is fully satisfied with his/her current working time. Assuming that the present hourly 
wage rate remained unchanged how many hours per week would you like to work? 
( Answers in % ) 
Weekly working hours 
less than 20 to 25 to 30 to 35 to 41 to 45 No Total 
20 h 24 h 29 h 34 h 40 h 44 h and answer 
more 
Community level (EUR 10) 
Total of all employess I (actual) 7,5 4,8 2,8 3,8 55,0 12,4 10,2 3,4 100,0 
2 (ideal) 7,7 4,9 4,8 17,5 48,3 6,3 3,7 6,6 100,0 
Sex 
- Men I (actual) 1,5 1,3 0,7 2,8 61,6 16,3 13,4 2,4 100,0 
2 (ideal) 1,8 1,6 3,3 17,6 56,3 8,0 5,3 6,1 100,0 
- Women I (actual) 17,0 10,3 6,3 5,5 44,5 6,3 5,0 5,1 100,0 
2 (ideal) 17,2 10,3 7,4 17,3 33,5 3,5 1,2 7,6 100,0 
Age (years) 
- Under 25 I (actual) 4,7 3,1 2,4 4,0 61,1 11,5 10,8 2,4 100,0 
2 (ideal) 2,1 3,1 4,2 18,6 51,8 7,3 7,2 5,7 100,0 
- 25-39 I (actual) 8,5 4,7 2,2 4,6 54,7 13,4 9,9 2,1 100,0 
2 (ideal) 8,7 4,8 4,8 19,8 47,3 6,2 2,8 5,6 100,0 
- 40-54 I (actual) 6,9 5,9 3,5 3,0 55,5 13,0 8,7 3,5 100,0 
2 (ideal) 7,9 6,0 5,3 16,2 49,8 5,9 3,4 5,6 100,0 
- 55 and older I (actual) 9,7 4,2 4,1 2,7 46,2 8,1 14,9 10,1 100,0 
2 (ideal) 11,5 4,7 4,7 10,1 43,1 6,8 3,9 15,2 100,0 
Family income (income pyramid) 
- Lower quartile I (actual) 2,9 8,1 3,0 2,4 52,1 12,7 6,0 12,8 100,0 
2 (ideal) 6,7 3,5 5,8 9,4 53,7 7,7 0,8 12,4 100,0 
- Second quartile I (actual) 7,1 3,6 2,1 2,7 62,7 13,4 5,7 2,7 100,0 
2 (ideal) 7,2 4,5 4,6 17,5 52,7 6,1 1,5 5,9 100,0 
- Third quartile I (actual) 7,0 4,7 2,8 3,8 59,0 11,0 10,3 1,4 100,0 
2 (ideal) 7,2 5,2 4,5 17,3 50,0 7,2 4,9 3,7 100,0 
- Upper quartile I (actual) 6,1 4,0 3,2 5,0 54,1 12,8 13,5 1,3 100,0 
2 (ideal) 8,4 5,3 4,4 22,1 45,8 5,3 4,2 4,5 100,0 
Function 
- Manual worker I (actual) 8,6 4,3 2,4 2,3 58,5 13,3 8,7 2,0 100,0 
2 (ideal) 7,2 4,8 3,8 15,9 53,4 7,0 3,8 4,0 100,0 
- White collar/office worker I (actual) 7,4 5,3 3,5 5,0 57,3 11,0 7,9 2,9 100,0 
2 (ideal) 9,0 5,4 6,0 19,6 46,3 5,2 2,4 6,1 100,0 
- Executive/top management I (actual) 4,3 2,4 1,0 4,1 42,9 17,8 23,4 2,1 100,0 
2 (ideal) 4,6 3,3 3,2 19,1 41,7 8,4 11,1 8,6 100,0 
Union memberschip 
- Active member I (actual) 2,5 1,4 2,6 3,2 66,5 13,7 8,8 1,3 100,0 
2 (ideal) 3,5 1,6 5,1 24,6 51,0 4,9 5,6 3,7 100,0 
- Only paying member I (actual) 4,4 3,3 3,3 6,1 62,2 12,7 7,4 0,6 100,0 
2 (ideal) 4,3 5,4 6,8 18,5 50,8 5.7 3,7 4,8 100,0 
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Table 2 ( continued) 
Weekly working hours 
less than 20 to 25 to 30 to 35 to 41 to 45 No Total 
20 h 24 h 29 h 34 h 40 h 44 h and answer 
more 
- Not member but sympathetic I (actual) 9,5 6,1 1,9 3,2 53,1 12,3 10,1 3,8 100,0 
2 (ideal) 8,9 5,2 4,5 15,9 52,0 5,1 2,0 6,4 100,0 
- Not member and not interested I (actual) 10,0 5,5 2,9 3,0 49.0 12,5 12,1 5,0 100,0 
2 (ideal) 10,8 5,5 3,7 16,8 43,8 8,1 4,4 6,9 100,0 
Weekly working time (hours) 
- Less than 25 I (actual) 61,3 38,7 100,0 
2 (ideal) 50,7 24,4 4,4 2,8 13,2 0,5 1,6 2,4 100,0 
- 25-34 I (actual) 42,5 57,5 100,0 
2 (ideal) 8,8 12,7 27,9 35,0 9,9 0,2 5,5 100,0 
- 35-40 I (actual) 100,0 
2 (ideal) 1,2 1,8 4,0 22,7 63,5 2,4 1,1 3,3 100,0 
- 41 and more I (actual) 55,0 45,0 100,0 
2 (ideal) 0,8 0,4 1,0 9,8 46,7 21,8 13,1 6,4 100,0 
Sector 
- Public I (actual) 8,9 5,1 4,5 6,2 57,6 8,5 7,6 1,6 100,0 
2 (ideal) 9,6 6,9 6,4 19,5 45,6 4,3 3,0 4,7 100,0 
- Private I (actual) 6,8 4,6 2,0 2,6 53,6 14,5 11,5 4,4 100,0 
2 (ideal) 6,8 3,9 4,1 16,4 49,8 7,4 4,1 7,5 100,0 
Member countries 
- Belgium I (actual) 6,0 6,2 1.8 5,2 68,3 5,7 5,7 1,0 100,0 
2 (ideal) 6,2 5,5 7,3 22,6 46,5 4,7 1,8 5,5 100,0 
- Denmark I (actual) 4,4 5,7 5,7 5,1 60,5 5,4 9,5 3,8 100,0 
2 (ideal) 3,5 5,9 5,6 18,9 51,5 4,1 3,0 7,4 100,0 
- FR of Germany I (actual) 3,8 3,5 2,2 2,3 54,0 18,4 6,8 8,9 100,0 
2 (ideal) 4,7 2,2 1,8 13,9 54,9 8,1 2,2 12,0 100,0 
- Greece I (actual) 2,1 1,6 5,3 4,3 64,4 10,6 9,6 2,1 100,0 
2 (ideal) 2,1 4,3 8,5 20,7 54,3 3,7 2,1 4,3 100,0 
- Spain I (actual) 1,9 0,5 3,0 6,0 53,5 18,3 16,2 0,6 100,0 
2 (ideal) 4,4 3,0 5,6 13,9 55,2 8,5 4,5 4,9 100,0 
- France I (actual) 5,2 5,8 2,6 3,5 60,8 12,4 8,5 1,3 100,0 
2 (ideal) 3,8 5,6 3,6 17,6 53,2 7,8 3,7 4,8 100,0 
- Ireland I (actual) 4,0 1,4 2,2 5,0 62,9 15,1 9,0 0,4 100,0 
2 (ideal) 4,7 3,2 3,2 20,1 56,1 5,4 4,7 2,5 100,0 
- Italy I (actual) 5,3 4,3 2,2 4,6 56,3 10,2 14,9 2,2 100,0 
2 (ideal) 6,8 5,6 9,0 24,5 43,0 4,3 3,1 3,7 100,0 
- Luxembourg I (actual) 2,8 6,5 1,9 1,9 65,4 14,0 7,5 100,0 
2 (ideal) 1,9 8,4 1,9 8,4 66,4 6,5 2,8 3,7 100,0 
- The Netherlands I (actual) 11,2 5,3 2,7 4,9 53,4 6,3 12,2 4,0 100,0 
2 (ideal) 9,7 9,5 3,6 12,4 48,4 4,2 5,6 6,6 100,0 
- Portugal I (actual) 1,8 2,7 2,5 4,1 34,1 26,6 24,2 4,0 100,0 
2 (ideal) 1,9 3,0 4,1 16,8 42,6 19,5 3,7 8,4 100,0 
- United Kingdom I (actual) 15,3 5,4 3,8 4,5 47,2 10,8 12,2 0,6 100,0 
2 (ideal) 15,6 5,7 5,7 16,2 40,2 5,8 6,0 4,8 100,0 
European Community (EUR 12) I (actual) 6,7 4,3 2,8 4,0 54,2 13,5 11,3 3,1 100,0 
2 (ideal) 7,2 4,6 4,9 17,1 48,9 6,9 3,8 6,5 100,0 
Source: EC employee survey 1985/86. 
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Table 3 
Actual and preferred working time (micro analysis; EUR 10) 
( Answers in % ) 
Actual working time (weekly hours) 
Whole of wage-earners 
Less 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-40 41-45 More 
than 20 than 45 
Ideal working time (weekly hours) 
- Less than 20 74 14 13 6 1 
- 20-24 3 58 20 7 2 1 
- 25-29 5 4 44 16 4 2 
- 30-34 3 2 5 57 23 12 7 
- 35-40 12 15 9 10 63 50 42 
- 41-45 0 1 0 0 2 28 14 
- More than 45 0 3 0 0 1 3 26 
- No answer 3 3 9 4 4 4 9 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(% share of this category of actual 
working time) (7.5) (4,8) (2.8) (3.8) (55.0) (12,4) (10,2) 
Actual working time (weekly hours) 
Men 
Less 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-40 41-45 More 
than 20 than 45 
Ideal working time (weekly hours) 
- Less than 20 73 20 4 
- 20-24 1 51 2 7 1 
- 25-29 4 72 13 4 1 
- 30-34 9 28 19 60 21 12 7 
- 35-40 1 2 14 67 51 41 
- 41-45 I I 3 27 14 
- More than 45 4 1 3 29 
- No answer 8 5 3 5 9 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(% share of this category 1 of actual 
working time) (1,6) (1,3) (0,7) (2,7) (61,6) (16,3) (13,4) 
Actual working time (weekly hours) 
Women 
Less 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-40 41-45 More 
than 20 than 45 
Ideal working time (weekly hours) 
- Less than 20 74 13 15 7 3 5 
- 20-24 3 59 24 7 3 2 I 
- 25-29 5 5 40 18 6 2 
- 30-34 2 3 3 55 27 13 8 
- 35-40 14 12 10 8 56 50 47 
- 41-45 I 2 32 12 
- More than 45 4 13 
- No answer 2 3 8 5 3 13 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(% share of this category 1 of actual 
working time) (16,9) (10,2) (6,4) (5,6) (44,5) (6,4) (5,0) 
I The figures do not add up exactly to IOO% as between 2 and 5% of interviewed persons did not specify their present working time. 
Source: EC employee survey 1985/86. 
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Table 4 
Flexible working time 
Question: Let us assume that more flexible working time arrangements will be offered in the near future. Which one would you prefer 
assuming that the salary is the same? 
1. Same working hours every day 
2. Fixed amount of working hours per month but the number of working days and working hours per day could be agreed on 
according to production and/or work organization requirements 
3. Fixed amount of working hours per year but with periods of hard work which would involve long hours and other periods of 
shorter hours or holidays according to production and/or work organization requirements 
? Don't know 
Community level (EUR 10) 
Total of all employees 
Sex 
- Men 
- Women 
Age (years) 
- Under 25 
- 25-39 
- 40-54 
- 55 and older 
Family income (income pyramid) 
- Lower quartile 
- Second quartile 
- Third quartile 
- Upper quartile 
Function 
- Manual worker 
- White collar/office worker 
- Executive/top management 
Union membership 
- Active member 
- Only paying member 
- Not member but sympathetic 
- Not member and not interested 
Weekly working time (hours) 
- Less than 25 
- 25-34 
- 35-40 
- 41 and more 
Sector 
- Public 
- Private 
38 
37 
38 
39 
36 
37 
46 
36 
42 
39 
31 
42 
35 
30 
38 
42 
32 
39 
44 
40 
42 
27 
37 
38 
( Answers in % ) 
2 Total 
39 16 7 100 
38 18 7 100 
41 13 8 100 
42 15 4 100 
41 18 5 100 
41 14 8 100 
23 16 15 100 
33 17 14 100 
35 14 9 100 
42 14 5 100 
43 23 3 100 
37 14 7 100 
41 18 6 100 
43 21 6 100 
43 16 3 100 
37 17 4 100 
43 16 9 100 
36 17 8 100 
40 8 8 100 
32 18 10 100 
40 14 4 100 
42 25 6 100 
41 17 5 100 
38 16 8 JOO 
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Table 4 ( continued) 
2 Total 
Member countries: ~ '. l. i: . 
- Belgium 62 23 If 4 100 
- Denmark '48 - 31''' ''13 ' 8 100 
- FR of Germany 31 43· ·13 13 100 
- Greece , 73 · 14 · 11 2 100 
- Spain 54 27 11 8 100 
- France 34 41 23 2 100 
- Ireland 46 37 15 2 100 
- Italy 36 38 18 8 100 
- Luxembourg 33 45· 17 5 100 
- The Netherlands 44 38 12 6 JOO 
- Portugal 43 37 7 13 100 
- United Kingdom 39 39 16 6 100 
European Community (EUR 12) 40 38 15 7 100 
Source: EC employee survey 1985/86. 
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Table 5 
New working time arrangements 
Question: Supposing you were offered the following working time arrangements: 
You work for example one Saturday a month, or else you work five times a month up to 22.00 in the evening, and as a 
counterpart, your working time per year is reduced by 5% (that could be 2 hours less work per week in the average or else it 
could be two weeks more vacation a year). 
What is your personal opinion on such an arrangement? 
Are you I. very much in favour 
2. rather in favour 
3. rather against 
4. very much against 
5. indifferent 
? Don't know 
4 Total 
Community level (EUR 10) 
Total of all Employees 12 26 20 14 18 10 100 
Sex 
- Men 14 26 19 13 19 9 100 
- Women 11 25 21 15 16 12 100 
Age (years) 
- Under 25 13 29 21 11 19 7 100 
- 25-39 13 28 20 14 16 9 100 
- 40-54 10 23 20 16 20 II 100 
- 55 and older 10 19 14 15 20 22 100 
Family income (income pyramid) 
- Lower quartile 10 24 16 12 18 20 100 
- Second quartile II 26 18 16 19 10 100 
- Third quartile II 27 20 15 19 8 100 
- Upper quartile 17 25 20 13 18 7 100 
Function 
- Manual worker 14 24 20 14 19 9 100 
- White collar/office worker 12 28 19 15 17 9 100 
- Executive/top management 12 27 16 13 23 9 100 
Union membership 
- Active member 12 24 22 17 17 8 100 
- Only paying member 14 25 19 17 17 8 100 
- Not member but sympathetic II 27 18 11 22 II 100 
- Not member and not interested 12 26 20 14 17 11 100 
Weekly working time (hours) 
- Less than 25 II 27 18 17 17 10 100 
- 25-34 12 25 19 13 22 9 100 
- 35-40 12 26 22 15 18 7 100 
- 41 and more 14 27 17 12 20 10 100 
Sector 
- Public 13 26 18 15 18 10 100 
-- Private 12 26 20 14 18 10 100 
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Table 5 ( continued) 
4 Total 
Member countries 
Belgium 15 19 29 18 12 7 100 
Denmark 11 19 14 20 16 20 100 
FR of Germany 8 28 17 9 24 14 100 
Greece 26 20 12 18 15 9 100 
Spain 12 28 20 13 18 9 100 
France 14 33 23 13 13 4 100 
Ireland 25 28 II 12 13 11 100 
Italy 14 25 20 18 II 12 100 
Luxembourg 10 26 20 19 16 9 100 
- The Netherlands 12 20 19 29 12 8 100 
Portugal 12 31 16 2 25 14 100 
- United Kingdom 13 21 18 13 25 10 100 
European Community (EUR 12) 12 26 20 14 18 10 100 
Source: EC employee survey 1985/86. 
Table 6 
Connection between readiness to evening and Saturday work and preferred changes in daily working hours (micro analysis; EUR 10) 
In favour of: 
For or against more 
flexible working hours 
- same hours every day 
fixed amount of working hours per month but the number 
of working days and working hours per day could be agreed 
on according to production and/or work organization re-
quirements 
fixed amount of working hours per year but with periods 
of hard work which would involve long hours and other 
periods of shorter hours or holidays according to production 
and/or work organization requirements 
1 % share of this category. 
For 
28 
46 
55 
For or against more flexible 
organization of working time including 
evening and Saturday work 
Against 
44 
31 
23 
lndi!Terent/ 
no answer 
28 
23 
22 
( Answers in % ) 
Total 
100 (38%)1 
100 (39%) 1 
JOO (23%)1 
Example how to read the figures in the table: Of the respondents in favour of same hours every day (38% of all employees interviewed) 28% arc for more flexible organization of working time 
including evening and Saturday work. 
Source: EC employee survey 1985/86. 
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Table 7 
Solidarity with company in bad times 
Question: In some countries salaried people are accepting lower salaries when their company is in difficulty, with the understanding that 
when the company will do better, they will get a share of the profits. 
What is your personal opinion on such arrangements? 
Are you I. very much in favour 
2. rather in favour 
3. rather against 
4. very much against 
5. indifferent 
? Don't know 
2 Total 
Community level (EUR 10) 
Total of all Employees 18 33 18 11 14 6 100 
Sex 
- Men 18 31 19 13 13 6 JOO 
- Women 17 37 16 8 14 8 100 
Age (years) 
- Under 25 16 32 19 13 16 4 100 
- 25-39 19 36 19 II II 4 100 
- 40-54 16 34 18 9 15 8 100 
- 55 and older 19 23 12 10 20 16 JOO 
Family income (income pyramid) 
- Lower quartile 23 27 15 8 14 13 JOO 
- Second quartile 15 32 21 13 10 9 100 
- Third quartile 17 37 14 12 16 4 JOO 
- Upper quartile 21 36 18 9 13 3 JOO 
Function 
- Manual worker 19 31 18 13 14 5 100 
- White collar/office worker 17 35 19 10 14 5 100 
- Executive/top management 18 40 13 9 12 8 100 
Union membership 
- Active member 18 31 17 19 11 4 JOO 
- Only paying member 18 30 20 15 13 4 100 
- Not member but sympathetic 15 37 17 8 16 7 100 
- Not member and not interested 20 34 17 8 14 7 100 
Weekly working time (hours) 
- Less than 25 22 42 14 4 12 6 100 
- 25-34 18 36 16 14 14 2 100 
- 35-40 16 33 20 12 15 4 100 
- 41 and more 21 33 16 12 13 5 100 
Sector 
- Public 17 35 17 12 14 5 100 
- Private 18 33 18 10 14 7 JOO 
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Table 7 ( continued) 
2 4 Total 
Member countries 
- Belgium 13 26 28 17 10 6 100 
- Denmark 18 28 14 16 12 12 100 
- FR of Germany 7 31 18 8 25 II 100 
- Greece 25 18 19 17 9 12 100 
- Spain 23 32 17 9 13 6 100 
- France 22 41 16 8 11 2 100 
- Ireland 29 32 15 10 9 5 100 
- Italy 20 35 21 13 5 6 100 
- Luxembourg 21 31 26 12 6 4 100 
- The Netherlands 20 44 9 17 4 6 100 
- Portugal 14 42 18 16 10 100 
- United Kingdom 24 31 16 11 13 5 100 
European Community (EUR 12) 18 33 18 II 14 6 100 
Source: EC employee survey 1985/86. 
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Table 8 
Bonus or profit-sharing 
Question: In 1984, did you personally get some bonus or profit-sharing because of the performance of the company you work with? If yes, 
how much approximately was this bonus or profit-sharing? The equivalent of one week of salary, one month of salary? 
Nothing Less than I month's Not been working Total 
I month or more in 1984 
salary or no answer 
Community level (EUR 10) 
Total of all employees 77 10 6 7 100 
Sex 
- Men 76 11 8 5 100 
- Women 78 9 4 9 100 
Age (years) 
- Under 25 76 14 5 5 100 
- 25-39 79 10 6 5 100 
- 40-54 77 9 8 6 100 
- 55 and older 72 8 6 14 100 
Family income (income pyramid) 
- Lower quartile 78 7 3 12 100 
- Second quartile 78 10 5 7 100 
- Third quartile 77 12 6 5 100 
- Upper quartile 78 9 10 3 100 
Function 
- Manual Worker 77 12 5 6 100 
- White collar/office worker 79 9 7 5 100 
- Executive/top management 65 10 20 5 100 
Union membership 
- Active member 78 9 8 5 100 
- Only paying member 79 12 6 3 100 
- Not member but sympathetic 77 8 6 9 100 
- Not member and not interested 76 10 7 7 100 
Weekly working time (hours) 
- Less than 25 85 7 2 6 100 
- 25-34 86 8 2 4 100 
- 35-40 79 12 6 3 100 
- 41 and more 71 10 12 7 100 
Sector 
- Public 89 4 4 3 100 
- Private 71 13 8 8 100 
Member countries: 
- Belgium 81 11 5 3 100 
- Denmark 87 3 2 8 100 
- FR of Germany 79 4 6 II 100 
- Greece 76 9 4 II 100 
- Spain 71 7 7 15 100 
- France 71 14 10 5 100 
- Ireland 77 10 6 7 100 
- Italy 85 8 2 5 100 
- Luxembourg 69 10 18 3 100 
- The Netherlands 77 8 12 3 100 
- Portugal 84 5 5 6 100 
- United Kingdom 73 16 8 3 100 
European Community (EUR 12) 77 10 6 7 100 
Source: EC employee survey 1985/86. 
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Table 9 
Salaries according to personal efficiency 
Question: In some places, individual salaries for the same job are different according to the personal efficiency at work of the people. 
What is your opinion on such an arrangement? 
Are you I. very much in favour 
2. rather in favour 
3. rather against 
4. very much against 
5. indifferent 
? Don't know 
4 Total 
Community level (EUR 10) 
Total of all Employees 24 32 16 11 II 6 100 
Sex 
- Men 26 31 16 11 11 5 100 
- Women 21 34 17 12 9 7 100 
Age (years) 
- Under 25 22 33 16 13 12 4 100 
- 25-39 25 32 17 13 9 4 100 
- 40-54 22 32 18 10 12 6 100 
- 55 and older 30 29 II 8 8 14 100 
Family income (income pyramid) 
- Lower quartile 18 31 18 10 13 10 100 
- Second quartile 18 34 16 II 14 7 100 
- Third quartile 24 32 16 13 10 5 100 
- Upper quartile 31 32 16 II 8 2 100 
Function 
- Manual worker 23 29 19 13 12 4 100 
- White collar/office worker 23 34 16 12 10 5 100 
- Executive/top management 45 30 9 7 5 4 100 
Union membership 
- Active member 21 31 19 17 8 4 100 
- Only paying member 25 28 17 14 12 4 100 
- Not member but sympathetic 21 34 17 10 12 6 100 
- Not member and not interested 28 33 15 10 8 6 100 
Weekly working time (hours) 
- Less than 25 22 37 16 10 10 5 100 
- 25-34 27 27 15 14 13 4 100 
- 35-40 23 32 18 12 12 3 100 
- 41 and more 31 32 15 10 8 4 100 
Sector 
- Public 24 32 19 12 9 4 100 
- Private 24 32 15 II II 7 100 
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Table 9 ( continued) 
2 4 
Member countries 
Belgium 17 26 27 12 13 
Denmark 25 20 II 26 8 
FR of Germany 17 33 13 10 19 
Greece 36 26 13 12 5 
Spain 26 31 15 15 7 
France 24 37 20 II 6 
Ireland 31 32 15 8 8 
Italy 27 34 18 II 4 
Luxembourg 30 24 14 21 8 
Netherlands 20 41 13 18 4 
Portugal 10 43 19 5 16 
United Kingdom 32 26 16 II II 
European Community (EUR 12) 24 32 16 II II 
Source: EC employee survey 1985/86. 
Table 10 
Connection between interest in payment r41lated to profits and/or losses and to performance (micro analysis; EUR 10) 
For or against a temporary reduction in pay if the employee's company is in difficulty 
(provided that the employee later shares in the profits when the firm is doing better again) 
- Very much in favour 
- Rather in favour 
- Rather against 
- Very much against 
Total 
In 
favour 
71 
59 
51 
43 
46 
1 % share of this category; the figures do not add up to 100% because 20% of the respondents had no definite opinion: 
For or against wages or salary 
being in accordance with 
personal performance 
Against Undecided/ 
no answer 
23 6 
27 14 
35 14 
46 10 
27 17 
Employee survey 
Total 
5 100 
10 100 
8 100 
8 100 
6 100 
2 100 
6 100 
6 100 
3 100 
4 100 
7 100 
4 100 
6 100 
( Answers in % ) 
Total 
100 (18%)' 
100 (33%) 1 
100 (18%) 1 
100 (11%)1 
100 (100%) 
How to read the table (example): of the respondents very much in favour of profit and loss sharing ( 18% of total employees) 71 % arc also in favour or payment by personal performance. 
Source: EC employee survey 1985/86. 
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Table 11 
Wage differences at place of work 
Question: At your place of work, would you say that the differences in pay between people who are more efficient and the other people 
are: 
I. fully sufficient 
2. more or less sufficient 
3. not sufficient 
4. other answer (volunteered) 
? Don't know 
2 4 Total 
Community level (EUR 10 
Total of all employees 16 25 26 15 18 100 
Sex 
- Men 16 27 28 14 15 100 
- Women 15 22 24 17 22 100 
Age (years) 
- Under 25 16 24 23 17 20 100 
- 25-39 17 25 28 15 15 100 
- 40-54 17 27 25 14 17 100 
- 55 and other 8 18 28 18 28 100 
Family income (income pyramid) 
- Lower quartile 13 27 25 11 24 100 
- Second quartile 15 24 24 18 19 100 
- Third quartile 15 26 28 16 15 100 
- Upper quartile 18 26 29 14 13 100 
Function 
- Manual worker 16 25 26 14 19 100 
- White collar/office worker 15 26 27 16 16 100 
- Executive/top management 25 24 30 12 9 100 
Union membership 
- Active member 14 25 29 16 16 100 
- Only paying member 21 20 26 17 16 100 
- Not member but sympathetic 15 25 25 16 19 100 
- Not member and not interested 13 28 28 14 17 100 
Weekly working time (hours) 
- Less than 25 14 22 19 22 23 100 
- 25-34 14 18 30 15 23 100 
- 35-40 16 26 30 15 13 100 
- 41 and more 18 28 25 15 14 100 
Sector 
- Public 16 21 29 19 15 100 
- Private 15 27 25 13 20 100 
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Table 11 ( continued) 
Member countries 
Belgium 25 
Denmark 28 
FR of Germany 17 
Greece 32 
Spain 18 
France 18 
Ireland 15 
Italy 6 
Luxembourg 28 
Netherlands 26 
Portugal 13 
United Kingdom 13 
European Community (EUR 12) 16 
Source: EC employee survey 1985/86. 
Table 12 
Connection between assessment of wage differentials and general 
interest in payment by performance (micro-analysis; EUR 10) 
% assess the differences 
in payment where 
they work to be 
Fully sufficient 
More or less sufficient 
Not sufficient 
- Other response 
- No answer 
{ Answas in % ) 
Amongst employees who are in favour of payment 
by performance ... 
Total Public Private 
(56%) 1 sector sector 
(56%) 1 (56%) 1 
15} 12} 16 l 41 33 I 44 
26 21 28 
33 38 30 
13 17 12 
13 12 14 
100 100 100 
1 % share of employees in favour of payment by performance in this category. 
How to read the figures in the table (example): Of all respondents in favour of payment by 
performance (56% in total) 15% assess the differences in payment at the place where they 
work to be ru!ly sufficient. 
Source: EC employee survey 1985/86. 
Employee survey 
4 Total 
33 18 10 14 100 
13 14 19 26 100 
30 23 9 21 100 
22 26 3 17 100 
23 29 12 12 100 
20 33 16 13 100 
28 18 12 27 100 
24 26 28 16 100 
18 22 20 12 100 
29 23 10 12 100 
29 20 I 37 100 
23 28 15 21 100 
25 26 14 19 100 
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Table 13 
Survey results of unemployed, European Community (EUR 12) 
Questions: 
Total of all 
employees 
Unemployed 
You sometimes hear that not everyone is fully satisfied with his/her current working time. Assuming that the present hourly wage rate 
remained unchanged, how many hours per week would you like to work? 
Less than 30 hours 17 13 
30-34 hours 17 15 
35 hours and more 60 57 
Indifferent 6 15 
100 100 
Let us assume that more flexible working time arrangements will be offered in the near future. Which one would you prefer (assuming 
that the salary is the same)? 
Same working hours every day 
Fixed amount of working hours per month but the number of working days and 
working hours per day could be agreed according to production and/or work 
organization requirements 
Fixed amount of working hours per year but with periods of hard work which 
would involve long hours and other periods of shorter hours or holidays according 
to production and/or work organization requirements 
Indifferent/don't know 
Supposing you were offered the following working time arrangements: 
40 
38 } 53 
15 
7 
100 
41 
35} 49 
14 
10 
100 
You work for example one Saturday a month, or else you work five times a month up to 22.00 in the evening, and as a counterpart, your 
working time per year is reduced by 5% (that could be 2 hours less work per week in the average or else it could be two weeks more 
vacation a year) 
What is your personal opinion of such arrangements? Are you ... 
very much in favour 
rather in favour 
rather against 
very much against 
indifferent 
- don't know 
12 } 38 
26 
20} 34 
14 
18 
10 
100 
13 } 43 
30 
15 ,1 25 
10 
14 
18 
100 
In some countries salaried people are accepting to get lower salaries when their company is in difficulty, with the understanding that when 
the company will do better, they will get a share of the profits. 
What is your personal opinion of such arrangements? Are you ... 
very much in favour 18 l 51 13 } 44 
- rather in favour 33 J 31 
- rather against 18 1 29 16 1 27 
- very much against 11 J 11 J 
- indifferent 14 13 
- don't know 6 16 
100 100 
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Table 13 ( continued) 
Total of all 
employees 
Employee survey 
Unemployed 
In some places, individual salaries for the same job are different according to the personal efficiency at work of the people. What is your 
opinion of such arrangements? Are you ... 
- very much in favour 24 } 56 20 l 48 
- rather in favour 32 28 J 
- rather against 16 } 27 15 l 29 
- very much against II 14 J 
- indifferent II 9 
- don't know 6 14 
100 100 
Source: EC employee survey 1985/86. 
67 
Employment problems: views of businessmen and the workforce 
Table 14 
Survey results of students, European Community (EUR 12) 
Questions: 
Tolal 
of all 
employees 
Employees 
younger 
than 25 years 
Students 
(15-24 years) 
Let us assume that more flexible working time arrangements will be offered in the near future. Which one would you prefer (assuming 
that the salary is the same)? 
Same working hours every day 
Fixed amount of working hours per month but the number of 
working days and working hours per day could be agreed according 
to production and/or work organization requirements 
Fixed amount of working hours per year but with periods of hard 
work which would involve long hours and other periods of shorter 
hours or holidays according to production and/or work organiza-
tion requirements 
Don't know 
Supposing you were offered the following working time arrangements: 
40 
38 ) 
53 
15 
7 
100 
39 27 
41 ) 
56 
15 
45 ) 
62 
17 
5 II 
100 100 
You work for example one Saturday a month, or else you work five times a month up to 22.00 in the evening, and as a counterpart, your 
working time per year is reduced by 5% (that could be 2 hours less work per week in the average or else it could be two weeks more 
vacation a year) (Show card) 
What is your personal opinion of such arrangements. Are you ... 
- very much in favour 12 I 38 13 I 42 II } 44 
- rather in favour 26 J 29 I 33 
- rather against 20 l 34 20 } 31 17 l 26 
- very much against 14 I II 9 I 
- indifferent 18 19 17 
- don't know 10 8 13 
100 100 100 
In some countries salaried people are accepting to get lower salaries when their company is in difficulty, with the understanding that when 
the company will do better, they will get a share of the profits. 
What is your personal opinion of such arrangements. Are you ... 
- very much in favour 18 l 51 16 l 49 II } 46 
- rather in favour 33 I 33 1 35 
- rather against 18 I 29 18 I 30 16 } 24 
- very much against II I 12 1 8 
- indifferent 14 16 17 
- don't know 6 5 13 
100 100 100 
In some places, individual salaries for the same job are different according to the personal efficiency at work of the people. What is your 
opinion of such arrangements? 
- very much in favour 24 l 56 22 I 56 21 } 53 
- rather in favour 32 I 34 J 32 
- rather against 16 \ 27 15 l 29 17 } 27 
- very much against II I 14 J 10 
- indifferent 11 II 8 
- don't know 6 4 12 
100 100 100 
Source: EC employee survey 1985/86. 
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Table 15 
Assessment of staff size in manufacturing industry by Member State 
Question: In relation to each category of worker you employ, could you say whether the present number of workers in that category is 
larger than you really need - in relation to current and expected levels of demand - about right or smaller than you need? 
( rota/ indwary: answers in % ) 
B D GR F IRL L NL UK EUR 91 
Skilled manual workers 
.. larger 15 8 16 25 12 34 13 2 14 17 
.. about right 54 57 71 51 73 55 57 59 60 57 
.. smaller 31 33 10 16 8 II 29 31 20 22 
.. No answer 0 2 3 8 7 0 I 8 6 4 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Balance2 -16 -25 6 9 4 23 -16 -29 -6 -5 
Unskilled manual workers 
.. larger 34 15 26 53 18 77 20 14 21 35 
.. about right 45 77 62 36 67 23 79 58 65 56 
.. smaller 21 4 4 2 5 0 0 8 3 3 
.. No answer 0 4 8 9 10 0 I 20 II 6 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Balance2 13 11 22 51 13 77 20 6 18 32 
Technicians 
.. larger 3 7 10 9 5 9 14 2 4 7 
.. about right 72 60 73 67 66 77 49 55 55 64 
.. smaller 25 29 15 17 II 14 36 28 28 23 
.. No answer 0 4 2 7 18 0 I 15 13 6 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Balance2 -22 -22 -5 -8 -6 -5 -22 -26 -24 -16 
Office/Sales staff 
.. larger 15 II 19 35 13 51 15 4 16 24 
.. about right 77 81 71 56 76 48 81 76 70 67 
.. smaller 8 6 9 4 10 I 4 9 7 5 
.. No answer 0 2 I 5 I 0 0 II 7 4 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Balance2 7 5 10 31 3 50 II -5 9 19 
Management 
.. larger 6 5 18 7 9 10 I 2 13 8 
.. about right 90 83 69 70 80 89 95 80 71 79 
.. smaller 4 8 11 16 10 I 3 II 9 9 
.. No answer 0 4 2 7 I 0 I 7 7 4 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Balance2 2 -3 7 -9 -1 9 -2 -9 4 0 
Total 
.. larger 26 12 17 42 17 60 15 5 15 27 
.. about right 66 70 61 50 70 38 70 62 54 56 
.. smaller 8 18 9 4 9 2 15 27 11 II 
.. No answer 0 0 13 4 4 0 0 6 20 6 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Balance2 18 -6 8 38 8 58 0 -22 4 16 
1 Without Denmark, Portugal and Spain. 
2 DifTercnce of the percentage shares 'larger' and 'smaller·. 
Source: EC survey on employment and Jabour market. 1985/86, industry. 
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Table 16 
Employment trend in manufacturing industry, by Member State 
Question: What has been the trend over the last year and what is the expected trend over the next 12 months? 
( total industry: answers in % ) 
B D GR F IRL L NL UK EUR91 
Past 12 months 
.. up 45 43 21 27 33 11 46 41 37 32 
.. no change 27 37 43 6 33 12 21 38 26 25 
.. down 28 18 33 64 33 77 33 21 37 42 
.. No answer 0 2 3 3 I 0 0 0 0 I 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Balance2 17 25 -12 -37 0 -66 13 20 0 -10 
Next 12 months 
.. up 20 32 17 9 18 5 37 36 28 21 
.. no change 52 45 54 33 55 22 61 45 47 40 
.. down 28 18 28 57 25 73 21 15 24 37 
.. No answer 0 5 I I 2 0 0 4 I 2 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Balance2 -8 14 -II -48 -7 -68 35 21 4 -16 
1 Without Denmark, Portugal and Spain. 
2 Difference of the percentage shares 'up· and 'down·. 
Source. EC survey on employment and Jabour market, 1985/86. industry. 
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Table 17 
Obstacles to more employment in manufacturing industry by Member State 
Question: Following is a list of reasons which employers have given for not being able to employ more people. In relation to employment 
in your firm, could you say whether each reason is very important, important or not (so) important? 
(order according to the importance given by companies at the Community level) ( total industry: answers in % ) 
B D GR F IRL L NL UK EUR 91 
(I) Present and expected levels of demand for your 
products 
.. very important 52 43 26 37 58 62 56 29 65 50 
.. important 32 28 27 34 27 30 37 27 22 28 
.. not important 16 25 26 25 13 8 7 40 8 18 
.. No answer 0 4 21 4 2 0 0 4 5 4 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Coefficient2 136 114 79 108 143 154 149 85 152 128 
(2) Insufficient profit margin due to competlt10n 
(domestic and foreign), which does not allow 
sufficient prices3 
.. very important 42 25 40 44 46 37 34 17 33 
.. important 39 31 31 27 34 43 46 23 34 
.. not important 19 39 13 25 18 20 20 54 30 
.. No answer 0 5 16 4 2 0 0 6 4 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Coefficient2 123 81 Ill 115 126 117 114 57 100 
(3) Insufficient profit margin due to non-wage 
labour cost level (e.g. employers' social security 
contribution, pay roll taxes, allowances, etc.) 
.. very important 63 28 15 42 40 46 5 15 9 30 
.. important 27 39 33 31 44 46 51 32 25 35 
.. not important 10 28 27 23 13 8 44 48 50 29 
.. No answer 0 5 25 4 3 0 0 5 16 7 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Coefficient2 153 95 63 115 124 138 61 62 43 95 
(4) Insufficient flexibility in hiring and shedding 
labour (i.e. necessary redundancies/dismissals 
and new recruitment may be difficult and costly) 
.. very important 38 23 45 48 41 68 30 19 7 33 
.. important 37 33 22 33 27 15 26 32 19 27 
.. not important 25 39 19 15 30 17 44 45 58 33 
.. No answer 0 5 14 4 2 0 0 4 16 7 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Coefficient2 113 79 112 129 109 151 86 70 33 93 
(5) Rationalization and/or introduction of new tech-
nologies 
.. very important 24 II 19 31 21 27 36 16 30 23 
.. important 42 38 20 31 44 44 36 30 45 38 
.. not important 34 46 37 34 33 29 28 49 13 33 
.. No answer 0 5 24 4 2 0 0 5 12 6 
100 100 100 ·100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Coefficient2 90 60 58 93 86 98 108 62 105 84 
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Table 17 ( continued) 
B D GR F IRL L NL UK EUR9 1 
(6) Insufficient profit margin due to wage and salary 
levels in your firm 
.. very important 19 14 13 8 15 23 6 7 18 15 
.. important 52 45 36 39 61 50 53 24 41 44 
.. not important 29 35 26 49 22 27 41 65 30 35 
.. No answer 0 6 25 4 2 0 0 4 11 6 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Coefficient2 90 73 62 55 91 96 65 38 77 74 
(7) Insufficient profit margin due to other than 
labour costs (e.g. capital costs etc.) 
.. very important 12 7 32 18 8 43 4 6 9 17 
.. important 41 33 25 22 39 29 43 20 25 28 
.. not important 47 51 23 56 47 28 53 67 50 47 
.. No answer 0 9 20 4 6 0 0 7 16 8 
100 JOO 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Coefficient2 65 47 89 58 55 115 51 32 43 62 
(8) Shortage of adequately skilled applicants 
.. very important 16 25 13 8 6 3 9 21 17 15 
.. important 35 28 22 28 14 39 34 23 20 28 
.. not important 49 43 44 60 78 58 57 50 50 51 
.. No answer 0 4 21 4 2 0 0 6 13 6 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Coefficient2 67 78 48 44 26 45 52 65 54 58 
(9) Increase in contracting out 
.. very important 4 2 5 3 4 3 0 2 5 3 
.. important 22 10 5 17 8 13 24 17 17 14 
.. not important 74 82 59 76 86 84 76 74 60 75 
.. No answer 0 6 31 4 2 0 0 7 18 8 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Coefficient2 30 14 15 23 16 19 24 21 27 20 
( I 0) Insufficient production capacity 
.. very important 5 3 8 3 4 2 3 5 5 4 
.. important 19 II 15 7 19 7 12 14 13 10 
.. not important 76 79 50 86 76 91 85 76 64 78 
.. No answer 0 7 27 4 I 0 0 5 18 8 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Coefficient2 29 17 31 13 27 11 18 24 23 18 
Without Denmark, Portugal and Spain. 
Coefficient is calculated as twice percentage share 'very important' plus 'important'; the coefficient is thus in the range O till + 200. 
The question on 'Competition' has not been asked in the United Kingdom: the EUR total thus refers here only to eight Member States. 
Sources: EC Survey on employment and labour market 1985/86, Industry. 
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Table 18 
Changes in the labour market and their impact on employment plans in manufacturing industry by Member State 
Question: Looking at the list of possible changes below, which effect do you think each might have on your employment plans for the 
next 12 months? Significant positive impact/little positive impact/no change/negative impact/no answer 
(order according to the importance given by companies at the Community level) (101a/ indus1ry: answers in%) 
B D GR F IRL L NL UK EUR 9 1 
(I) Shorter periods of notice in case of redundancies, 
dismissals and simpler legal procedures 
.. significant positive 33 31 50 18 4 79 13 6 6 31.0 
.. little positive 41 32 26 30 31 9 41 41 22 25.7 
.. no change 25 34 14 34 62 II 45 49 66 37.1 
.. negative I I I 13 3 I I I 3 3,7 
.. No answer 0 2 9 5 0 0 0 3 3 2.6 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100,0 
Coefficient2 106 93 125 53 36 166 66 52 31 84.1 
(2) More frequent use of temporary contracts (fixed 
term, interim work, etc.) 
.. significant positive 30 23 29 13 3 47 9 4 4 20,7 
.. little positive 33 51 21 41 44 16 60 28 23 34.4 
.. no change 31 22 31 40 48 21 30 61 66 37.1 
.. negative 6 2 6 I 4 16 I 3 4 5.1 
.. No answer 0 2 13 5 I 0 0 4 3 2.7 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100,0 
Coefficient2 87 95 73 66 46 ~4 77 33 27 70.8 
(3) Better trained job seekers 
.. significant positive 26 26 43 I I 56 56 4 9 22.5 
.. Ii ttle positive 33 36 23 18 13 17 10 31 31 27.3 
.. no change 40 37 20 75 85 27 32 60 52 46.3 
.. negative I 0 3 I 0 0 2 2 6 2.1 
.. No answer 0 I 11 5 I 0 0 3 2 2.1 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100,0 
Coefficient2 84 88 106 19 15 129 120 37 43 70.7 
(4) Introduction of wider wage differentials accord-
ing to skills and working conditions 
.. significant positive 26 18 46 8 3 64 6 8 3 21.5 
.. little positive 38 40 33 21 15 16 43 32 14 25.6 
.. no change 31 39 5 64 79 20 49 55 75 48.0 
.. negative 5 I 3 2 2 0 2 I 3 1.6 
.. No answer 0 2 13 5 I 0 0 4 5 3.2 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100,0 
Coefficient2 85 75 122 35 19 144 53 47 17 67.1 
(5) Greater emphasis on productivity in determining 
wages and salaries 
.. significant positive 39 20 77 10 6 53 44 5 3 21.8 
.. little positive 34 45 II 28 33 26 28 31 14 29.6 
.. no change 22 30 4 51 48 20 25 55 50 36.6 
.. negative 5 2 0 6 13 I 3 4 28 8.6 
.. No answer 0 3 8 5 0 0 0 5 5 3.5 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100,0 
Coefficient2 107 83 165 42 32 131 113 37 -8 64.5 
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Table 18 ( continued) 
B D GR F IRL L NL UK EUR91 
(6) Introduction of 'initial wage rates' (i.e. lower 
wages salaries for new starters) 
.. significant positive 17 10 35 8 4 26 22 2 5 12.0 
.. little positive 36 34 31 32 30 55 31 25 30 36.1 
.. no change 43 53 22 54 65 18 45 68 60 47.9 
.. negative 4 I 2 I 0 I 2 I 2 1.3 
.. No answer 0 2 10 5 I 0 0 4 3 2.6 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 JOO 100,0 
Coefficient2 66 53 99 47 38 106 73 28 38 58.7 
(7) More flexible working time arrangements at 
company level 
.. significant positive 33 13 30 14 2 13 24 6 3 I 1.7 
.. little positive 27 38 31 48 14 58 29 30 19 38.1 
.. no change 35 43 22 31 81 27 46 56 69 43.8 
.. negative 5 3 2 2 2 2 I 3 6 3.3 
.. No answer 0 3 15 5 I 0 0 5 3 3.1 
100 JOO 100 100 100 100 100 JOO 100 100,0 
Coefficient2 88 61 89 74 16 82 76 39 19 58.1 
(8) Reduction of redundancy payments that may 
have to be paid 
.. significant positive 26 21 28 7 3 29 7 I 6 16.0 
.. little positive 37 25 33 15 30 49 45 II 17 25.8 
.. no change 36 50 24 67 63 21 48 80 71 52.6 
.. negative I 2 2 6 3 I 0 I 4 2.9 
.. No answer 0 2 13 5 . I 0 0 7 2 2.6 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 JOO 100 100,0 
Coefficient2 88 65 87 23 33 106 59 12 25 54,9 
(9) (Higher) temporary employment subsides for 
employing unemployed persons, who have par-
ticular difficulties in finding a job, (e.g. young 
people, women, older workers, etc.) 
.. significant positive 7 7 24 3 2 47 6 2 7 13.7 
.. little positive 29 26 27 18 40 24 22 23 40 27.5 
.. no change 54 64 31 74 57 29 70 71 50 55.4 
.. negative 10 I 4 0 I 0 2 0 I 1.0 
.. No answer 0 2 14 5 0 0 0 4 2 2.5 
100 100 100 100 100 JOO 100 100 100 100,0 
Coefficient2 33 39 71 24 43 118 32 27 53 53.9 
(10) Functional improvement of public employment 
offices (better services provided by official em-
ployment agencies regarding job-seekers, pro-
fessional training, etc.) 
.. significant positive 11 9 9 I 0 17 33 2 2 7.2 
.. little positive 32 34 22 8 15 46 28 20 10 24.9 
.. no change 56 54 51 85 85 37 39 73 85 64.5 
.. negative I 0 l I 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 
.. No answer 0 3 17 5 0 0 0 5 3 3.2 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100,0 
Coefficient2 53 52 39 9 15 80 94 24 14 39.0 
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(11) Reduction in standard weekly working hours 
without increasing total production costs (i.e. 
cost-neutral) 
.. significant positive 
.. little positive 
.. no change 
.. negative 
.. No answer 
Coefficient2 
(12) Introduction of (more) profit-oriented com-
ponents in contractual salaries 
.. significant positive 
.. little positive 
.. no change 
.. negative 
.. No answer 
Coefficient2 
' Without Denmark, Portugal and Spain. 
B 
24 
34 
18 
24 
0 
100 
31 
38 
29 
2 
0 
100 
98 
D 
24 
36 
26 
10 
4 
100 
74 
12 
38 
43 
4 
3 
100 
58 
GR 
13 
20 
24 
28 
15 
100 
18 
27 
25 
29 
4 
15 
JOO 
75 
F 
4 
28 
56 
7 
5 
100 
29 
7 
30 
56 
2 
5 
JOO 
42 
IRL 
2 
36 
57 
3 
2 
100 
37 
4 
34 
55 
6 
I 
100 
36 
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3 
19 
16 
62 
0 
JOO 
-37 
5 
22 
51 
22 
0 
100 
10 
L 
36 
20 
27 
17 
0 
100 
75 
8 
38 
50 
4 
0 
100 
50 
NL 
6 
38 
47 
4 
5 
100 
46 
2 
23 
66 
2 
7 
100 
25 
UK EUR9 1 
6 
40 
43 
7 
4 
11.5 
31.9 
34.2 
18.7 
3.7 
100 100,0 
45 36.1 
2 8.1 
12 26,9 
68 52,5 
14 9.0 
4 3.4 
JOO 100,0 
2 34.2 
2 Coefficient is calculated as difference of the weighted positive impact ('significant positive impact' weight + 2; 'little positive impact' weight + I) and the negative impact (weight - I); the 
coefficient is thus in the range - I 00 till + 200. · 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86, industry. 
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Table 19 
Changes in the labour market and their impact on employment plans in manufacturing industry by Member State 
(Ranks according to employers' survey; rank I is the measure with the expected most positive impact, 12 the measure with the least positive 
impact; for details see Table 18) 
(total industry, ranks) 
Changes B D GR F IRL L NL UK EUR 91 
Shorter notice in case of redundancies/dismissals and 
simpler legal procedures 2 2 2 3 5/6 8 5 
More frequent temporary contracts 6 9 2 8 4 7 6 2 
Better trained job-seekers 8 3 4 II 11/12 3 5/6 3 3 
Wider wage differentials 7 5 3 7 9 7 10 2 9 4 
Greater emphasis on productivity in wage determi-
nation 4 5/6 7 2 2 5/6 12 5 
Lower initial wage rates 9 10 5 4 3 5/6 7 8 4 6 
More flexible working time 4/5 8 6 10 9 5 4 8 7 
Reduction in redundancy payments 4/5 7 7 10 8 5/6 9 12 7 8 
Temporary employment subsidies 12 12 10 9 2 4 12 9 9 
Functional improvement of employment offices II II II 12 11/12 10 3 II 10 10 
Reduction in standard working hours 10 6 12 8 4 12 6 3 2 II 
More profit oriented components 3 9 8 5/6 5/6 II II 10 11 12 
I Without Denmark, Portugal and Spain. 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86, industry. 
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Table 20 
Expected employment effect of proposed changes in manufacturing industry by Member State 
Question: What could be the net effect of all the changes described in Table 18 on your employment plans for the next 12 months? 
Up/no change/down; if up or down: by what percentage? 
Net effect next 12 months 
.. up 
.. no change 
.. down 
.. No answer 
Balance2 
up by% 
down by% 
overall effect (by % ) 
1 Without Denmark, Portugal and Spain. 
2 Difference of %-shares 'up' and 'down·. 
Source: EC survey on employment and Jabour market, 1985/86, industry. 
B 
44 
54 
2 
0 
100 
42 
6,0 
-1,0 
2,6 
D GR 
50 52 
46 36 
0 2 
4 10 
100 100 
50 50 
4,6 14,0 
0 0 
2,3 7,3 
F IRL L NL UK 
Answer in % (tendency) 
31 38 59 26 39 34 
39 56 2 73 50 58 
3 3 39 1 6 6 
27 3 0 0 5 2 
100 100 100 100 100 100 
28 35 20 25 33 28 
Change in % (quantitative) 
5,2 7,0 9,0 4,2 11,0 8,0 
-7,4 -11,0 -1,0 -12,5 -16,0 -6,0 
1,4 2,3 4,9 1,0 3,3 2,4 
EUR9 1 
44 
40 
9 
7 
100 
35 
6,8 
-3,6 
2,7 
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Table 21 
Working time arrangements at company leYel in manufacturing industry by Member State. 
Question: (a) Apart from the length of the standard working week, do you consider that the existing working time arrangements in your 
company are fully satisfactory/could be marginally improved/could be significantly improved? 
(b) Has your company increased or is it about to increase significantly the flexibility of working time arrangements? 
Last 2-3 years/Next 1-2 years 
(total industry, answers in%) 
B D GR F IRL L NL UK EUR91 
(a) Working time arrangements 
.. fully satisfactory 29 33 31 14 49 16 58 47 27 26 
.. marginally improved 43 52 53 55 44 72 26 33 57 56 
.. significantly improved 28 13 14 26 6 12 16 18 15 16 
.. No answer 0 2 2 5 I 0 0 2 I 2 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
(b) Last 2-3 years 
.. yes, significantly 17 19 9 16 7 15 19 II 12 16 
.. yes, slightly 36 33 27 31 24 43 26 20 34 34 
.. no 47 45 57 49 69 42 55 67 50 48 
.. No answer 0 3 7 4 0 0 0 2 4 2 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Next 1-2 years 
.. yes, significantly 15 5 3 20 3 63 17 10 7 19 
.. yes, slightly 40 31 27 50 28 16 32 II 37 33 
.. no 45 42 56 22 69 21 51 71 50 38 
.. No answer 0 22 14 8 0 0 0 8 6 10 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
I Without Denmark, Portugal and Spain 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/1986. industry. 
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Table 22 
Main reasons for and against flexible working time arrangements in manufacturing industry by Member State 
If flexible working time arrangements already introduced or planned 
( total indus1ry, answers in % ) 
Main reasons for B D GR F IRL L NL UK EUR 91 
(1) - to use plant more intensively 61 70 24 70 24 91 60 14 37 63 
(2)- to compensate for reduction m standard 
weekly working hours 25 66 14 19 2 15 5 11 14 31 
(3) - to reflect employees' preferences 25 42 16 30 14 4 46 16 17 25 
(4) - better adjustment to demand 42 46 17 67 23 86 48 14 30 51 
(5) - other reasons 8 8 3 6 3 2 0 I 3 5 
If no flexible working time arrangements already introduced or planned 
Main reasons against B D GR F IRL L NL UK EUR 91 
(I) - existing working time arrangements are already 
flexible enough 22 31 22 24 25 28 0 13 25 27 
(2) - legal or contractual restrictions 43 28 16 11 3 34 0 6 5 20 
(3) - technical and/or organizational problems 49 59 24 36 33 36 97 42 18 39 
(4) - working time preferences of employees 31 22 18 19 23 17 4 4 12 18 
(5) - induced increase of total cost per unit of output 12 17 22 9 18 30 70 9 13 17 
(6) - other reasons (please specify) 11 6 I 2 4 8 0 I 2 5 
I Without Denmark, Portugal and Spain. 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/1986, industry. 
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Table 23 
Split of full-time jobs into part-time jobs in manufacturing industry by Member State 
Question: It has sometimes been suggested that full-time jobs could be split into part-time jobs as a way of reducing the impact of 
unemployment. Such suggestions can take the form of two part-time workers instead of one full-time, 3 part-timers instead of 
two full-time, job-sharing, etc. Do you think any of the full-time jobs in your firm could be split into part-time jobs without 
significant economic disadvantages for your firm? 
No 
Yes: if yes, about what percentage of the full-time jobs in your firm could be split? 
B 
.. No(% share) 50 
.. Yes(% share) 50 
If yes: 
(a) 1-2 (%) 8 
.. (b) 3-4 (%) 14 
.. (c) 5-10 (%) 16 
.. (d) 11-20 (%) 8 
.. (e) more than 20% 4 
Average (% of total full-time jobs) 3,0 
I Without Denmark, Portugal and Spain 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86, industry. 
Table 24 
Structure of employment in manufacturing industry by Member State 
Full-time 
Part-time 
Total 
Of which on a temporary basis 
B 
97,1 
2,9 
100,0 
3,9 
D GR F IRL 
52 90 40 65 
48 10 60 35 
12 3 32 I 
13 2 32 7 
16 3 27 15 
4 0 7 6 
3 2 3 4 
3,4 0,3 5,9 4,5 
D GR F IRL 
96,4 99,4 93,6 95,9 
3,6 0,6 6,4 4,1 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1,9 8,4 2.2 4,7 
80 
20 
1,4 
99,3 
0,7 
100,0 
1,1 
(total industry, answers in%;% share) 
L NL UK EUR91 
49 61 66 59 
51 39 34 41 
46 5 5 II 
2 3 9 13 
2 10 9 13 
I 6 6 4 
0 15 3 3 
1,1 2,1 3,5 3,3 
(% share -/985) 
L NL UK EUR 91 
99,1 93,1 86,8 94,2 
0,9 6,9 13,2 5,8 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
1,4 2,9 1,5 2,0 
Absolute figures ( 1985, estimates in I OOO) 
Full-time 
Part-time 
Total 
Of which on a temporary basis 
1 Without Denmark, Portugal and Spain. 
Source: Estimates of Commission's Services (absolute figures): 
EC survey on employment and labour market 1985/86 (% shares). 
80 
713 
22 
735 
29 
7 358 667 4 191 
272 4 288 
7 630 671 4 479 
143 56 100 
183 4 348 38 755 4 818 23 072 
8 30 56 734 I 414 
191 4 378 38 811 5 552 24 486 
9 47 23 82 490 
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Table 25 
Employment trend in retail trade by Member State and company size class 
Question: What has been the trend over the last year and what is the expected trend over the next 12 months? 
(retail trade: answers in%) 
European Community (EUR 5) 
B D F NL UK Less than More than 
5 5-19 20-50 50 All sizes 
(total) 
employees 
Past 12 months 
.. up 31 13 35 22 31 9,1 16,2 25,0 33,6 26,1 
.. no change 38 61 30 63 46 77,0 59,8 45,0 29,7 47,4 
.. down 31 25 34 13 21 11,7 23,0 29,0 32,4 25,2 
.. No answer 0 1 1 2 2 2,2 1,0 1,0 4,3 1,3 
100 100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Balance1 0 -12 9 10 -2,6 -6,8 -3,9 1,2 0,9 
Next 12 months 
.. up 21 12 15 22 29 6,7 10,6 15,3 30,1 19,9 
.. no change 65 59 59 65 55 80,9 71,3 63,1 38,2 58,0 
.. down 14 24 25 7 12 8,8 14,8 17,2 25,1 18,5 
.. No answer 0 5 1 6 4 3,6 3,3 4,4 6,6 3,6 
100 100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Balance1 7 -12 -10 15 17 -2,1 -4,2 -1,9 5,0 1,4 
I DifTerence between the percentage shares 'up' and 'down'. 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86. retail trade. 
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Table 26 
Changes in the labour market and their impact on employment plans in retail trade by Member State and company size class 
Question: Looking at the list of possible changes below, which effect do you think each might have on your employment plans for the 
next 12 months? 
Significant positive impact/little positive impact/no change/negative impact/no answer 
(order according to the importance given by companies at the Community level; at the national level the ranking may be 
different). 
(retail trade; answers ;n %) 
European Community (EUR 5) 
B D F NL UK Less than More than 
5 5-19 20-50 50 All sizes 
(total) 
employees 
(I) Introduction of "initial wage rates' (i.e. 
lower wages/salaries for new starters) 
.. significant positive 35 26 11 3 16 12,4 23,3 18,8 17,8 17,5 
.. little positive 37 29 47 25 38 25,1 32,5 36,9 39,9 36,7 
.. no change 28 39 32 68 41 49,0 37,1 37,6 36,0 39,5 
.. negative 0 I 2 I 2 1,4 1,3 2,2 0,9 1,6 
.. No answer 0 5 8 3 3 12,1 5,8 4,5 5,4 4,7 
100 100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient 1 107 80 67 30 68 48,4 77,9 72,4 74,6 70,2 
(2) Shorter periods of notice and simpler 
legal procedures in case of redundancies 
and dismissals 
.. signific:ir.t positive 50 30 15 4 9 13,5 19,7 22,8 19,4 17,6 
.. little positive 29 27 36 31 26 -21.1 29,6 30,4 30,l 29,l 
.. no change 19 37 37 60 60 51,4 42,4 38,2 44,4 46,4 
.. negative 2 0 3 I 2 2,2 1,7 3,1 2.0 1,6 
.. No answer 0 6 9 4 3 11,8 6,6 5,5 4,1 5.3 
100 100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient I 127 87 63 38 42 45,9 67,2 72,9 66,8 62,7 
(3) Introduction of wider wage differentials 
according to skills and working con-
ditions 
.. significant positive 19 28 6 3 8 7.5 15,3 19,3 14,5 13,5 
.. little positive 42 39 23 26 22 15,8 30,1 33,5 31,2 28,1 
.. no change 36 28 62 67 62 59,1 46,1 41.7 48,0 51,4 
.. negative 3 0 1 I 4 3,4 1,5 0,9 0,9 1,9 
.. No answer 0 5 8 3 4 14,2 7,0 4,6 5,4 5,1 
100 100 100 100 100 100.0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100,0 
Coefficient 1 97 95 34 31 34 27.5 59,2 71,2 59,3 53,2 
(4) More llexible working time arrange-
ments at company level 
.. significant positive 32 16 15 2 3 6,9 9,3 11,0 14.1 10.6 
.. Ii ttle positive 31 26 45 22 24 16.9 19,5 28,0 36,9 29.8 
.. no change 32 48 30 70 67 61,5 62,0 52.8 41.2 51,5 
.. negative 5 3 1 3 I 1.7 2.5 2.8 0,5 1,8 
.. No answer 0 ? 9 3 5 13.0 6.7 5.4 7~3 6,3 
100 100 100 100 100 100.0 100.0 100.0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient 1 90 55 74 23 29 29.1 35.5 47.2 64.7 49.1 
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Table 26 ( continued) 
European Community (EUR 5) 
B D F NL UK Less than More than 
5 5-19 20-50 50 All sizes 
(total) 
employees 
(5) (Higher) temporary employment subsid-
ies for employing unemployed persons, 
who have particular difficulties in find-
ing a job, e.g. young people, women, 
older workers, etc . 
. . significant positive 21 8 6 2 11 8,1 10,9 13,2 7,0 8,6 
.. little positive 41 24 27 26 42 15,7 24,6 28,7 42,7 32,0 
.. no change 35 61 58 67 43 63,4 55,5 51,6 44,8 53,2 
.. negative 3 1 1 1 1 0,7 1,5 0,7 0,9 1,1 
.. No answer 0 6 8 4 3 12,1 7,5 5,8 4,6 5,1 
100 100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100_0 100_0 
Coefficient1 80 39 38 29 63 31,2 44,8 54,2 55,8 48,2 
(6) More frequent use of temporary con-
tracts (fixed term, interim work, etc.) 
.. significant positive 27 16 13 2 1 7,8 10,0 14,7 2,1 9,2 
.. little positive 38 37 35 20 18 17,4 19,6 27,0 36.6 28_5 
.. no change 31 39 42 75 76 61,3 61,7 50,4 47,4 55,3 
.. negative 4 I 1 1 I 1,2 1,8 2,2 0,5 LI 
.. No answer 0 7 9 2 4 12,3 6,9 5,7 6,4 5,9 
100 100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 
Coefficient I 88 68 60 23 19 31,9 37,7 54.2 54,3 45.8 
(7) Introduction of (more) profit-oriented 
components in contractual salaries 
.. significant positive 36 17 9 I 6 7,0 11,3 10,7 11.9 10.6 
.. little positive 32 33 38 15 15 16,6 22,0 30,5 28,4 26.5 
.. no change 30 38 44 73 66 61,2 55,0 49,5 46,0 51.6 
.. negative 2 6 I 4 6 2,1 2,8 2.5 6.9 4.5 
.. No answer 0 6 8 7 7 13,1 8,9 6.8 6,8 6,8 
100 100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100.0 
Coefficient I 102 61 55 13 21 28,6 41,8 49,4 45.2 43.0 
(8) More flexible shop opening hours 
.. significant positive 25 12 12 I 9 4,4 5,0 8.9 15.8 10.6 
.. little positive 25 15 36 16 37 12,8 19,1 27,7 36.4 28.6 
.. no change 46 55 42 78 45 63,1 59,0 48,4 38.2 49.2 
.. negative 4 14 2 1 7 7,1 11,1 9,2 5.5 1_4 
.. No answer 0 4 8 4 2 12.6 5.8 5.8 4.1 4.1 
100 100 100 100 100 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Coefficient I 71 25 58 17 48 14.5 18,0 36,4 62.6 42.4 
(9) Better trained job-seekers 
.. significant positive 26 18 4 1 8 5,7 13.5 15.4 9.7 10.1 
.. little positive 30 27 17 18 28 15,8 20,2 26.7 30.6 24.5 
.. no change 43 49 70 78 55 66.2 57,9 51.8 51.0 51.9 
.. negative I I 1 1 5 0.2 1.3 1.4 3.7 2.5 
.. No answer 0 5 8 2 4 12,1 7.1 4,7 5.0 5.0 
100 100 100 100 100 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Coefficient I 81 62 24 19 39 27,0 45.8 56.1 46.2 42.2 
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Table 26 ( continued) 
European Community (EUR 5) 
B D F NL UK Less than More than 
5 5-19 20-50 50 All sizes 
(total) 
employees 
(10) Reduction of redundancy payments that 
may have to be paid 
.. significant positive 36 21 10 I 7 10,6 14,3 15,2 12,6 12,4 
.. little positive 32 18 14 7 16 15,6 19,1 24,2 13,6 16,0 
.. no change 31 55 65 83 71 59,4 56,3 53,4 66,6 64,4 
.. negative I I 3 I 3 2,2 2,3 2,8 2,2 2,2 
.. No answer 0 5 8 8 3 12,2 8,0 4,4 5,0 5,0 
100 100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient 1 103 59 31 8 27 34,7 45,5 51,8 36,6 38,5 
(11) Reduction in standard weekly working 
hours without increasing total pro-
duction costs (i.e. cost-neutral) 
.. significant positive 13 16 4 I 5 2,9 6,4 9,1 11,2 8,0 
.. little positive 21 31 15 21 37 11,4 21,7 25,4 40,3 28,4 
.. no change 43 34 69 70 42 64,0 53,0 49,4 32,4 47,9 
.. negative 23 13 4 2 12 8,3 10,7 10,9 10,6 10,1 
.. No answer 0 6 8 6 4 13,4 8,2 5,2 5,5 5,6 
100 100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient I 24 50 19 21 35 8,8 23,9 32,7 52,1 34,4 
(12) Functional improvement of public em-
ployment offices (better services pro-
vided by official employment agencies 
regarding job-seekers, professional 
training, etc.) 
.. significant positive 13 8 4 2 5 4,3 5,8 7,3 6,4 5,7 
.. little positive 36 19 14 13 16 9,9 14,5 16,9 21,4 16,8 
.. no change 50 66 73 80 72 71,4 70,0 69,1 65,8 70,3 
.. negative I I I I 2 0,4 0,8 1,0 1,4 1,4 
.. No answer 0 6 8 4 5 14,0 8,9 5,7 5,0 5,8 
100 100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient I 61 34 21 16 24 18,2 25,4 30,6 32,7 26,8 
I Coefficient is calculated as difference or weighted positive impact ('significant positive impact'. weight + 2: 'little positive impact', weight + I and the negative impact, weight - I); the coefficient 
is thus in the range - 100 till + 200. 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market. 1985/86. retail trade. 
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Table 27 
Changes in the labour market and their impact on employment plans in retail trade by Member State 
(ranks according to employers' survey; rank is the measure with the expected most positive impact; rank 12 the measure with the least 
positive impact; for details see Table 26) 
(retail trade: ranks) 
Changes EUR 5 B D F NL UK 
Lower initial wage rates I 2 3 2 3 I 
Shorter notice in case of redundancies and simpler legal procedures 2 I 2 3 I 4 
Wider wage differentials 3 9 I 8 2 7 
More flexible working time 4 5 8 I 5/6 8 
Temporary employment subsidies 5 8 10 7 4 2 
More frequent temporary contracts 6 6 4 4 5/6 12 
More profit-oriented components 7 4 6 6 II II 
More flexible opening hours 8 10 12 5 9 3 
Better trained job-seekers 9 7 5 10 8 5 
Reduction in redundancy payments 10 3 7 9 12 9 
Reduction in standard weekly working hours II 12 9 12 7 6 
Functional improvement of employment offices 12 II II II 10 10 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86, retail trade. 
Table 28 
Employment effect of proposed changes in retail trade by Member State and company size class 
Question: What could be the net effect of all the changes described in Table 26 on your employment plans for the next 12 months? 
Up/no change/down 
If 'up' or 'down': by what percentage? 
(retail trade; answers in%) 
European Community (EUR 5) 
B D F NL UK Less than More than 
5 5-19 20-50 50 All sizes 
(total) 
employees 
Net effect next 12 months Answers in % (tendency) 
.. up 36 37 38 31 43 22,0 33,6 42,8 45,2 39,1 
.. no change 62 59 38 63 55 63,8 53,5 47,6 45,8 52,7 
.. down 2 0 I 2 2 0,8 1,8 0,6 2,0 1,2 
.. No answer 0 4 23 4 0 13,4 11,1 9,0 7,0 7,0 
100 100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Balance I 34 37 37 29 41 21,2 31,8 42,2 43,2 37,9 
Change in % (quantitative) 
.. up by% 19 3 7 16 12 22,8 10,3 7,l 4,6 8,5 
.. down by% 0 0 -17 -10 -9 -9,4 -8,5 -5,8 -5,l -8,0 
.. Overall effect (by % ) 7 2 5 4 4,9 3,3 3,0 2,0 3,2 
1 Difference of% shares 'up' and 'down'. 
S011rn·: EC survey on employment and Labour Market, I 985/86, retail trade 
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Table 29 
Shop opening hours in retail trade by Member State and company size class 
Question: Do you consider the existing shop opening hours to be satisfactory? 
Yes/No 
If no, which change of the shop opening hours would you prefer? 
Complete liberalization/2 evenings open per week/setting a maximum limit of weekly opening hours/other 
( retail trade; answers in % ) 
European Community (EU R 5) 
B D F NL UK Less than More than 
5 5-19 20-50 50 All sizes 
(total) 
employees 
Existing shop opening hours satisfactory? 
Yes 54 7 55 87 53 77,8 70,3 63,2 45,8 60,9 
No 46 29 34 10 47 15,6 24,0 32,2 49,8 36,2 
No answer 0 0 II 3 0 6,6 5,7 4,5 4,4 2,9 
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100,0 
If no, which change would you prefer? 
Complete liberalization 19 10 23 2 18 4,1 6,3 13,3 24,3 15,9 
2 evenings per week (till 20.00 or longer) 5 10 0 0 6 0,8 3,5 4,6 8,1 5,3 
Setting a maximum limit of weekly opening 
hours and leave it up to the companies how 
to distribute them over the week 17 4 I 4 15 6,7 9,9 8,6 8,6 7,7 
Other changes 5 5 10 4 8 4,1 4,3 5,7 8,8 7,3 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86. retail trade. 
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Table 30 
Split of full-time jobs into part-time jobs in retail trade by Member State and company size class 
Question: It has sometimes been suggested that full-time jobs could be split into part-time jobs as a way of reducing the impact of 
unemployment. Such suggestions can take the form of two part-time workers instead of one full-time, three part-timers instead 
of two full-time, job-sharing, etc. Do you think any of the full-time jobs in your firm could be split into part-time jobs without 
significant economic disadvantages for your firm? 
No 
Yes: if yes, about what percentage of the full-time jobs in your firm could be split? 
( retail trade; answers in % ) 
European Community (EUR 5) 
B D F NL UK Less than More than 
5 5-19 20-50 50 All sizes 
(total) 
employees 
No (share) 61 42 50 23 36 18,3 26,9 31.2 56,0 41,1 
Yes (share) 39 56 36 75 64 73,8 66,4 64,1 38.0 54.8 
No answer 0 2 14 2 0 7,9 6,7 4,6 6,0 4.1 
100 100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 
If yes, 
(a) 1-2% 17 6 4 I 4 2,3 3,0 2.7 7.1 4.8 
(b) 3-4% 31 3 4 I 3 1,5 1,7 6,6 5.5 3.9 
(c) 5-10% 4 13 27 3 9 1,2 7,5 10,4 20,4 14.1 
(d) 11-20% 3 17 10 4 8 3,6 8,4 6,3 16,5 10.8 
(e) more than 20% 6 3 5 14 12 9,2 6.3 5,3 6,9 7.6 
Average(% of total full-time jobs) 4,3 5,1 5,8 5,9 7.3 4,8 4,7 4.3 7.0 6.1 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86, retail trade. 
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Table 31 
Structure of employment in retail trade by Member State 
(% share ( 1985))' 
B D F NL UK EUR 5 
Full-time 55,3 72,0 78,3 63,7 50,0 64,4 
Part-time 44,7 28,0 21,7 36,3 50,0 35,6 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
of which 
on a temporary basis 5,1 0,9 8,2 5,3 5,8 4,9 
Absolute figures 19852 
(in I OOO) 
Full-time 88 I 225 I 091 217 I 056 3 677 
Part-time 72 476 303 124 I 056 2 031 
Total 160 I 701 I 394 341 2 112 5 708 
of which 
on a temporary basis 8 16 115 18 123 280 
I EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86, retail trade. 
2 Estimates of Commission's services. 
Source· EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86. retail trade. 
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Table 32 
Employment trend in wholesale trade by Member State and company size class 
Question: What has been the trend over the last year and what is the expected trend over the next 12 months? 
(wholeJale trade; answers in%) 
European Community (EUR 4) 
B D F UK Less than More than 
5 5-19 20-50 50 All sires 
(total) 
employees 
Past 12 months 
.. up 31 12 41 37 15,7 22,3 28,l 37,0 29,3 
.. no change 48 60 25 36 74,2 53,7 37,8 26,8 41,8 
.. down 21 28 34 26 9,8 23,4 33,6 35,2 28,6 
.. No answer 0 0 0 I 0,3 0,6 0,5 1,0 0,3 
100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Balance1 10 7 11 II 5,9 -1,l -5,5 1,7 0,7 
Next 12 months 
.. up 23 14 28 28 18,0 18,4 17,4 17,6 17,8 
.. no change 53 69 64 55 71,0 69,6 62,4 55,7 62,1 
.. down 24 19 20 12 4,0 10,3 18,0 23,4 17,2 
.. No answer 0 2 2 5 7,0 1,7 2,2 3,3 2,9 
100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Balance1 -1 -9 -6 16 13,9 8,1 -0,6 -5,8 0,6 
I Difference between the percentage shares 'up' and 'down'. 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86, wholesale trade. 
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Table 33 
Changes in the labour market and their impact on employment plans in wholesale trade by Member State and by company size class 
Question: Looking at the list of possible changes below, which effect do you think each might have on your employment plans for the 
next 12 months? 
Significant positive impact/little positive impact/no change/negative impact/no answer 
(order according to the importance given by companies at the Community level; at the national level the ranking may be 
different) 
(wholesale trade; answers in%) 
European Community (EUR 4) 
B D F UK Less than More than 
5 5-19 20-50 50 All sizes 
(total) 
employees 
(I) Shorter periods of notice and simpler legal pro-
cedures in case of redundancies and dismissals 
.. significant positive 47 29 19 16 32,6 21,9 26,6 19,8 22,9 
.. little positive 23 29 33 23 19,1 21,7 31,1 31,5 27,8 
.. no change 29 39 37 54 36,3 49,3 34,4 44,7 42,8 
.. negative 1 I 4 5 7,2 2,9 3,6 2,7 3,2 
.. No answer 0 2 7 2 4,8 4,2 4,3 1,3 3,3 
100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient I 116 86 67 50 77,0 62,7 80,7 68,5 70,5 
(2) Introduction of 'initial wage rates' (i.e. lower 
wages/salaries for new starters) 
.. significant positive 31 16 10 14 20,0 18,2 14,9 10,7 14,5 
.. little positive 36 32 37 37 19,6 35,8 35,4 38,5 35,3 
.. no change 32 48 45 46 "48,4 41,6 43,0 47,9 45,6 
.. negative 1 I I 2 7,5 0,5 1,4 1,1 1,3 
.. No answer 0 3 7 I 4,5 3,9 5,3 1,8 3,3 
100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient I 97 63 56 63 52,1 71,7 63,8 58,8 63,0 
(3) Introduction of wider wage differentials accord-
ing to skills and working conditions 
.. significant positive 29 20 8 7 18,3 13,0 15,4 10,7 12,9 
.. little positive 34 34 24 21 14,1 25,7 25,9 30,9 26,9 
.. no change 33 41 60 67 52,3 55,5 51,4 55,5 54,5 
.. negative 4 I I 3 10,8 0,4 2,0 1,1 1,8 
.. No answer 0 4 7 2 4,5 5,4 5,3 1,8 3,9 
100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient I 88 73 39 32 40,0 51,3 54,7 51,2 50,9 
(4) Reduction of redundancy payments that may 
have to be paid 
.. significant positive 43 22 II 15 30,1 17,6 19,4 14,3 17,8 
.. little positive 21 18 18 13 8,7 16,9 20,0 16,9 16,5 
.. no change 36 56 61 67 49,0 58,6 52,5 65,4 59,9 
.. negative 0 I 3 4 7,7 2,5 2,9 1,6 2,5 
.. No answer 0 3 7 I 4,5 4,4 5,2 1,8 3,3 
100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient 1 107 61 37 39 61,1 49,7 55,9 43,8 49,7 
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Table 33 ( continued) 
European Community (EUR 4J 
B D F UK Less than More than 
5 5-19 20-50 5() All-=-
1w1al1 
employees 
(5) Introduction of more profit-oriented corn-
ponents in contractual salaries 
.. significant positive 34 13 10 6 11,7 9,2 12,3 10,0 11,0 
.. little positive 35 26 37 19 26,2 22,7 28.0 22,8 27.2 
.. no change 31 54 45 65 57,3 59,6 49,9 59.0 53,9 
.. negative 0 3 I 9 0,3 4,2 2,8 6,0 4,3 
.. No answer 0 4 7 I 4,5 4,3 7,0 2,2 3,6 
JOO JOO JOO JOO 100,0 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Coefficient 1 103 49 56 22 49,3 36,9 49,8 36,9 44.9 
(6) More frequent use of temporary contracts (fixed-
term, interim work, etc.) 
.. significant positive 23 16 12 I 9,5 8,0 12,3 10.8 10.3 
.. little positive 37 37 30 14 18,2 22.0 29,0 31,6 21.4 
.. no change 35 43 50 78 58,9 60,6 50,1 55,1 562 
.. negative 5 2 I 6 8,9 4,7 2.8 1,1 3.2 
.. No answer 0 2 7 I 4,5 4.7 5,8 IA 2.9 
100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100.0 100.0 IOOJJJ 
Coefficient 1 78 67 53 JO 28,3 33.3 50.9 52.~ -14.$ 
(7) Better trained job-seekers 
.. significant positive 26 17 3 6 11,6 9.4 12.9 9.4 lli]IJ) 
.. little positive 31 26 16 33 14,5 26.8 23.J '.!85 25.9 
.. no change 43 54 73 53 63,1 57,2 56.5 51.9 ;:g;, 
.. negative 0 0 I 6 0,3 2.3 2.3 2.8 ,, ~ 
-~ 
.. No answer 0 3 7 2 10.6 4.4 4.6 1.4 3.6 
100 100 100 100 100.0 100.0 100.0 HlO.O 100.0I 
Coefficient' 83 60 21 39 37,3 43.3 47.2 44.4 -U.6 
(8) (Higher) temporary employment subsidies for 
employing unemployed persons, who have par-
ticular difficulties in finding a job, e.g. young 
people, women, older workers, etc . 
. . significant positive 14 5 6 9 9,6 6.9 8.0 6.2 1.1 
.. little positive 29 25 20 45 27.4 33.0 28.9 34.0 30.5 
.. no change 50 65 66 42 50.4 53.3 55.3 57.3 56.S 
.. negative 7 I I 2 7,8 1.9 1.4 1.1 IJI 
.. No answer 0 4 7 2 4,8 4.9 6.4 1.4 3.9 
100 100 100 JOO 100,0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Coefficient I 50 34 31 61 38,9 44.9 43.6 45.4 -B.R 
(9) More flexible working time arrangements at 
company level 
.. significant positive 18 7 13 5 4,3 9.2 8.9 8.7 8.f> 
.. Ii ttle positive 27 26 36 II 14.1 16.5 15.5 30.7 23 .. 8 
.. no change 50 62 43 80 76,6 67.0 57.7 56.7 62.l 
.. negative 5 2 I 3 0,8 2,6 2.0 1.5 
.,. .,. 
.. No answer 0 3 7 I 4.1 4.7 5.9 IA ~ ~ -~ ,._ ... 
JOO 100 JOO 100 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Coefficient 1 58 38 61 18 21.9 32.3 41.3 45.6 38 .. 7 
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Table 33 ( continued) 
European Community (EUR 4) 
B D F UK Less than More than 
5 5-19 20-50 50 All sizes 
(total) 
employees 
(10) Reduction in standard weekly working hours 
without increasing total production costs (i.e. 
cost-neutral) 
.. significant positive II 9 4 6 1,3 3,9 6,2 8,9 6,7 
.. little positive 34 25 23 32 20,2 19,5 23,2 34,8 27,3 
.. no change 30 52 60 53 68,9 61,2 54,8 45,1 53,3 
.. negative 25 II 6 8 5,1 11,7 9,9 9,8 9,4 
.. No answer 0 3 7 I 4,5 3,7 5,9 1,4 3,3 
100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient' 31 32 25 36 17,8 15,6 25,7 42,8 31,4 
(11) Functional improvement of public employment 
offices (better services provided by official em-
ployment agencies regarding job-seekers, pro-
fessional training, etc.) 
.. significant positive 23 8 4 2 5,4 4,5 7,5 5,7 5.7 
.. little positive 17 18 14 17 12,1 14,2 20,8 16,4 16.5 
.. no change 57 70 74 77 71,6 75,3 64,6 75,5 72.7 
.. negative 3 1 1 0 0,3 1,0 1,1 0,4 0.8 
.. No answer 0 3 7 4 10,6 5,0 6.0 2,0 4.3 
100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient I 60 33 21 21 22,6 22,1 34,7 27,3 27,2 
(12) More flexible shop opening hours 
.. significant positive 12 4 4 6 10.8 5,0 3,5 4,4 5,1 
.. little positive 14 7 23 21 11,8 11,4 12,4 21,5 16,4 
.. no change 71 79 65 66 71,5 73,2 72,2 68,1 70,4 
.. negative 3 5 I 4 1,4 3,6 4,6 2,9 3,5 
.. No answer 0 5 7 3 4,5 6,8 7,3 3,1 4,6 
100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient 1 35 10 30 29 32,0 17,8 14,8 27,3 23.2 
I Coefficient is calculated as difference of weighted positive impact ('significant positive impact', weight + 2; 'little positive impact', weight + I) and the negative impact (weight - I); the coefficient 
is thus in the range - 100 till + 200. 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86, wholesale trade. 
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Table 34 
Changes in the labour market and their impact on employment plans in wholesale trade by Member State 
(Ranks according to employer's survey; rank I is the measure with the expected most positive impact; rank 12 the measure with the least 
positive impact; for details see Table 33) 
(whoh•.rnle tradt·: ranks) 
Changes 
Shorter notice in case of redundancies and simpler legal procedures 
Lower initial wage rates 
Wider wage differentials 
Reduction in redundancy payments 
More profit-oriented components 
More frequent temporary contracts 
Better trained job-seekers 
Temporary employment subsidies 
More flexible working time 
Reduction in standard weekly working hours 
Functional improvement of employment offices 
More flexible opening hours 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86, wholesale trade. 
Table 35 
EUR4 
I 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
II 
12 
B 
I 
4 
5 
2 
3 
7 
6 
10 
9 
12 
8 
II 
Employment effect of proposed changes in wholesale trade by Member State and company size class 
D F 
I I 
4 3 
2 6 
5 7 
7 3 
3 5 
6 11/12 
9 8 
8 2 
II 10 
10 11/12 
12 9 
Question: What could be the net effect of all the changes described in Table 33 on your employment plans for the next 12 months? 
up/no change/down; if 'up' or 'down': by what percentage? 
UK 
3 
I 
7 
4/5 
9 
12 
4/5 
2 
II 
6 
10 
8 
( wholesale trade. answers in % ) 
Net effect 
next 12 months 
.. up 
.. no change 
.. down 
.. No answer 
Balance 1 
.. up by% 
.. down by% 
Overall effect (by %) 
1 Difference of% shares ·up' and ·down·. 
Sourn•: EC survey on cmpldymcnt and labour market, 1985/86, wholesale trade. 
B 
45 
55 
0 
0 
100 
45 
12 
0 
5 
D 
32 
65 
0 
3 
100 
32 
2 
0 
I 
European Community (EUR 4) 
F UK Less than 
5 5-19 
employees 
Answers in % (tendency) 
31 50 35,5 36,4 
34 45 56,3 54,6 
I 5 0,0 1,5 
34 0 8,2 7,5 
100 100 100,0 100,0 
30 45 35,5 34,9 
Change in % (quantitative) 
8 
-8 
2 
9 
-4 
4 
16,2 
0,0 
5,7 
9,2 
-5,5 
3,3 
20-50 
44,4 
45,4 
1,4 
8,8 
100,0 
43,0 
6,2 
-4,7 
2,7 
More than 
50 
38,7 
46,0 
2,6 
12,7 
100,0 
36,1 
3,9 
-1,5 
1,5 
All sizes 
(total) 
38,5 
49,3 
1,9 
10,3 
100,0 
36,6 
6,6 
-3,5 
2,5 
93 
Employment problems: views of businessmen and the workforce 
Table 36 
Shop opening hours in wholesale trade by Member State and company size class 
Question: Do you consider the existing shop opening hours to be satisfactory? 
Yes/No 
If no, which change of the shop opening hours would you prefer? 
Complete liberalization/2 evenings open per week/setting a maximum limit of weekly opening hours/others 
(wholesale trade; answers in%) 
European Community (EUR 4) 
B F UK Less than More than 
5 5-19 20-50 50 All sizes 
(total) 
employees 
Existing shop opening hours satisfactory? 
Yes 72 64 42 72,1 54,6 61,5 43,7 53,5 
No 28 22 58 20,5 40,6 30,3 51,0 40,7 
No answer 0 14 0 7,4 4,8 8,2 5,3 5,8 
100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
If no, which change would you prefer? 
Complete liberalization 14 17 35 13,1 22,4 15,5 31,5 25,8 
2 evenings per week (till 20.00 or longer) 0 3 0,4 3,9 2,5 3,4 1,6 
Setting a maximum limit of weekly opening hours and leave 
it up to the companies how to distribute them over the week II 5 17 7,0 12,0 11,5 13,3 11,6 
Other changes 2 0 3 0,0 2,3 0,7 2,8 1,7 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market. 1985/86. wholesale trade. 
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Table 37 
Split of full-time jobs into part-time jobs in wholesale trade by Member State and company size class 
Question: It has sometimes been suggested that full-time jobs could be split into part-time jobs as a way of reducing the impact of 
unemployment. Such suggestions can take the form of two part-time workers instead of one full-time, three part-timers instead 
of two full-time, job-sharing etc. Do you think any of the full-time jobs in your firm could be split into part-time jobs without 
significant economic disadvantages for your firm? 
No 
Yes: if yes, about what percentage of the full-time jobs in your firm could be split? 
{wholesale trade; answers in%;% share) 
European Community (EUR 4) 
B D F UK Less than More than 
5 5-19 20-50 50 All sizes 
(total) 
employees 
No(% share) 57 29 26 27 8,6 21,1 28,8 38,0 29,1 
Yes(% share) 43 71 54 73 85,6 74,9 66,0 56,1 65,5 
No answer 0 0 20 0 6,4 4,0 5,2 5,9 5,4 
100 100 100 100 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
If yes 
(a) I- 2% 11 5 7 2 0,5 1,6 1,5 9,0 4,9 
(b) 3- 4% 39 5 6 4 4,5 2,8 9,8 8,5 6,8 
(c) 5-10% 3 13 9 12 0,3 8,5 11,5 13,7 11,0 
(d) 11-20% 3 5 3 7 1,6 5,9 4,5 4,8 5,0 
(e) More than 20% 1 I I 4 1,6 1,8 1,2 2,3 2,0 
Average(% of total full-time jobs) 2,4 3,3 2,0 3,5 0,8 2,3 2,3 3,3 2,7 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86, wholesale trade. 
Table 38 
Structure of employment in wholesale trade 
/% share ( 1985)) 
B D F UK EUR4 
Full-time 80,6 87,6 93,3 90,3 89,7 
Part-time 19,4 12,4 6,7 9,7 10,3 
Total 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
of which 
on a temporary basis 3,8 0,9 4,0 1,0 2,0 
Absolute figures 1985 (in 1 OOO) 1 
B D F UK EUR 4 
Full-time 124 818 702 833 2 477 
Part-time 30 116 50 89 285 
Total 154 934 752 922 2 762 
of which 
on a temporary basis 6 9 31 9 55 
I Estimates of Commission's services (absolute figures). 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market. 1985/86, wholesale trade(% share). 
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Annex I: Institutes carrying out the surveys 
Survey: 
Spain 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Federal Republic of 
Germany 
Greece 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
The Netherlands 
Portugal 
United Kingdom 
1 International coordination: HCICne Riffault 
Enterprises 
BNB 
Banque nationale de Belgique 
IFO 
Institut fiir Wirtschafts-
forschung 
IEIR 
Institute of Economic Research 
INSEE 
Institut national de la statistique 
et de etudes economiques 
CII and ESRI 
Confederation of Irish Industries 
and Economic and Social Research 
Institute 
ISCO 
Istituto per lo studio della 
congiuntura 
STATEC 
Service central de la statistique 
et des etudes economiques 
NIPO 
Nederlands Instituut 
voor de Publieke Opinie 
en het Marktonderzoek 
CBI 
Confederation of British Industry 
(Faits et opinions, Paris) 
Employees 1 
Instituto de Investigaci6n Gallup 
Dimarso NV 
Gallup Markedsanalyse AS 
Emnid-Institut GmbH 
ICAP Hellas SA 
Institut de sondages 
Lavialle 
Irish Marketing Surveys Ltd 
Istituto per le ricerche statistiche e l'analisi dell'opi-
nione pubblica (DOXA) 
Institut Iuxembourgeois de recherches sociales (Ilres) 
Nederlands Instituut voor de Publieke 
Opinie (NIPO) BV 
NORMA - Sociedade de Estudos para o Desenvolvi-
mento de Empresas, SARL 
Social Surveys (Gallup poll) 
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Table 39* 
Assessment of staff size in manufacturing industry by branch and company size class at Community level 1 
Question: In relation to each category of worker you employ, could you say whether the present number of workers in that category is 
larger than you really need-in relation to current and expected levels of demand-about right or smaller than you need? 
( answers in % ) 
Branch Size class (employees) All sizes 
Intermediate Investment Consumer Less than More than 
goods goods goods 200 200-499 500-1 OOO I OOO 
Skilled manual workers 
.. larger 17,2 13,5 20,8 8,9 11,6 16,2 23,0 17,4 
.. about right 60,9 53,6 59,0 65,3 62,2 61.1 47,5 56,6 
.. smaller 18,0 30,0 16,2 21,4 22,2 21,1 26,3 22,1 
.. No answer 3,9 2,9 4,0 4,4 4,0 1,6 3,2 3,9 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Balance2 -0,9 -16,5 4,5 -12,4 -10,5 -4,9 -3,2 -4,7 
Unskilled manual workers 
.. larger 42,2 26,2 39,3 22,7 28,7 30,2 43,2 35,3 
.. about right 47,7 64,2 50,9 64,3 61,8 62,3 50,6 55,1 
.. smaller 3,4 3,5 3,7 4,3 4,3 3,2 2,9 3,3 
.. No answer 6,7 6,1 6,1 8,7 5,2 4,3 3,3 6,3 
100.0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Balance2 38,8 22,8 35,6 18,4 24,4 27,0 40,3 31,9 
Technicians 
.. larger 7,5 9,6 3,8 3,7 4,5 6,5 11,0 6,8 
.. about right 66,2 50,8 75,2 67,6 68,4 61,0 51,6 63,8 
.. smaller 18,6 36,0 13,6 28,5 23,1 29,8 35,3 23,2 
.. No answer 7,7 3,6 7,4 10,2 4,0 2,7 2,1 6,2 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Balance2 -11,2 -26,5 -9,7 -14,9 -18,6 -23,3 -24,3 -16,4 
Office/Sales staff 
.. larger 31,9 17,4 24,6 11,2 16,0 19,6 33,4 23.8 
.. about right 58,9 74,4 67,6 78,4 75,6 73,7 58,1 67.5 
.. smaller 4,9 5.6 4,7 5,8 5,9 4,8 6,1 5.2 
.. No answer 4,3 2,6 3,1 4,6 2,5 1,9 2,4 3.5 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Balance2 27,1 11,7 19,9 5,5 10,1 14,9 27,3 18.6 
Management 
.. larger 10,7 10,4 5,2 5,1 5,6 7,4 13.7 8,4 
.. about right 77,3 74,3 84,9 82,3 82,0 82,5 70,4 78,7 
.. smaller 7,1 11,8 6,0 6,7 9,4 7,6 13,1 8,5 
.. No answer 4,9 3,5 3,9 5,9 3,0 2,5 2,8 4,4 
100.0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Balance2 3.5 -1.4 -0,8 - 1.6 -3,8 -0,2 0,6 -0,1 
100 
Survey results in manufacturing industry 
Table 39* ( continued) 
Branch Size class (employees) All sizes 
Intermediate Investment Consumer Less than More Lhan 
goods goods goods 200 200-499 500-1 OOO I OOO 
TOTAL 
.. larger 28,0 19,9 33,3 13,7 19,1 19,9 37,6 27,1 
.. about right 61,3 57,7 53,7 70,9 65,1 63,7 41,7 56,3 
.. smaller 5,7 16,9 7,1 9,5 9,9 9,4 14,5 10,7 
.. No answer 5,0 5,5 5,9 5,9 5,9 7,0 6,2 5,9 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Balance2 22,3 3,0 26,2 4,2 9,1 10,5 23,1 16,5 
I Without Denmark. Portugal and Spain. 
2 Difference of the percentage shares 'up' or 'down·. 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86, industry. 
Table 40* 
Employment trend in manufacturing industry by branch and company size class at Community level 1 
Question: What has been the trend over the last year and what is the expected trend over the next 12 months? 
f answers in % ) 
Branch Size class (employees) All sizes 
Intermediate Investment Consumer Less than More than 
goods goods goods 200 200-499 500-1 OOO I OOO 
Past 12 months 
.. up 26,4 43,5 24,4 29,1 38,5 34,7 36,4 32,3 
.. no change 22,5 23,9 27,3 41,1 25,8 25,4 13,8 24,2 
.. down 49,4 31,5 47,4 28,8 34,9 38,9 48,8 42,2 
.. No answer 1,7 1,1 0,9 1,0 0,8 1,0 1,0 1,3 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Balance2 -23,0 12,1 -22,9 0,2 3,6 -4,3 -12,4 -9,9 
Next 12 months 
.. up 13,2 31,7 17,3 22,7 22,9 21,2 25,0 21,3 
.. no change 38,5 39,4 41,2 55,2 46,8 44,2 24,0 39,8 
.. down 46,1 26,0 39,9 20,3 28,3 31,4 48,5 36,8 
.. No answer 2,2 2,9 1,6 1,8 2,0 3,2 2,5 2,1 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 
Balance2 -32,9 5,7 -22.7 2,5 -5,5 - 10,2 -23,6 -15,5 
I Without Denmark, Portugal and Spain. 
2 Di!Terencc of the percentage shares 'up' and 'down'. 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86, industry. 
101 
Annexes 
Table 41* 
Obstacles to more employment in manufacturing industry by branch and company size class at Community level 1 
Question: Following is a list of reasons which employers have given for not being able to employ more people. In relation to employment 
in your firm, could you say whether each reason is very important, important or not (so) important? 
(order according to the importance given by companies at Community level) ( answers in % ) 
Branch Size class (employees) All sizes 
Intermediate Investment Consumer Less than More than 
goods goods goods 200 200-499 500-1 OOO I OOO 
(I) Present and expected levels of demand for your 
products 
.. very important 50,5 44,5 54,l 45,0 51,6 53,8 43,9 49,8 
.. important 27,1 30,4 26,5 30,7 26,1 24,7 31,5 28,2 
.. not important 18,5 21,3 14,8 19,4 18,3 18,3 21,5 18,2 
.. No answer 3,9 3,8 4,6 4,9 4,0 3,2 3,1 3,8 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient2 128,1 119,3 134,8 120,6 129,3 132,4 119,3 127,7 
(2) Insufficient profit margin due to compet1t10n 
(domestic and foreign), which does not allow 
sufficient prices3 
.. very important 36,0 25,8 40,0 34,3 31,9 30,5 32,7 33,3 
.. important 33,8 29,4 35,8 35,0 32,8 37,3 26,8 32,9 
.. not important 26,4 40,7 20,7 26,6 31,4 30,0 37,2 30,0 
.. No answer 3,8 4,2 3,5 4,1 3,9 2,2 3,3 3,8 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient2 105,6 81,0 115,9 103,6 96,7 98,3 92,3 99,6 
(3) Insufficient profit margin due to non-wage lab-
our cost level (e.g. employers' social security 
contribution, pay roll taxes, allowances, etc.) 
.. very important 35,2 26,7 32,6 39,2 30,4 26,4 23,5 29,8 
.. important 33,0 37,0 39,8 34,1 38,1 45,4 36,4 34,9 
.. not important 25,1 30,0 20,5 18,8 24,3 24,0 34,9 28,5 
.. No answer 6,7 6,3 7,1 7,9 7,2 4,2 5,2 6,8 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient2 103,5 90,4 105,0 112,3 98,9 98,3 83,4 94,5 
(4) Insufficient flexibility in hiring and shedding lab-
our (i.e. necessary redundancies/dismissals and 
new recruitment may be difficult and costly) 
.. very important 33,2 27,1 38,5 38,4 28,9 28,5 22,4 33,1 
.. important 21,7 29,9 25,7 22,8 25,7 30,1 36,1 26,3 
.. not important 38,1 38,3 28,9 31,1 37,7 36,3 37,9 34.2 
.. No answer 7,0 4,7 6,9 7,7 7,7 5,1 3,6 6,4 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient2 88,0 84,2 102,6 99,8 83,5 87,0 81,0 92,5 
(5) Rationalization and/or introduction of new tech-
nologies 
.. very important 32,8 17,1 23,0 19,5 26,1 27,0 26,2 22,7 
.. important 37,9 40,2 38,1 38,5 40,0 43,3 39,3 38,8 
.. not important 22,6 37,5 33,0 34,5 28,3 26,3 30,4 32,6 
.. No answer 6,7 5,2 5,9 7,5 5,6 3,4 4,1 5,9 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient2 103,5 74,5 84,1 77,5 92,2 97,3 91,7 84,2 
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Table 41 * ( continued) 
Branch Size class (employees) All sizes 
Intermediate Investment Consumer Less than More than 
goods goods goods 200 200-499 500-1 OOO 1000 
(6) Insufficient profit margin due to wage and salary 
levels in your firm 
.. very important 11,1 11,6 20,9 17,5 15,8 12,2 9,6 15,3 
.. important 41,0 43,6 44,8 43,1 40,6 47,2 44,9 43,3 
.. not important 41,9 39,5 27,9 32,4 37,5 36,9 41,1 35,5 
.. No answer 6,0 5,3 6,4 7,0 6,1 3,7 4,4 5,9 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient2 63,3 66,8 86,6 78,2 72,2 71,6 64,1 73,9 
(7) Insufficient profit margin due to other than lab-
our costs (e.g. capital costs etc.) 
.. very important 19,5 7,4 26,9 17,5 12,7 11,4 15,3 16,7 
.. important 27,1 29,6 31,7 30,9 30,2 37,6 24,3 28,1 
.. not important 46,1 55,3 33,4 42,5 47,4 45,1 55,0 47,2 
.. No answer 7,3 7,7 8,0 9,1 9,7 5,9 5,4 8,0 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient2 66,0 44,5 85,5 65,9 55,6 60,3 54,9 61,5 
(8) Shortage of adequately skilled applicants 
.. very important 8,6 22,5 12.1 17,4 14,9 14,9 15,8 15,2 
.. important 22,8 32,1 28,6 26,3 29,6 26,9 25,9 27,9 
.. not important 61,9 42,9 52,6 49,5 49,6 53,9 53,9 51,2 
.. No answer 6,7 2,5 6,7 6,8 5,9 4,3 4,4 5,7 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient2 40,0 77,I 52,8 61,1 59,5 56,6 57,5 58,4 
(9) Increase in contracting out 
.. very important 2,0 3,5 3,8 6,6 3,8 2,4 1,9 3,2 
.. important 10,6 18,1 12,2 16,1 13,7 16,3 14,9 13,9 
.. not important 78,7 71,9 75,8 68,3 72,9 75,0 77,8 75,I 
.. No answer 8,7 6,5 8,2 9,0 9,6 6,3 5,4 7,8 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient2 14,6 25,0 19,9 29,4 21,3 21,2 18,8 20,3 
(10) Insufficient production capacity 
.. very important 4,0 3,0 3,2 5,4 4,2 2,3 2,7 3,5 
.. important 11,9 10,5 9,6 16,2 15,3 10,4 7,8 10,5 
.. not important 75,8 79,4 78,7 69,2 71,3 79,4 84,1 78,1 
.. No answer 8,3 7,1 8,5 9,2 9,2 7,9 5,4 7,9 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficien t2 20,0 16,6 16,0 27,0 23,6 15,0 13,2 17,6 
1 Without Denmark. Portugal and Spain. 
2 Coefficient is calculated as twice percentage share ·very important' plus 'important'. 
3 The question on 'Competition' has not been asked in the United Kingdom: the EUR total thus refers here only to 8 member countries. 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86, industry. 
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Table 42* 
Changes in the labour market and their impact on employment plans in manufacturing industry by branch and by company size class at 
Community level I 
Question: Looking at the list of possible changes below, which effect do you think each might have on your employment plans for the 
next 12 months? Significant positive impact/little positive impact/no change/negative impact/no answer 
(order according to the importance given by companies at Community level) 
( answers in % ) 
Branch Size class (employees) All sizes 
Intermediate Investment Consumer Less than More than 
goods goods goods 200 200-499 500-1 OOO 1000 
(I) Shorter periods of notice in case of redundancies 
dismissals and simpler legal procedures 
.. significant positive 29,0 26,0 37,6 38,4 28,2 26,7 18,3 31,0 
.. little positive 23,4 29,7 23,2 25,5 30,1 31,4 24,2 25,7 
.. no change 42,5 39,0 31,3 29,8 37,5 38,5 49,9 37,0 
.. negative 3,1 3,3 4,9 2,4 1,7 2,3 6,7 3,7 
.. No answer 2,0 2,0 3,0 3,9 2,5 1,1 0,9 2,6 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient2 78,4 78,5 93,5 100,0 84,9 82,6 54,2 84,1 
(2) More frequent use of temporary contracts (fixed-
term interim work, etc.) 
.. significant positive 17,5 21,0 23,1 22,4 20,0 16,9 15,8 20,7 
.. little positive 27,0 42,1 31,6 30,2 36,8 40,3 44,9 34,4 
.. no change 49,4 32,5 33,7 40;5 38,8 39,9 33,8 37,1 
.. negative 3,6 1,9 8,3 2,5 1,7 1,0 4,7 5,1 
.. No answer 2,5 2,5 3,3 4,4 2,7 1,9 0,8 2,7 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient2 58,4 82,1 69,6 72,5 75,1 73,1 71,9 70,8 
(3) Better trained job-seekers 
.. significant positive 15,5 21,5 28,1 21,3 16,7 11,0 18,9 22,5 
.. little positive 21,8 34,5 23,8 28.7 33,2 33,2 24,9 27,3 
.. no change 58,4 40,4 43,5 44,9 45,4 52,7 52,8 46,4 
.. negative 2,2 1,5 1,7 1,7 2,1 2,2 1,9 1,7 
.. No answer 2,1 2,1 2,9 3,4 2,6 0,9 1,5 2,1 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient2 50,6 76,0 78,3 69,6 64,6 53,0 60,8 70,7 
(4) Introduction of wider wage differentials accord-
ing to skills and working conditions 
.. significant positive 19,9 14,4 30,0 30,2 19,4 15,4 10,8 21,5 
.. little positive 19,8 32,7 23,3 27,5 29,9 32,0 21,3 25,6 
.. no change 55,6 48,6 41,0 36,3 45,6 49,2 64,4 48,1 
.. negative 1,8 1,0 1,4 1,3 1,5 1,3 1,7 1,6 
.. No answer 2,9 3,3 4,3 4,7 3,6 2,1 1,8 3,2 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient2 57,9 60,4 81,8 86,7 67,2 61,5 41,2 67,1 
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Table 42* ( continued) 
Branch Size class (employees) All sizes 
Intermediate Investment Consumer Less than More than 
goods goods goods 200 200-499 500-1 OOO I OOO 
(5) Greater emphasis on productivity in determining 
wages and salaries 
.. significant positive 23,8 16,8 26,1 27,6 20,6 17,2 12,9 21,8 
.. little positive 23,1 34,2 29,8 30,2 29,5 33,3 30,3 29,6 
.. no change 39,3 39,0 31,6 32,3 35,8 34,4 42,0 36,6 
.. negative 10,3 6,8 8,9 5,9 10,3 13,6 11,8 8,6 
.. No answer 3,5 3,2 3,6 4,0 3,8 1,5 3,0 3,4 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient2 60,5 60,9 73,2 79,5 60,4 54,1 44,4 64,5 
(6) Introduction of 'initial wage rates' (i.e. lower 
wages/ salaries for new starters) 
.. significant positive 18,0 8,6 12,6 25,2 15,8 9,9 4,2 12,0 
.. little positive 28,7 34,9 42,5 32,7 34,3 31,5 31,1 36,1 
.. no change 49,3 52,6 41,0 36,6 46,0 55,8 61,9 48,0 
.. negative 1.6 1,2 0,8 1,8 1,2 0,9 1,2 1,3 
.. No answer 2,4 2,7 3,1 3,7 2,7 1,9 1,6 2,6 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient2 63,1 50,9 66,8 81,2 64,6 50,5 38,3 58,7 
(7) More flexible working time arrangements at 
company level 
.. significant positive 12,3 10,4 13,2 18,1 14,4 13,2 9,7 11,7 
.. little positive 31,5 37,8 41,0 25,7 29,9 34,1 49,8 38,1 
.. no change 49,3 46,8 37,8 47,2 48,3 45,8 35,8 43,8 
.. negative 4,1 2,1 4,4 4,8 4,4 4,6 3,1 3.3 
.. No answer 2,8 2,9 3,6 4,2 3,0 2,3 1,6 3,1 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient2 52,1 56,4 63,2 57,2 54,2 55,8 66,0 58,1 
(8) Reduction of redundancy payments that may 
have to be paid 
.. significant positive 18,2 17,0 15,0 26,6 18,3 14,3 6,5 16,0 
.. little positive 16,9 21,6 35,3 22.4 22,6 22,6 22,5 25,8 
.. no change 59,2 55,4 44,8 43,9 54.2 58,5 65,7 52.7 
.. negative 3,3 3.3 1,9 3,1 2.5 3,1 3.8 2.9 
.. No answer 2,4 2,7 3,0 4,0 2,4 1.5 1.5 2.6 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient2 50,0 52,3 63,6 72,5 56.8 48,1 31,8 54.9 
(9) (Higher) temporary employment subsidies for 
employing unemployed persons, who have par-
ticular difficulties in finding a job, (e.g. young 
people, women, older workers, etc.) 
.. significant positive 12,9 6,6 22.5 18,0 10,7 8.0 6,6 13.7 
.. little positive 26,9 28,1 27.2 31,1 32,8 27.9 23,6 27,5 
.. no change 56,7 62,0 46,0 45,0 53.1 61,8 67,6 55.3 
.. negative 1,1 0,9 1.0 1,7 0,7 0,5 0.7 1.0 
.. No answer 2,4 2,4 3,3 4,2 2.7 1.8 1.5 2.5 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100.0 100.0 
Coefficient2 51,6 40,3 71,3 65,3 53,5 43,5 36.1 53.9 
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Table 42* ( continued) 
Branch Size class (employees) All sizes 
Intermediate Investment Consumer Less than More than 
goods goods goods 200 200-499 500-1 OOO 1000 
(10) Functional improvement of public employment 
offices (better services provided by official em-
ployment agencies regarding job-seekers, pro-
fessional training, etc.) 
.. significant positive 9,8 7,4 5,4 9,2 7,0 4,0 5,7 7,2 
.. little positive 14,7 27,9 29,4 22,8 21,5 23,4 22,4 24,9 
.. no change 72,7 61,5 61,2 62,3 68,0 70,4 70,8 64,5 
.. negative 0,1 0,1 0,5 1,0 0,2 0,4 0,0 0,2 
.. No answer 2,7 3,1 3,5 4,7 3,3 1,8 1,1 3,2 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient2 34,1 42,6 39,6 40,1 35,5 31,1 33,8 39,0 
(11) Reduction in standard weekly working hours 
without increasing total production costs (i.e. 
cost-neutral) 
.. significant positive 8,9 15,7 9,5 10,2 13,8 13,4 13,9 11,5 
.. little positive 38,2 30,3 28,6 25,5 33,8 43,1 33,9 31,9 
.. no change 36,3 35,0 31,8 35,1 32,7 29,0 37,9 34,2 
.. negative 12,7 15,3 26,2 24,4 16,0 12,3 10,8 18,7 
.. No answer 3,9 3,7 3,9 4,8 3,7 2,2 3,5 3,7 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient2 43,3 46,4 21,5 21,5 45,3 57,5 51,0 36,1 
(12) Introduction of (more) profit-oriented corn-
ponents in contractual salaries 
.. significant positive 7,0 9,1 9,3 15,1 11,0 9,1 4,1 8,1 
.. little positive 29,7 29,6 22,8 29,2 30,5 30,2 25,1 26,9 
.. no change 53,5 52,0 51,4 42,6 46,6 49,1 61,2 52,6 
.. negative 7,1 6,3 12,3 8,5 8,3 9,6 7,6 9,0 
.. No answer 2,7. 3,0 4,2 4,6 3,6 2,0 2,0 3,4 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Coefficient2 36,6 41,5 29,2 50,8 44,3 38,7 25,8 64,5 
I Without Denmark. Portugal and Spain. 
2 Coefficient is calculated as difference of weighted positive impact ('significant positive impact' weight + 2, 'little positive impact' weight + I) and the negative impact (weight - I). 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86, industry. 
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Table 43* 
Expected employment effect of proposed changes in manufacturing industry by branch and company size class at Community level 1 
Question: What could be the net effect of all the changes described in Table 42 on your employment plans for the next 12 months? 
up/no change/down: if up or down: by what percentage? 
( ansH'ers in % ) 
Net effect next 12 months 
.. up 
.. no change 
.. down 
.. No answer 
Balance2 
Upby % 
Down by% 
Overall effect (by % ) 
I Without Denmark, Portugal and Spain. 
2 Difference of% shares 'up' and 'down'. 
Source: EC survey on employment and Jabour market, 1985/86, industry. 
Intermediate 
goods 
39,3 
40,5 
11,4 
8,8 
100,0 
27,9 
6,0 
-3,8 
1,9 
Branch 
Investment Consumer 
goods goods 
44,7 47,5 
39,3 39,8 
9,7 6,6 
6,3 6,1 
100,0 100,0 
35,1 40,8 
5,4 8,6 
-3,1 -3,5 
2,1 3,9 
Sire class (employees) All sires 
Less than More than 
200 200-499 500-1 OOO 1000 
Answers in% 
50,0 44,6 38,9 37,8 43,9 
33,3 41,1 46,8 47,5 39,8 
10,3 8,6 8,2 5,7 9,2 
6,4 5,7 6,1 9,0 7,1 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
39,7 36,0 30,7 32,1 34,7 
Change in% 
8,3 5,6 4,8 4,2 6,8 
-3,7 -4,0 -3,1 -2,2 -3,6 
3,8 2,1 1,6 1,5 2,7 
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Table 44* 
Working time arrangements at company level in manufacturing industry- by branch and company size class at Community leve1 1 
Question: (a) Apart from the length of the standard working week, do you consider that the existing working time arrangements in your 
company are 
fully satisfactory/could be marginally improved/could be significantly improved? 
(b) Has your company increased or is it about to increase significantly the flexibility of working time arrangements? 
Last 2-3 years/Next 1-2 years 
( answers in % ) 
Branch Size class (employees) All sizes 
Intermediate Investment Consumer Less than More than 
goods goods goods 200 200-499 500-1 OOO I OOO 
(a) Working time arrangements 
.. fully satisfactory 26,8 27,2 24,6 40,4 27,0 25,4 16,0 25,6 
.. marginally improved 53,3 53,9 59,6 45,2 53,8 53,8 62,6 56,3 
.. significantly improved 17,9 17,9 14,2 12,5 17,0 20,2 21,0 16,2 
.. No answer 2,0 1,0 1,6 1,9 2,2 0,6 0,4 1,9 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
(b) Last 2-3 years 
.. yes, significantly 21,0 19,2 8,9 10,1 12,7 17,5 23,9 15,5 
.. yes, slightly 27,4 33,6 39,2 22,9 35,2 33,0 38,8 34,1 
.. no 48,4 44,7 48,7 64,1 49,0 45,3 35,2 47,6 
.. No answer 3,2 2,5 3,2 2,9 3,1 4,2 2,1 2,8 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
Next 1-2 years 
.. yes, significantly 20,5 12,0 23,7 10,0 11,1 14,6 18,0 19,0 
.. yes, slightly 30,8 36,I 30,4 26,4 32,6 35,6 45,8 32,6 
.. no 41,3 37,7 37,9 55,4 45,1 38,7 23,9 38,1 
.. No answer 7,4 14,2 8,0 8,2 11,2 11,1 12,3 10,3 
100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 100,0 
I Without Denmark, Portugal and Spain. 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86, industry. 
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Table 45* 
Main reasons for and against flexible working time arrangements in manufacturing industry by branch and company size class at Community 
level1 
If flexible working time arrangements already introduced or planned 
( answers in % ) 
Branch Size class (employees) All sizes 
Main reasons for Intermediate Investment Consumer Less than More than 
goods goods goods 200 200-499 500-1 OOO I OOO 
(I) to use plant more intensively 56,5 67,5 59,5 58,l 55,3 55,4 75,1 62,5 
(2) to compensate for reduction in standard weekly 
working hours 23,9 50,2 16,6 22,2 30,2 33,7 45,5 31,4 
(3) to reflect employees' preferences 21,3 30,8 22,7 23,3 25,2 23,9 34,0 25,0 
(4) better adjustment to demand 47,1 46,9 59,3 57,5 43,9 43,1 54,6 51,2 
( 5) other reasons 5,3 4,7 4,9 2,8 5,3 4,6 6,9 5,0 
If no flexible working time arrangements already introduced or planned 
( answers in % ) 
Branch Size class (employees) All sizes 
Main reasons against Intermediate Investment Consumer Less than More than 
goods goods goods 200 200-499 500-1 OOO I OOO 
(I) existing working time arrangements are already 
flexible enough 28,6 30,1 26,7 33,l 28,5 25,1 22,8 26,6 
(2) legal or contractual restrictions 14,0 19,2 20,9 14,7 22,8 26,1 15,8 19,9 
(3) technical and/or organizational problems 42,3 39,5 39,9 42,0 43,5 37,7 36,2 39,4 
(4) working time preferences of employees 19,6 18,4 19,5 24,0 19,3 19,1 14,0 17,8 
(5) induced increase of total cost per unit of output 16,5 18,2 13,9 15,9 13,2 17,7 18,0 16,8 
( 6) other reasons, please specify 3,1 6,4 2,5 2,0 2,9 5,0 7,6 4,5 
I Without Denmark, Portugal and Spain. 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86, industry. 
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Table 46* 
Split of full-time jobs into part-time jobs in manufacturing industry by branch and company size class at Community level 1 
Question: It has sometimes been suggested that full-time jobs could be split into part-time jobs as a way of reducing the impact of 
unemployment. Such suggestions can take the form of two part-time workers instead of one full-time, three part-timers instead 
of two full-time, job-sharing, etc. Do you think any of the full-time jobs in your firm could be split into part-time jobs without 
significant economic disadvantages for your firm? 
No 
Yes: if yes, about what percentage of the full-time jobs in your firm could be split? 
Branch Size class (employees) 
Intermediate Investment Consumer Less than 
goods goods goods 200 200-499 500-1 OOO 
.. No(% share) 58,3 57,8 62,0 69,6 60,5 48,0 
.. Yes(% share) 41,7 42,2 38,0 30,4 39,5 52,0 
.. (a) 1-2 (%) 9,4 11,8 11,2 4,3 6,7 11,9 
.. (b) 3-4 (%) 15,3 14,5 8,6 8,6 13,0 17,6 
.. (c) 5-10 (%) 12,1 14,2 12,4 10,5 14,7 13,9 
.. (d) 11-20(%) 4,6 4,0 4,6 5,2 3,4 5,6 
.. (e) More than 20% 2,9 3,0 2,6 2,7 2,5 2,4 
Average(% of total full-time jobs) 3,2 3,4 2,8 2,7 3,0 3,3 
I Without Denmark. Portugal and Spain. 
Source: EC survey on employment and labour market, 1985/86, industry. 
Table 47* 
Structure of employment in manufacturing industry by branch and company size class at Community leve11 
Full-time 
Part-time 
Total 
Of which on a temporary basis 
Full-time 
Part-time 
Total 
Of which on a temporary basis 
1 Without Denmark, Portugul and Spatn, 
S1111rct': Estimates of Commisswn's services {uhsolutc lilturc!i); 
EC surH') on employment und labour nrnrkct 19K5/K6 (% 11hurc). 
no 
Branch 
lntcnnediate Investment Consumer 
goods goods goods 
% share 1985 (according to survey) 
96,3 95,9 92,9 
3,7 4,1 7,1 
100,0 100,0 100,0 
1,7 2,2 2,8 
Absolute figures ( 1985, estimates) ( I OOO) 
6 791 
263 
100,0 
119 
9 007 
384 
100,0 
207 
7 475 
573 
100,0 
225 
Less than 
200 
94,8 
5,2 
100,0 
2,5 
9 937 
543 
100,0 
260 
Size class (employees) 
200-499 
95,0 
5,0 
100,0 
2,7 
3 944 
208 
100,0 
Ill 
500-1 OOO 
95,6 
4,4 
100,0 
2,3 
2 765 
128 
100,0 
65 
More than 
I OOO 
43,2 
56,8 
22,0 
16,6 
16,3 
3,6 
3,3 
4,0 
More than 
I OOO 
94,7 
5,3 
100,0 
1,5 
6 592 
369 
100,0 
205 
( answers in % ) 
All sizes 
59,4 
40,6 
11,3 
12,6 
13,0 
4,4 
2,9 
3,1 
All sizes 
94,9 
5,1 
100,0 
2,2 
23 238 
I 248 
100,0 
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1. Introduction 
The Compact world model in its present formulation is 
based on a decomposition of the world economy into three 
behavioural models for EUR 10 as a homogeneous whole, 
the United States of America and Japan. The system is 
closed by a rest-of-world module which is mostly determined 
as a residual item in order to ensure world accounting 
consistency for international trade and capital flows. 
The EC module which is presented in Section 2 is, by 
necessity, somewhat stylized since the introduction of insti-
tutional constraints and national specificities has to wait for 
the development of national models. It includes, however, 
all the basic elements of an operational model, i.e. 
(i) a final demand block, 
(ii) a production and factor demand block, 
(iii) a wage and price block, 
(iv) a public sector block, 
(v) a monetary block, 
(vi) a linkage and balance-of-payments block. 
The estimation is done on yearly data coming mostly from 
the EC aggregate series published in the Statistical annex of 
the 'Annual Economic Review' (European Economy, No-
vember issue). 
Given the small size of the model, it is used as a test-bed 
for some new developments in applied econometrics. It 
should also be understood that the use of the European 
Community as a homogeneous whole is but a temporary 
experiment pending the development of the country-based 
final model. 
Leaving aside the trade linkage part, the EC model includes 
50 endogenous variables determined by 28 behavioural equa-
tions and 22 identities. The USA and Japan modules were 
derived from existing material, i.e. from the world model 
built by the Economic Planning Agency (EPA) of the Ja-
panese Government. The reasons for this choice and the 
methodology used are described in Section 3. After analyti-
cal reduction, these two models were compacted from about 
70 behavioural relations to 18 equations, the coefficients of 
which are combinations of the initial published parameters. 1 
The rest-of-world module includes only international trade 
and capital variables, and an estimate of its GDP, as com-
puted in the LINK model ( 1983). In this module, current and 
1 See bibliography for complete references. 
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capital account balances are determined so as to implement 
world consistency, i.e. to constrain current and capital world 
balances to sum over zero. 
The linkage equations allocate imports amongst the four 
zones and compute dollar import prices as the weighted 
average of dollar export prices from the four zones. The rest-
of-world and linkage equations are presented in Section 3. 
The in and out-of sample simulation properties of the system 
are assessed in Section 4. 
In its present form, Compact is basically a tool for the 
simulation of international policy scenarios between the 
USA, Japan and the EC as a whole. Its small size also makes 
it suitable for the application of a game theory approach to 
the problem of international coordination (Hughes-Hallet, 
1984). 
Section 5 gives policy simulation exercises for the EC mod-
ule. analysing standardized policy shocks. 
Section 6 presents revisions and developments that have 
been or will be applied to the version described here, which 
is the one used for all simulation exercises contained in the 
'Annual Economic Review 1985 - 86', Chapter 6, European 
Economy, No 26, November 1985. 
The appendices give the complete listing of all estimated 
equations and an analysis of the properties of the USA and 
Japan compacted form. 
2. The EC module 
2.1. Basic structure 
The experiment of constructing an aggregate model for the 
EC, linked to the other main regions of the world is of 
interest in itself. However, the EC module is a test-bed for 
the most important theoretical principles to be used in the 
future models of EC national economies. The main features 
are: 
(i) the attention paid to both stock and flow equilibrium 
in the flow-of-funds matrix between economic agents, 
namely households, enterprises. public authorities and 
the foreign sector; 
(ii) the inclusion of wealth effects in consumers' demand; 
(iii) the disaggregation of total unemployment between 
classical, Keynesian and frictional shares using a labour 
market disequilibrium approach; 
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(iv) the integration of the balance-of-payments item with 
the determination of the public sector borrowing re-
quirement and money supply; 
(v) the integration of the distinction between Keynesian 
and classical unemployment into the wage determi-
nation process and, via wages, into the inflation process. 
These features may be summed up as follows: 
2.1.1. Financial balances 
Ignoring for the time being (and for illustrative purposes 
only) the subdivision between households and enterprises, 
there are two basic financial constraints in the economy. 
(i) The first distributes private savings (Sp) into holdings 
of money {Mp), net assets or liabilities on both the 
domestic economy (Bp) and the foreign sector (Bfp), in 
national currency terms, er being the exchange rate and 
D the first difference operator 
Sp- DMp- DBp-er.DBfp = 0 (1) 
(ii) The second is the public sector budget constraint, i.e. 
Sg + DMg - DBg - er.DBfg - er.DR = 0 (2) 
where variables have the same meaning as above, except 
that they are related to the public sector, which also 
holds foreign reserves R (the central bank is consoli-
dated within the government sector). 
Given the consolidation of the private sector, we also have 
that 
Bp + Bg = 0 
Mp = Mg 
(3) 
(4) 
The balance-of-payments constraint also links Bfp, Bfg, R 
and er, i.e. in its simplest form 
CURBAL + er.CAPBAL = er.DR 
with CURBAL = current balance 
CAPBAL = DBfp + DBfg 
(5) 
Finally, at world level, to any net increases in foreign assets 
in country i should correspond net increases in foreign 
liabilities in one or more countries j. Hence: 
:E D(Bfpi + Bfgi) = 0 
i 
116 
(6) 
Given these constraints, one must decide beforehand which 
variables will be determined by independent behavioural 
relations, and which others obtained by identities. Usually, 
private domestic bond holdings are defined as an identity in 
this way. Furthermore, either er (floating exchange rate) or 
R (fixed exchange rate) is determined by the balance-of-
payments constraint. Since money demand clearly needs a 
behavioural explanation and since savings are determined 
from the behavioural relations present in the national ac-
counts part of the model, one must choose between the 
private or public net foreign assets or liabilities position, 
Bfp or Bfg. In the present version, Bfg (public external 
borrowing, for all practical purposes) is defined as a residual 
item by an identity. 
At world level, given data availability, constraint (6) should 
be used to define the rest-of-world capital balance. 
The next issue to consider in this context is whether bonds 
are perfect substitutes at the international level or not. In 
theoretical models, perfect substitution is often imposed and 
this results in the introduction of the interest rate parity 
equilibrium condition, which means that the forward ex-
change rate should also become an endogenous variable. 
Furthermore, these formulations are generally derived in a 
two-country framework and their generalization to an n-
country model is far from clear. 
The implication of perfect substitution is that bond holders 
are indifferent between domestic and foreign bond holdings 
and that the interest rate parity condition should always be 
maintained. The outcome is that it is impossible to determine 
the allocation between domestic and foreign bonds through 
behavioural equations. 2 In other words, this allocation must 
be fixed exogenously, which means that in policy simulations 
it will remain invariant. Furthermore, in fixed exchange rate 
mode, one and only one interest rate in the system can be 
determined independently. Should the US rate be the leader 
(as usually assumed) and the forward rate be determined by 
market expectations, the EC interest rate is merely the US 
rate times the forward premium, which means that the EC 
monetary authorities have no control on their interest rate. 
Although these assumptions and their logical consequences 
are extremely convenient in terms of data requirements and 
model simplification, they restrict considerably the useful-
ness of the model for policy analysis. It was decided therefore 
to assume in Compact that domestic and foreign bonds are 
2 The same indeterminacy applies in theoretical models with two consumers 
and two firms where the consumers arc indifferent between the goods 
produced by the two firms. In that case, it is not possible to determine 
the allocation of the two goods between the two consumers. 
not perfect substitutes. Accordingly, the allocation between 
them is made by a net foreign assets demand function, using 
income, wealth, interest rate (domestic and foreign) and 
exchange rates as explanatory variables. 
The current balance being computed elsewhere in the model, 
these foreign asset equations feed back into the model 
through the definition of private net wealth and through 
either foreign reserve fluctuations (which act on the public 
sector budget constraints) or through exchange rate fluctu-
ations. Finally, it makes sense to have an interest rate equa-
tion which is not simply an interest rate parity condition. 
2.1.2. Aggregate supply and demand conditions 
The aggregate EC model uses a CES production frontier for 
the derivation of labour demand relations. The production 
frontier itself is used to derive target levels for potential 
employment and output, subject to a given capital stock. The 
targets are the potential level of aggregate supply compatible 
with full employment of the capital stock and potential 
labour demand in the sense of Sneessens (1983), i.e. the 
maximum quantity of labour which firms are ready to hire, 
dependent both on capital stock and real factor costs. 
Aggregate demand (excluding inventories) is determined in 
the usual way as the sum of private and public consumption, 
fixed investment and net exports. Private consumption in-
cludes both income and wealth effects, which gives a direct 
feedback from the monetary sector to the real sector. The 
determination of fixed investment also takes into account 
monetary variables (i.e. the long-term real interest rate) in 
the definition of capital user costs. This is compared to the 
marginal product of capital, which is equal in long-run 
equilibrium to its real rate of return, hence establishing a 
linkage with profitability conditions. Net exports are deter-
mined in the linkage part (see below). 
With a given level of aggregate demand, inventories and 
prices fluctuate in order to ensure ex-post short-run equilib-
rium between· aggregate supply and demand on the goods 
market. 
On the labour market side, the approach follows Sneessens 
(1983- 84), i.e. effective observed labour demand (L) is 
defined as the minimum of 
(i) potential demand, i.e. the maximum amount firms are 
ready to hire given the existing capital stock and factor 
costs (LP); 
(ii) 'Keynesian' demand defined as a log-linear function of 
final demand and the relative cost of labour (LK), 
together with terms-of-trade effects; 
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(iii) labour supply (LS) defined as a log-linear function of 
active population. 
These elements are combined with an adaptive adjustment 
lag in order to take into account labour market rigidities, 
i.e. in log-linear form 
log L = a min (log LP, log LK, log LS)+ (1-a) log L_ 1 + u 
The equation for LS is, of course, a poor substitute for a 
'true' labour supply equation endogenizing participation 
rates, but the latter involves taking into account not only 
economic factors but also demographic (shifts in age groups) 
and sociological factors. Until now, it has proved difficult 
to obtain a satisfactory estimate of all these factors. For 
simulation purposes, the active population is given by an 
identity: 
where PA = active population (employment and unem-
ployment) 
PW A = population in working age group 
pat = average participation rate (ex-
ogenous). 
The constant in the relation between LS and PA takes into 
account frictional unemployment. The feedback to the rest 
of the model goes through the wage equation. 
According to the production block formulation, long-run 
consistency implies that equilibrium real wage costs should 
be determined by equilibrium real labour productivity and 
the elasticity of substitution, i.e. 
log W/ = constant + 1/s log plr* 
with s the CES elasticity of substitution. 
For empirical application, there should, of course, be adjust-
ment lags as in the labour demand formulation. The length 
of the adjustment lag is influenced by the degree of pressure 
on the labour market measured by the share of Keynesian 
unemployment in total unemployment. 
In other words, when unemployment is inherently of a 
classical nature (with therefore a low share of Keynesian 
unemployment), the relation between real wage cost per 
person employed and real productivity per person employed 
will still work as if the unemployment rate were low. 3 
3 Although the influence of Keynesian unemployment appears quite clearly 
from 1970 to 1980 in the evolution of real wages, one may argue that 
classical unemployment should also play a role since its determinants 
will be directly felt by participants in the wage determination process. 
This point should be clarified by further empirical investigation. 
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2.1.3. Prices and income 
The approach for price inflation is based on the microecon-
omic approach to average cost pricing. The domestic defla-
tor is linked to expected average cost, as given by the 
production block through an adjustment lag of the error-
learning kind. It also uses 'surprises' in the form of increases 
in the rate of variation of the import price and the money 
stock (giving therefore a second-order equation) and also of 
variations in the pressure of demand indicator defined as 
the ratio of potential capital output as computed in the 
production block to total demand minus imports. 
The consumption and investment prices are linked to the 
domestic deflator, with a terms-of-trade effect. 
Disposable income is reconciled with the financial con-
straints and defined as the sum of the wage bill, interest and 
dividend income on domestic private and public bonds and 
on foreign bonds. 
2.1.4. Government sector 
Most relations in this block are in fact identities, using 
average tax rates, etc., as policy variables on the income 
side. On the expenditure side, the main variables are fixed 
exogenously, either in real or in nominal terms according to 
the kind of policy scenario introduced in the model. 
Similarly, the interest on public debt equation is replaced 
by an identity using an average rate of return concept. This 
average rate of return (total of interest paid divided by the 
stock at the beginning of the period) is then linked to short 
and long-term interest rates through a Koyck lag. When 
going to country-based models, it will, of course, be necess-
ary to have a more refined approach, in terms of specific 
maturity structures, etc. 
2.1.5. Monetary relations 
As mentioned above, behavioural relations are needed for 
all asset demands not given by identities. 
Money demand (M2/M3) is determined as a function of 
nominal income (transaction motive) and of short-term 
interest rates (as proxy for the yield of interest-bearing 
elements in M2/M3) and long-term interest rates (as proxy 
for alternative asset yields). The stock of foreign reserves is 
either exogenous or endogenous according to the exchange 
rate determination model (see below, Section 2.1.6). 
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Net assets on the private sector are determined through the 
private sector balance sheet. There remains therefore the net 
foreign assets position. The equation used is a standard stock 
allocation relationship from a modified portfolio adjustment 
function, as proposed by L. Klein and K. Marwah ( 1983). 
The ratio of the net capital inflow (or outflow, according to 
sign) to the net foreign assets stock at the beginning of the 
period is a function of: 
(i) the rate of change in net foreign assets; 
(ii) the level of and change in the difference between dom-
estic and foreign yields, as measured by domestic and 
foreign interest rates, given the exchange rate (for sim-
plicity the forward premium is implicitly constant); 
(iii) an expectation factor on the exchange rate measured 
as the discrepancy between the rate of change in the 
exchange rate and the difference between domestic and 
foreign inflation rates, as an attempt to measure the 
influence of expectations about future PPP-driven ex-
change rate movements; 
(iv) the current balance, as a share of net foreign assets 
(matching credit creation to finance trade, plus active 
search of capital inflows or outflows to offset current 
account deficits or surpluses). 
As far as the government position is concerned, when a 
distinction between domestic and foreign debt is included, 
an equation is needed for distribution between the two. 
The ratio of domestic debt in total debt is a function of the 
existing debt to GDP ratio, the expected growth in the 
money stock and variations in real long-term interest rates, 
domestic and foreign. 
Finally, the variation in the share of new domestic debt in 
new total public debt feeds back into the term structure 
equation for the long-term rate, together with the US rate 
for the non-US zones. 
2.1.6. The exchange rate problem 
Two polar regimes may in principle be introduced into a 
model: either fixed rates where international reserves fluctu-
ate in order to maintain the balance-of-payments identity; or 
fully floating rates where there is no change in international 
reserves (DR = o). 
In between, and approaching some actual institutional ar-
rangements, two intermediate approaches have been de-
veloped: 
(i) the EPA model 'Flex' (Amano, 1981) approach which 
introduces explicit constraints on the range of desired 
variations in exchange rates such as the fluctuation 
margin in the European Monetary System. When the 
constraints are binding, then international reserves 
change through official interventions. Should a con-
straint on reserves be reached, the interest rates would 
have to move; 
(ii) the Klein-Marwah (1983) approach, where a semi-mar-
ket clearing equation is introduced, with, as the explain-
ed variable, the difference between the rate of change 
of the exchange rate and the rate of change of the stock 
of net foreign assets, giving in some sense the rate of 
change of the exchange rate that would have taken 
place in the absence of government intervention. 
In the present formulation, the EPA approach is retained 
for the ECU /dollar and yen/dollar exchange rates. The rest-
of-world module is defined in dollar terms. Its implicit ex-
change rate follows therefore strictly the US dollar. 
2.2. Main estimation results 
In this section, estimation results will be presented for the 
most important equations. A full listing of estimation results 
and a description of the estimation technique are given in 
Appendix A. Simultaneous equation techniques were used 
in the labour market, wage and price blocks. The small 
number of observations does not allow for a joint estimation 
of the full model. The presentation will follow the usual 
order, i.e. final demand, factor demand, wage and prices, 
public sector receipts and expenditures, monetary variables 
and balance-of-payments flows. 
2.2.1. Private consumption 
The literature about the consumption function is particularly 
abundant and the formulation retained here is fairly straight-
forward and compatible with the life-cycle hypothesis, i.e. it 
includes wealth together with income. 
The specification also incorporates the usual Koyck lag. The 
first year marginal propensity to consume is 0,385 with a 
long-run propensity of0,827 on real disposable income. The 
propensity to consume on net wealth in the first year is 10 
times smaller, i.e. 0,0305 and 0,0676 in the long term. An 
explicit price inflation effect is also introduced with an 
implicit elasticity at the mean of about - 0,08 short-term 
and - 0, 17 long-term. 
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2.2.2. Investment 
The investment function is always a critical one in macro-
economic models: whereas the various theories about the 
aggregate consumption function lead to fairly similar specifi-
cations, the investment functions show considerable vari-
ations in their analytical expression and explanatory vari-
ables. 
In terms of long-run equilibrium, the cost minimization 
hypothesis combined with a production function leads to 
well-defined desired capital stock relations. However, as 
pointed out already in 1960 by Haavelmo, the demand for 
investment cannot simply be derived from the demand of 
capital since a finite addition to the stock of capital can lead 
to any rate of investment.flows depending on the hypothesis 
made about the speed of reaction of capital users and, 
more specifically, about the factors influencing that speed 
of reaction. 
Compact uses the formulation proposed by Gandolfo ( 1978) 
and Knight and Wymer (1981) and assumes that net invest-
ment depends on the difference between the desired capital 
stock and the actual stock in existence at the beginning of 
the period, through a partial adjustment lag. The desired 
rate of growth of the capital stock is a linear function of the 
difference between the marginal product of capital and its 
marginal real user cost. The integration of these elements 
leads to a second-order equation linking variations in the 
rate of growth of net investment to the discrepancy between 
marginal product and marginal costs and to the former 
period rate of growth of the actual capital stock. The mar-
ginal product variable is derived from the CES production 
frontier and is therefore compatible with the labour market 
approach (see Section 2.2.4). 
Although well-suited to the long run 'supply-side' determi-
nants of investment, this function neglects in the short run 
the more usual acceleration effect linking directly investment 
to variations in effective demand. This formulation may 
therefore underestimate the speed of reaction of investment 
to policy shocks (cf. below, Section 5.3, p. 135, and Sec-
tion 6, p. 144). 
Variations in inventories also follow a desired stock ap-
proach, when the desired variation is determined as a func-
tion of the discrepancy between potential output and effec-
tive final demand (excluding inventory variations), with a 
partial adjustment lag. 
In the CES or Cobb-Douglas formulation, the real marginal 
product of capital is equal to its long-run real rate of return. 
Furthermore, the elasticity of the rate of return with respect 
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to the real wage rate may be measured by the ratio of the 
share of labour to the share of capital in value added. In 
other words, an increase in real wages will ultimately cause 
a fall in the marginal product of capital, hence a deceleration 
of net capital formation. This in turn will reduce potential 
output and potential employment as defined in the labour 
market section, contributing to an increase in classical unem-
ployment for a given labour supply. 
The estimation results show that a 1 % change in the discrep-
ancy between marginal product and marginal costs in one 
period of time will change the rate of growth of the desired 
rate of growth of the capital stock by 1 ,8 percentage points, 
which, given the adjustment lag, leads to an effective change 
of 1,0 percentage point in the rate of growth of net investment 
during the same period. 
2.2.3. Imports 
Given the aggregate nature of the EC module, external trade 
flows incorporate only extra-EC trade. This does not cause 
problems for GDP determination since intra-EC exports 
and imports should of course balance. Indeed, the flow data 
are adjusted by Eurostat in order to obtain that balance, 
any residual item being transferred to the 'rest of the world'.-
The trade balance remains therefore the same with extra-
EC flows as with total flows. 
The specification is the usual demand formulation, with 
demand for imports a function of final demand and relative 
prices (import prices divided by the domestic price index). 
In the initial Compact formulation, it was proposed to 
disaggregate final demand into gross fixed capital formation 
on the one hand, and total consumption plus exports on 
the other. Similarly, an attempt was made to get separate 
elasticities for dollar import price, exchange rate and dom-
estic prices. Although these disaggregations work very well 
in some EC country models (and in some European modules 
of the Japanese EPA model), none proved to be workable 
at the aggregate EC level: one of the side-effects of geo-
graphical aggregation of economic data is the partial cancel-
lation of country variations going in opposite directions. In 
other words, EC data are as a rule smoother than individual 
country data, which cause colinearity problems in estimation 
when a large number of explanatory variables are used. The 
problem is, of course, a general one, but the import function 
seemed to be particularly vulnerable. 
Finally, a case may be made for the use of the degree of 
capacity utilization in the import equation as a linkage to a 
disequilibrium situation on the goods market, in accordance 
with the approach retained for the labour market (cf. below, 
Section 2.2.4). This will be done in future developments. 
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Estimation results show an import elasticity of 1,33 with 
respect to final demand and - 0,26 with respect to relative 
prices. These may seem low compared to results obtained in 
other models, but are consistent with the fact that they relate 
to extra-EC flows only. The latter are growing at a slower 
rate than total country imports and include a larger share 
of raw materials which have lower price elasticities than 
manufactured goods. 
2.2.4. Labour market and derived concepts 
The approach follows closely that proposed by H. Sneessens 
in various publications ( 1981, 1983, 1984) and may therefore 
be linked to the seminal works written on the present nature 
of unemployment by Malinvaud (1977) and others. 
As mentioned above, the equations of the model determine 
three concepts, i.e. 
(i) potential labour demand (LP), defined as the maximum 
amount of labour firms are ready to hire, given existing 
capacity and factor costs; 
(ii) Keynesian labour demand (LK) with effective domestic 
final demand as the critical explanatory variable; 
(iii) labour supply (LS) as a function of active population 
(PA). Taking into account frictional unemployment, LS 
is therefore always smaller than PA. 
In the absence of adjustment lags, effective labour demand 
would be the smallest level between LP, LK, LS, with three 
possible outcomes represented by three binary variables: 
01 = I if LK ;:e: LP, 0 otherwise 
02 = I if LK ;:e: LS, 0 otherwise 
03 = I if LP ;:e: LS, 0 otherwise. 
The case 02 = 03 = I is the repressed inflation case (both 
Keynesian and potential labour demand are larger than 
supply). 
The case 01 = I and 03 = 0 is the classical case (maximum 
demand by firms is smaller than both supply and purely 
demand-oriented labour demand). 
Finally, 01 = 02 = 0 is the Keynesian regime. 
One has therefore for effective employment L 
L = minimum (LP, LK, LS). 
In the real world, of course, firms are not able to adjust 
instantaneously to equilibrium values and one has an adjust-
ment process which, in Sneessens's works, 1s a standard 
partial adjustment mechanism. 
~-I =[min (L:~~K,LS)r (7) 
with O<a< I 
Hence, one is practically never in a 'pure' case with the 
economy switching instantaneously from one regime to an-
other at a given date. 4 
Results for the initial Sneessens approach are the following: 
(i) The estimated long-run elasticity of substitution be-
tween labour and capital for EUR 10 is 0,967. As should 
be remembered, in a CES framework, this elasticity 
is also the equilibrium own-price elasticity of labour 
demand with respect to real wage costs. Although the 
value is statistically different from I, it tends to confirm 
that on aggregate data the Cobb-Douglas hypothesis 
of unitary elasticity of substitution is a good approxi-
mation. 
(ii) The adjustment speed with respect to factor price 
changes is fairly slow, with 16,4 % of the adjustment in 
the first year, and about 4 1/2 years for total adjustment, 
all other things being equal. 
(iii) The long-run value for labour-increasing technical pro-
gress is estimated at 2,7 % and capital-increasing techni-
cal progress at 3,3 %. Tests were made for non-con-
stancy of these coefficients but it made the estimation 
problem intractable, other coefficients of the pro-
duction frontier taking absurd values. 
4 Since the estimation of the labour market equations, a further paper 
applied to the French data only, by Lambert, Lubrano and Sneessens 
has appeared, where the partial adjustment is replaced by a CES 
smoothing, i.e. 
L = [ LP·' + LK·' + LS·']·.;-. ~ min (LP, LK, LS) (2) 
Table 1 
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(iv) The adjustment coefficient between regimes (a in equa-
tion (7)) appears to be high, i.e. 0,63, meaning a fairly 
fast adjustment between regimes. This also implies a 
high short-term elasticity of Keynesian labour demand 
to output changes, i.e. 0,55, a value higher than the one 
usually obtained, i.e. 0,3 to 0,4. 
When the estimation is redone by imposing a Keynesian 
labour demand onto all observations, the short-term 
elasticity of labour demand with respect to final demand 
falls to 0,37. This confirms the results obtained for 
France by Lambert et al. (1984) and for Belgium by 
Sneessens (1981) (on quite different samples) and gives 
an idea of the kind of bias obtained in standard Keyne-
sian analysis for individual coefficients. 
(v) The equations can be used to compute the evolution of 
potential and Keynesian employment. As in all similar 
studies, however, the levels are undetermined, but vari-
ations are correct. Potential employment was therefore 
scaled so as to have in every period a positive discrep-
ancy and in at least one period a zero discrepancy 
between potential and actual employment. The evol-
utions are compatible with those found by Sneessens 
(1984) for the four main countries, with an increasing 
discrepancy between labour supply and potential em-
ployment since 1972/73, whereas all three series (LP, 
LK, LS) fluctuate in a parallel way before that time. It 
should, however, be pointed out that due to the very 
low level of unemployment in EUR 10 during the 1960s, 
the proportions for that period are somewhat unreliable 
since a very small change in parameters is able to cause 
shifts between regimes. Since 1973, however, differences 
are more clear-cut and proportions more usable. Table 
I therefore gives the proportions since 1973 only. 
Table I gives the amount of the observed unemployment 
rate that can be attributed to either Keynesian or classical 
unemployment. 
EC unemployment rate - Breakdown between Keynesian and classical rates 
1973 1974 1q75 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 
Classical I 2,3 2,6 3.4 4.4 4,5 4,8 5,3 5,8 6,0 7,4 
Keynesian 0,1 0.3 0.9 0.5 0,8 0,6 0,2 0,3 1.9 2.2 
Total 2.4 2,9 4,3 4.9 5,3 5,4 5,5 6,1 7,9 9,6 
I Including frictional unemployment. 
So11rn' for total: Statistical annex- 'Annual t:conomk Rc.•1·h·1r /98}-84'. Tub\c .l 
121 
Compact - A prototype macroeconomic model of the European Community in the world economy 
In accordance with the theoretical background of the model, 
the evolution of Keynesian unemployment follows closely 
the cyclical variations of real GDP with expansion of Keyne-
sian unemployment during the low growth years (1974/75, 
1980/82) and quick reduction during cyclical recovery ( 1973, 
1976, 1979). Classical unemployment, on the other hand, 
may be related to the very fast expansion of real wages after 
the first oil shock and to the considerable slowdown of fixed 
investment formation after both oil shocks. 
It should be stated at this stage that the disequilibrium 
approach in Compact is limited at present to the labour 
market and, more specifically, to the labour demand deter-
mination by firms. The present formulation, therefore, is 
not consistent with a full disequilibrium approach for all 
agents, including, for example, rationing on the goods mar-
ket or investment demand (see below, Section 6, p. 144). 
The problem of returns to scale should also be investigated 
in that framework. Methodological problems for a full (and 
consistent) disequilibrium approach are, however, consider-
able and the present formulation should be considered only 
as a first step in that direction. · 
2.2.5. Wage determination 
The CES formulation rests upon the hypothesis of a long-
run equilibrium relation between real wage cost and real 
labour productivity, the long-run elasticity between these 
two variables being the elasticity of substition of the underly-
ing CES function. 
Expected labour productivity is therefore taken as a target 
in wage determination and is represented by a distributed 
lag over present and past observed variations in output per 
occupied person. This target may, however, be over or 
under-reached, according to the respective bargaining power 
of employers' and employees' representatives during wage 
negotiations. In the Compact formulation, this aspect is 
taken into account by making the adjustment speed an 
inverse function of Keynesian unemployment plus I % be-
fore 1971 and 2 % later, representing in a somewhat ad-hoe 
way frictional unemployment. It also avoids division by 
zero when the Keynesian part of unemployment (nearly) 
disappears. 5 
There remains, however, the problem that real wages are an 
ex-post concept, i.e. nominal wages deflated by either output 
prices (cost concept) or consumption prices (income con-
cept). An equation using the data series on real wages as 
dependent variables introduces therefore a kind of automatic 
5 See footnote 3. 
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100 % indexation process since, for accounting consistency, 
nominal wages must be defined by an identity (price times 
real wage). Therefore an indexation process was combined 
with the real wage determination in a two-equation system, 
i.e. with 
wn and wr 
prl 
ushk 
* 
nominal and real wage costs 
labour productivity 
Keynesian unemployment rate 
= desired or expected variable. 
wr* = a prl* 
prl* = TI prJWi_i 
d 
Dlog wr = -----. Dlog wr* 
a + b.Ushk 
Dlog W n = b Dlog p + (I- b) Dlog p_ 1 + Dlog wr 
The opportunity was also taken to include a concept of real 
net after-tax target for wage-earners through the introduc-
tion of the difference between nominal net (after-tax) wage 
growth and consumer price inflation, lagged one period, as 
third explanatory variable. 
When solving the system for the real wage-cost target, one 
is left with one equation linking variations in nominal wage 
cost to 
(i) real productivity changes with an adjustment lag func-
tion of the unemployment rate as described above; 
(ii) price changes; 
(iii) discrepancy between net wage-income changes and the 
inflation rate lagged one year. 
The main quantitative results are: 
(i) In a situation of Keynesian full employment, the long-
run productivity coefficient is equal to 0,978 and does 
not statistically differ from the elasticity of substitution 
of the implicit CES function. 
(ii) The adjustment is distributed over three years with 
proportions I /4, I /2 and I /4 in t0, t_ 1 and t_2 respectively. 
(iii) The adjustment to price inflation is equal to 0,872 the 
first year and 0, 128 the second year (the fact that both 
coefficients sum to I had to be imposed a priori). 
(iv) An increase by I % of Keynesian unemployment in a 
given year (which is a significant change; see Table 1) 
will cut during that year the adjustment of wages to 
productivity by one half with respect to its full employ-
ment trajectory. However, given the distributed lag over 
productivity, the net effect on wage cost will be much 
less in relative terms. 
(v) A fall by 1 % of the purchasing power of net, after-tax, 
wages will cause an increase by 0,39 % of nominal wage 
cost the following year, all other things being equal. 
2.2.6. Prices 
The price determination section starts from the GDP price 
deflator, used as general inflation indicator in the model. 
Other prices are expressed as function of the GDP price 
plus correction for relative import costs (consumption and 
investment deflators) or export prices. The alternative for-
mulation would have independent and specific price func-
tions for all final demand categories, then computing the 
GDP deflator as a weighted average of these prices. The 
main drawback of the latter approach compared to that 
chosen is that it requires more complicated estimation work 
and cumulates all errors in individual demand components 
with no guarantee that they will cancel out. Since the GDP 
deflator plays an important role in the labour market and 
investment equations, this cumulation of errors was deemed 
undesirable in terms of simulation properties. 
The equation for the GDP price deflator takes into account 
the evolution of average costs, as computed from the CES 
production frontier. Since in the short run the economy may 
be off its production frontier, this element may be taken as 
a long-run price target. In the short run, deviations around 
this target are determined by any acceleration or deceleration 
in import costs and money supply, these two elements being 
taken as proxy for expectations of future increase or decrease 
in the average rate of inflation. The equation also uses 
Hendry's error correction mechanism for its dynamic formu-
lation. 
Results are very good for an equation expressed in rates of 
growth (it explains 92 % of the variance in inflation rate) 
and are consistent with the theoretical postulates of the CES 
model in a profit maximation mode. In the long run, the 
average cost elasticity is 0,998 and not statistically different 
from I. In the short run, any acceleration of import costs 
by one percentage point will add 0,05 points to the general 
inflation level. Similarly, a variation of one point in money 
supply (M2/M3) growth will cause an increase of 0, 18 points 
in inflation in the first year, all other things being equal. 
Finally, any discrepancy in t_ 1 between computed average 
costs and effective price increases will appear in year t 
with a coefficient of 0, 72, all these coefficients being highly 
significant. 
For consumption and investment prices, the simplified equa-
tions work very well, with R 2 of 0,98 ( over rates of growth), 
the coefficients being respectively about 0,87 and 0,85 for 
the GDP deflator and 0,09 and 0, 12 for the terms-of-trade 
The EC module 
effect (price of imports over price of exports). Finally, the 
export price is a function of the EC's GDP deflator, with a 
weight of0,67 and of extra-EC world export price variations, 
with a weight of 0,36. The pricing behaviour may therefore 
be interpreted as two-thirds price setter and one-third price 
taker. 
2.2. 7. Public sector and incomes 
The public sector and income part of Compact-EC needs 
little elaboration here since it is composed mostly of identi-
ties, with average rate of taxation, social security contri-
butions, etc., taken as policy instruments. This part of the 
system will therefore be strongly revised in the future country 
modules, where institutional divergences and reaction func-
tion for the public authorities may more properly be intro-
duced. 
2.2.8. Monetary and financial equations 
Money demand in nominal terms is determined by the most 
usual formulation with nominal GDP. short-term and long-
term interest rates as explanatory variables. The elasticity is 
1,1 for nominal GDP. The short-term interest rate elasticity 
is small (0, 18) and is not significantly different from zero. 6 
The long-term interest rate elasticity. however, is equal to 
- 1,02 and significant. 
The short-term interest rate equation should be considered 
as a reaction function. The main factors included are the 
discrepancy between nominal GDP growth and M2/M3 
growth, the exchange rate variations and the US short-term 
interest rate. The equation was estimated with a Koyck lag 
and gives the following results: 
A discrepancy of one percentage point between money 
growth and nominal GDP growth will change the _short-
term rate by 0,226 points in the short run, by 1, 14 pomts m 
the long run. A I % increase in the USD/ECU rate will 
decrease the short-term rate by 0,017 points (short run) or 
0,09 points in the long run. The US rate will affect the EC 
rate by O, I O points in the short run, 0,513 points in the long 
run. The average lag length is four years. 
The long-term interest rate is related to the short-term rate 
(term structure equation) with a coefficient of 0,48 in the 
o The fact that the short-term interest rate has a positive elasticity comes 
from the heterogenous nature of the monetary aggregate at the EC level. 
i.e. a mixture of M2 and M3 which contains interest-bearing assets 
reacting positively to changes in the short-term interest rate. 
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short run, 0,736 in the long run. The acceleration of inflation 
taken as an expectation of future inflation is not significant. 
An increase in the PSBR as a percentage of GDP will 
increase the long-run rate by 0, 18 points in the short run, 
0,27 in the long run. The average lag length is 2 1/2 years. 
2.2.9. Balance of payments 
External capital net inflows are given by a portfolio allo-
cation equation following the model proposed and tested by 
L. Klein and K. Marwah (1983). The net capital flow in 
country or zone i, expressed as a ratio to the stock of net 
foreign assets at the beginning of the period, is a function 
of 
(i) the rate of change in net foreign assets; 
(ii) the yield differential both in level and in first differences; 
(iii) the price-parity deviation of the exchange rate (vari-
ation in exchange rate parity minus the relative price 
change between domestic and foreign prices); 
(iv) the current account balance as a fraction of net foreign 
assets at the beginning of the period, representing both 
credit creation to finance trade or active search of 
capital inflows or outflows to offset the current account 
position. 
Given the poor quality of capital flow data, the estimates 
should be taken with caution. It should also be remembered 
that elasticities apply to a ratio. Therefore, a high elasticity 
with respect to the share of capital inflows in wealth may 
correspond to a small adjustment in the stocks. The esti-
mated coefficient on the rate of change in total net foreign 
assets is 0,48. The interest rate differential impact is also 
substantial with a coefficient ofO, 12 for the differential itself 
and 0,093 for its variation. The purchasing power parity 
discrepancy is weakly significant with a coefficient of 
- 0, 112. Finally, the current balance term has a coefficient 
of -0,412. 
3. United States of America, Japan, 
rest-of-world and linkage module 
3.1. Methodology for the USA and Japan 
modules 
It was considered inadvisable to re-estimate the USA and 
Japan equations since this would have greatly lengthened 
the time required to built Compact. Two alternatives were 
therefore considered: 
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(a) Minimal approach: this would have consisted of making 
direct use of multiplier tables from other sources. The equa-
tions might have been of the form (taken from Helliwell and 
Padmore, 1981) 
d% YusA = 1,18 d%XusA + 0,2 d%XJA + 0,05 d%XEc 
+ 0,69 d%XusA + 0,02 d%X1A + etc... (9) 
~, ~l 
where d % Y USA = impact on US income of a I % change 
(d %X) in public expenditure in Japan, EC in periods t, 
t- 1, etc. 
These relations are, of course, very easy to use and build, 
but published material on policy shocks are extremely heter-
ogenous and not always well documented. Besides, inter-
national exercises (the only ones that are truly relevant for 
our purpose) are limited to a few case studies. This means 
that the possible use of the Compact model as far the USA 
and Japan are concerned would be limited to what has 
already been done elsewhere. 
(b) A second approach, that which was retained, requires 
the availability of a US and a Japanese model together with 
a minimal subset of its data base (the most recent preferably). 
This requirement is met by the USA and Japan modules of 
the EPA world model since both equations and simulation 
results for 1982 - 83 together with exogenous hypotheses are 
published in the EPA Discussion Paper No 15, March 1983. 
Furthermore, the monetary equations of the US model have 
been revised by Flint Brayton (Federal Reserve Board) in 
EPA Discussion Paper No 26, May 1983, and may be taken 
into account since they incorporate the impact of the most 
recent institutional development in US financial markets. 
Since Brayton's equations are relatively self-contained, the 
substitution may be done without difficulty. 
The procedure may be decomposed in two steps: 
(i) Analytical linearization of the models. Since 99 % of 
any model's behavioural equations are either linear or 
linearized for estimation (through logarithms etc.), the 
process is quite simple. 
Example: a standard Cobb-Douglas production function 
Y0 = AK\L\egto may be rewritten 
log Y 0 = log A + a log K 0 + b log L0 + gto giving 
dY dK dL 
-=a-+b-
yo Ko Lo 
or 
United States of America, Japan, rest-of-world and linkage modules 
a linear relation in the first differences (after switching from 
continuous to discrete time), the index o denoting the period 
around which the model is linearized and D being the first 
difference operator. 
(ii) Condensation of the linearized model into a semi-re-
duced form. Once the model is linearized, it may be 
written for any period t 
(10) 
The vector DY1 represents the first differences in the en-
dogenous variables, the vector DX1 the first differences in the 
contemporaneous exogenous variables. Al' 8 1 are matrices of 
coefficients. C1 is a matrix of constant, incorporating not 
only trend constant terms but also all predetermined variable 
impacts (i.e. those relative to lagged values of Y and X). 
A condensed semi-reduced form of the system will be written 
(11) 
where DY\ denotes the vector of first differences in retained 
endogenous variables, i.e. a subset of the initial endogenous 
coverage of the initial model. The method used is Gauss 
pivotal substitution which means that the reduced matrices 
Ar, sr, er will nevertheless contain the same information set 
as in A, B, C (the coefficients of the former being linear 
combinations of those of the latter). Thanks to this pro-
cedure, a simultaneous model of say 50 equations may 
be compressed into JO or less behaviourals without losing 
information in the process. Of course, the full analytical 
derivation of coefficients A\, B\, C\ from A 1, 8 1, C1 would 
be extremely cumbersome, but their numerical computation 
is always possible since, in an actual model, all these coef-
ficients are numbers. 
The main advantage of this procedure is that the final output 
is still a simultaneous system that may be linked to the other 
components of the complete model and used for simulations 
with possible shocks both on the exogenous variables dX1 
but also on the retained endogenous variables. 
It may also be noted that it is not necessary to consider 
all exogenous variables. Should some of them be judged 
irrelevant or better kept invariant, they may be transferred 
into the constant matrix C1. 
As proposed above, the US and Japanese modules of Com-
pact are semi-reduced forms of the corresponding Economic 
Planning Agency (EPA Tokyo) world model. 
These were chosen for the following reasons: 
(i) They are published and well documented, together with 
numerous simulation results. 
(ii) They have reasonably good properties at least in their 
'constrained exchange rate' mode. 
(iii) They are much smaller than most other USA or Japan 
models in existence but still contain all that is needed 
in Compact, i.e. final demand, Jabour market, wages, 
prices, monetary and financial equations with a com-
plete presentation of all balance-of-payments flows, 
wealth, and real balance effects, etc. 
(iv) They were built from the start as components in a 
multinational model and, although not identical (as in 
Comet), their basic macro-structures are quite compar-
able. 
(v) Their analytical formulation (basically Jog-linear) is eas-
ily tractable for linearization and partial reduction. 
Although much smaller than the US and Japanese models 
used in other institutions, the USA and Japan modules of 
the EPA model are still large compared to the proposed 
EC module. Excluding the linkage part, the number of 
behavioural equations is 74 in the US model and 69 in the 
Japanese model, with the following breakdown: 
USA Japan 
Final expenditure 9 16 
Labour market and capacity utiliza-
tion 4 4 
Prices and wages 17 12 
Income distribution 8 8 
Government 1 4 
Money and finances 16 8 
Balance of payments 19 17 
74 69 
It is therefore necessary to reduce the size of the system, 
according to the substitution methodology proposed above. 
The final structure is the following: 
Endogenous variables present in the USA and Japan com-
pacted modules (eq = defined by a behavioural equation, id = 
defined by an identity) ' 
I. Private consumption 
2. Gross domestic fixed 
capital formation 
(eq) 
(eq) 
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3. Changes in inventories (eq) = 5 final expenditure 
4. Exports, goods and ser- (eq) equations 
vices 
5. Imports, goods and ser- (eq) 
vices 
6. GDP (id) 
7. Employment (eq) = 2 labour market 
8. Unemployment (eq) equations 
9. Wage cost per employee (eq) 
10. Domestic deflator (eq) 
11. Export deflator (eq) =4 pnce and wage 
12. Import deflator (eq) equations 
13. GDP price (id) 
14. Disposable income (eq) = I income equation 
15. Private net worth (id) 
16. Net government surplus (id) 
17. Money demand (eq) 
18. Short-term interest rate (eq) 3 monetary equa-
19. Long-term interest rate (eq) tions 
20. Net service balance (eq) 
21. Current balance (id) 3 balance-of-pay-
22. Private capital balance (eq) ments equations 
23. Reserves or exchanges (eq) 
rate 
18 behavioural 
equations 
As far as exogenous variables are concerned, the initial set 
in the EPA models is too large to be used easily. Therefore 
only a subset is retained here as basic exogenous values, the 
other being included in the residual adjustment item used 
for the calibration of the equations. 
The remaining instruments are: 
(i) government current expenditure in real terms, 
(ii) average tax rates, 
(iii) population in working age group, 
(iv) discount rate, 
(v) required reserve ratio, 
(vi) net transfers in balance of payments, 
(vii) exchange rate or reserve constraint. 
As can be inferred from equation 11, the coefficients of 
the Compact module are linear combinations of the initial 
parameters. Their interpretation is therefore difficult. In 
order to give a better idea of the key coefficients, expressed 
in the usual macroeconomic formulation (propensity to con-
sume, own-price elasticity, etc.), a short description of the 
initial equations is given in Appendix B. 
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3.2. Rest-of-world module 
As indicated in the introduction, the equations for the rest-
of-world component are at this stage primitive, with no 
other aim than to close the system. Rest-of-world (ROW) 
GDP (representing about 22 % of world GDP) is linked to 
the combined GDP of the EC, the USA and Japan. The 
short-term elasticity is 0,39, the long-term elasticity I, 18. 
This relation, however, explains only 75 % of the variance 
in the ROW rate of growth. 
Imports of goods are linked to GDP with an elasticity of 
0,327 short-term, 0,998 long-term. Price effects are intro-
duced through terms-of-trade change, the ratio of dollar 
export prices to dollar import prices being weakly significant 
at 0,211 short-term, 0,643 long-term. Export prices (in dollar 
terms) are related to the aggregate EC-USA-Japan export 
price with an elasticity of 0,638. 
Real exports of goods and import prices are given by the 
linkage equation. 
All other balance-of-payments items are determined as re-
siduals so as to ensure summation over zero for world 
current and capital balance positions. 
It is planned to introduce at a later stage specific commodity 
price equations in this module, in order to be able to simulate 
more closely the relations between economic developments 
in the EC, USA and Japan zones and commodity price 
evolution. At present, specific commodity price shocks must 
be introduced by ad hoe adjustment in the rest-of-world 
export price equation. 
3.3. Linkage equations 
The linkage methodology is taken directly from the Desmos 
system (Dramais, 1975). 
The basic assumption is that similar goods produced in 
different countries are not perfect substitutes. This leads to 
bilateral export equations that are highly non-linear but may 
be linearized by taking their Taylor expansion truncated 
after the first-order term. As a by-product, the linearized 
system is automatically additive. In other words, the world 
consistency constraint for the trade balance may be ensured 
without need for a country or zone to be determined as a 
residual. 
The linkage equations are bilateral and relate changes in 
market shares to relative dollar prices, relative potential 
output and relative degree of use of capacity. As in Desmos, 
the potential output term represents the notion of growth-
propelled exports. The degree of use of capacity acts as a 
proxy for non-price cyclical factors affecting exports. A 
Koyck lag acts on prices and potential output, but not on 
the degree of use of capacity. 
The dependent variables are not real bilateral export flows 
as such, but the difference between the effective export flow 
from i to j (Xi} minus what it would have been, were market 
shares constant. Calling Mj the import demand from country 
j, and aij ( = Xij/M} the market share in the base year to, 
the constant share export amount would have been aij.Mj. 
For the EC, the relative price elasticities are - 0,053 short-
term and - 0,442 long-term. The relative potential output 
term has a short-term elasticity of 0,093, becoming 0,768 in 
the long run. Finally, the degree of use of capacity has an 
impact elasticity of -1,03. 
It results from these parameters that bilateral export flows 
will be more affected by comparative changes in productive 
capacity and its degree of use than by relative price effects. 
4. Basic simulation results 
4.1. Methodology 
Any model may be simulated in four possible modes: 
Since lagged endogenous variables are used as explanatory 
variables, the user may decide for a given period t to use 
either the observed values of the lagged endogenous vari-
ables (when available) or the values computed by the model 
itself during the solution of period t - 1, t - 2, etc. The 
first case is called static simulation and the second dynamic 
simulation. 
All behavioural equations estimated by econometric tech-
niques contain a residual error term of mean zero over the 
estimation sample but with a non-zero variance around that 
mean. When simulating the model, these residuals may be 
set equal to zero or may be given random values drawn 
from a given statistical distribution (most often the normal 
or Gaussian distribution) with mean zero and variance equal 
to the residual variance of the equation. The first case 
will be called deterministic simulation, the second stochastic 
simulation. 
The combination of these polar cases leads to four possible 
simulation sets, i.e. deterministic-static, stochastic-static, de-
terministic-dynamic and stochastic-dynamic. 
Basic simulation results 
Over the historical sample, these simulation sets are essen-
tially reliability tests showing the properties of the model as 
a global system. To make an analogy with engineering sys-
tems, it is well-known that in a system with many com-
ponents, the fact that all individual components have a very 
low probability of failure does not preclude the fact that the 
probability of failure of the global system might become 
very large indeed. In modelling terms, the combination of 
equations yielding very good independent results may pro-
duce an unstable or explosive system. 
In most cases, simulations are presented in a deterministic 
way, i.e. with residuals set to zero. 7 This is the most con-
venient and time-saving procedure, but it causes some con-
ceptual difficulties. As shown theoretically by Howrey and 
Kelejian in 1971, the application of non-stochastic simula-
tion procedures to econometric models that contain non-
linearities in the endogenous variables yields results that are 
not consistent with the properties of the reduced form of 
the model. In other words, the multiplier analysis based on 
deterministic simulations yields results that do not apply to 
the corresponding historical value. The correct procedure 
should be to run a large number of simulations using the 
same levels or shocks for exogenous variables but different 
random values for the residuals and then compute the stat-
istical mean (and variance if need be) of the multipliers, in 
order to check whether discrepancies between deterministic 
and stochastic results may be ignored. 
For Compact, two sets of simulations are presented here, 
giving the two polar cases, i.e. deterministic-static and sto-
chastic-dynamic. These sets are completed by a determinist-
ic-dynamic simulation made on a forecasting period consist-
ent with the short-term forecasts made in the autumn of 
1984. Since the estimation period stops in 1982, the dynamic 
simulation covers the years 1983, 1984 and 1985. 
4.2. Historical period, deterministic-static sol-
utions 
The historical simulations were run on the last 10 years of 
the sample, i.e. 1973 - 82. 
As is always the case in modelling work, historical simula-
tions are difficult to present analytically since there is no 
single criterion from which to evaluate the precision of the 
model as such. All aggregated statistics (Theil's inequality 
coefficient, root-mean-squared-errors, etc.) relate to individ-
ual variables. One may, of course, build weighted averages 
of root-mean-squared-errors, but the weighting pattern is 
always arbitrary: on which criteria should one weight final 
demand errors versus price errors, etc. 
7 The fact that residuals may be given ad-hoe values during forecasting 
exercises (the so-called calibration of the model) has nothing to do with 
stochastic simulations and does not change the deterministic nature of 
the exercise. 
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GRAPH 9: Import price GRAPH 10: Total employment 
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GRAPH 13: Government net lending (% of GDP) 
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GRAPH 15: Long-term interest rate 
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GRAPH 14: Money demand (Ml/M3) 
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For these reasons, this first presentation is limited to graphs 
of the key variables and comments are confined to the most 
critical issues. 
On the whole the dynamic behaviour of the system is satis-
factory and follows the deep fluctuations in real and nominal 
macroeconomic variables registered during the period. From 
a structural point of view, the real part of the model performs 
slightly better than the monetary part. The weaker monetary 
performance may be attributed to the heterogenous nature 
of the monetary aggregates at the EC level and the fact that 
institutional factors and divergences in national monetary 
policies cannot be taken properly into account, together 
with the weaknesses of the short-term interest rate equation 
(see Section 6). The biases are mostly located in the 1977 - 78 
period as shown by the following figures. 
Money demand (an-
nual rate of growth of 
M2/M3) 
Observed 
Simulated 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
13,5 13,4 14,2 12,6 
13,4 12,1 12,7 12,4 
The model therefore does not reflect correctly the substantial 
change in apparent velocity during 1977 - 78 where in fact 
the rate of growth of nominal GDP decreased. 
Also difficult is the determination of the exchange rate as 
an equilibrium variable in the balance-of-payment identity, 
notably when the evolution of official foreign currency re-
serves is set exogenously. Since the simulated net capital 
balance fluctuates more smoothly than the observed one, 
the fluctuations in exchanges rates are also dampened during 
the period 1978 - 80 where the ECU /dollar simulated levels 
are 1,19, 1,29 and 1,31 versus observed levels of 1,27, 1,37 
and 1,39. The same phenomenon appears during the 
1981 - 82 dollar revaluation, with simulated values of 1, 17 
and 1,03 against I, 11 and 0,98 observed. 
When analysing the contribution of explanatory variables, 
it seems that the problem results from the parameters of the 
net foreign capital inflow equations, where the weight given 
to interest rate differentials should perhaps for recent years 
be more important and the weight of the current balance 
less important than those given by coefficients estimated 
over 1971 - 82. 
4.3. Out-of-sample deterministic-dynamic 
simulations 
The out-of-sample simulation was run on the same exogen-
ous assumptions as those published in the economic fore-
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casts made in the autumn of 1984. As said above, since the 
estimation data base stops in 1982, the simulation covers in 
fact three years. 
Results are satisfactory as far as domestic variables are 
concerned. The model, however, was unable to reproduce 
the ECU /dollar evolution. Export growth is therefore under-
estimated over the whole period and imports slightly higher. 
GDP growth is therefore biased downward. 
As regards prices, import prices in ECU terms are also 
subject to the exchange rate bias. This, of course, has favour-
able consequences for the domestic inflation rate and nomi-
nal wage growth. 
On the labour market side, both biases (less growth but 
lower wages) tend to cancel out and the projection for 
employment is practically the same with a lower rate of 
increase of classical unemployment and a marginal fall of 
Keynesian unemployment in 1984- 85. Overall, however, 
unemployment still increases as in the autumn 1984 forecast. 
On the monetary side, the lower growth on nominal GDP 
leads to some underestimation of the M2/M3 evolution. 
Interest rates follow the right profile, but are overestimated 
by about I /2 point. 
With respect to the latest estimations for the effective rate 
of growth 1983 - 84, besides exchange rates, the major differ-
ence in assumptions stays at the level of public consumption 
in 1984, forecast to grow at 0,6 % only, whereas the latest 
available figure is 1,2 %. 
4.4. Dynamic-stochastic simulations 
Stochastic simulations reintroduce the amount of random 
'noise' not explained by the estimated parameters. They may 
be used for a variety of experiments but will be used here 
as a test for the uncertainty to be associated with the model 
results. Over the historical sample, this uncertainty may be 
linked to two factors, i.e. the error term and the coefficient 
estimates. The latter are also stochastic variables with a 
given mean, i.e. the value of the coefficient used in the 
equation and a standard error (from which the significativity 
tests are derived). In forecasting runs, a third factor should 
be taken into account, i.e. the uncertainty about the exogen-
ous forecasts, which is also the most difficult to estimate. 
The present exercise is limited to the residual error term. 
The procedure is then straightforward, if tedious. 
Basic simulation results 
Table 2 
Comparison of Compact's forecasts and DG Il's official forecasts of autumn 1984 
1983 1984 
Gross domestic product DG II forecast 0,90 2,20 
Compact 0,60 1,90 
Latest estimates 1,00 2,20 
Private consumption DG II forecast 1,20 1,20 
Compact 1,00 1,10 
Latest estimates 1,10 1,00 
Investment DG II forecast -0,10 3,20 
Compact -0,50 2,80 
Latest estimates 0,00 2,30 
Exports DG II forecast 1,90 7,60 
Compact 1,50 6,00 
Latest estimates 1,70 7,10 
Imports DG II forecast 0,00 6,80 
Compact 0,50 7,60 
Latest estimates 1,40 6,30 
GDP price DG II forecast 6,40 4,70 
Compact 6,10 4,50 
Latest estimates 7,80 5,80 
Consumption price DG II forecast 6,00 4,90 
Compact 5,80 4,60 
Latest estimates 7,60 6,20 
Export price DG II forecast 4,70 6,20 
Compact 4,50 6,00 
Latest estimates 6,30 7,50 
Import price DG II forecast 3,20 7,00 
Compact 3,00 6,60 
Latest estimates 4,90 8,30 
Employment DG II forecast -0,80 0,00 
Compact -1,00 -0,10 
Latest estimates -0,90 0,30 
Net lending ( +) or borrowing ( - ) of general DG II forecast -5,50 -5,40 
government(% of GDP) Compact -5,30 -5,20 
Latest estimates -5,40 -5,30 
Current balance(% of GDP) DG II forecast 0,10 0,00 
Compact 0,00 -0,10 
Latest estimates 0,10 0,10 
Long-term interest rate DG II forecast 12,20 11,60 
Compact 13,00 12,10 
Latest estimates 12,70 10,90 
M2/M3 DG II forecast 10,10 8,40 
Compact 9,80 8,00 
Latest estimates 10,70 10,40 
ECU/USD DG II forecast 10,10 12,50 
Compact 5,60 5,80 
Latest estimates 9,10 11,50 
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Step 1: Residuals are built for equation i in period t as 
24 
uit = su. ( :E rj - 12) for all i, t 
j=I 
where su is the estimated standard error of the residuals in 
equation i (as given by the regression programme) and the 
ri computer generated random numbers drawn from the (0,1) 
interval. The uit have all properties of a normal distributed 
variable with mean zero and standard error su. 
Step 2: The model is solved in the usual way. 
Step 3: The process step I-step 2 is repeated 50 times. 
The end result is therefore 50 computed values for each 
endogenous variable in each period, Yitk• giving 50 simulation 
residuals sitk = Yit-Yitk• when Yit is the observed value of y. 
The mean (E(sitk)) and variance (V(sitk)) of these residuals 
may then be computed giving a measure of any systematic 
bias in the equation and of the potential variability of its 
Table 3 
Estimated standard errors of simulation results for 1973-82 
1973 1974 1975 
Real GDP 0,23 0,38 0,34 
GDP deflator 0,32 0,43 0,51 
Labour demand 0,06 0,05 0,08 
Real wage rate 0,26 0,33 0,39 
Long-term interest rate 0,46 0,51 0,49 
Money (M2/M3) 0,83 0,74 0,72 
ECU/USD rate 0,49 1,09 1,10 
Should the residuals follow a normal distribution, these 
figures would mean that the margin of uncertainty for the 
variables given here is equal to ± 1,96 times the standard 
error contained in the table. The error on real GDP would 
be about 0,6 points, about I, I points for the inflation rate, 
etc. As could be expected, the exchange rate results are 
significantly worse than the others, illustrating clearly the 
difficulty of handling the ECU/dollar rate in economic terms 
only. 
It should be stated again that these results are partial since 
they ignore parameter variability and that they are essen-
tially useful in a comparative way between models or formu-
lations inside a model, since it gives a statistical basis on 
which to appreciate which model or specification performs 
best over a given period of time. 
134 
simulation results, i.e. a measure of the uncertainty associ-
ated with the equation. Should there be no problem of mis-
specification, no error in the stochastic simulation process 
and no error from the parameter estimates, then the average 
of the sitk for all i, t should be zero. None of these assump-
tions is likely to be satisfied, but the net effect on E(sitk) is 
difficult to assess since no analytical solution is possible. The 
most important feature should therefore be the evolution of 
the E(sitk) as t varies. 
For Compact also, for any period t the mean value may 
differ from zero, but the average over time is indeed zero, 
i.e. there is no systematic bias in the model over its sample 
period. The dispersion, however, may be larger and is given 
in the following table for GDP, the GDP deflator, labour 
demand, wage rate, long-term interest rate, money supply 
and ECU/USD rate. The data are the standard errors of the 
simulation residuals as computed by stochastic simulation 
and are normalized so as to be expressed in percentage 
points to be compared with the average rate of growth, 
except for the interest rate. 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Average 
0,27 0,22 0,40 0,36 0,30 0,31 0,29 0,31 
0,58 0,60 0,54 0,61 0,72 0,76 0,69 0,57 
0,09 0,08 0,09 0,10 0,09 0,09 0,09 0,08 
0,31 0,29 0,32 0,28 0,27 0,31 0,29 0,31 
0,55 0,57 0,56 0,59 0,61 0,69 0,79 0,58 
0,76 0,78 0,75 0,72 0,77 0,75 0,76 0,76 
1,20 1,23 1,20 1,32 1,30 1,31 1,46 1,22 
5. Multipliers 
5.1. Basic definitions 
In order to simplify comparison with other models' results, 
all tables in this note are given in percent or percentage 
point differences between shock and baseline. If we call mi 
the multiplier for variable i, Si the level reached by variable 
i after a given policy shock and Bi its level in the baseline 
solution, the multipliers are defined for any period t as: 
This formula generally applies, the only exceptions being 
variables defined as ratios (current balance and budget defi-
cit as a percentage of nominal GDP, unemployment as a 
percentage of active population) or variables already expre-
ssed in percent, such as the interest rates. Since percentage 
changes in a ratio are difficult to interpret, these variables 
will have multipliers expressed in level differences, i.e. 
The units are therefore percent for mi,t and points for mj,t· 
Since it sometimes causes some confusion, it may be useful 
to remember here the relation between multipliers as defined 
and average annual rate of growth for the relevant variables. 
Multipliers mi t give the percentage differences in the levels 
of the variables. As the simulation goes on, they represent 
therefore the accumulated discrepancy between shock and 
baseline and not the yearly changes. In order to get the 
changes in the annual average rate of growth of the variables, 
one should therefore take the first difference in the multi-
pliers (mi,t - mi,t- 1). 8 
For instance, if the multipliers over four years are 
1,1 1,3 1,0 0,6 
the changes in annual rate of growth in percentage points 
will be 
+ 1,1 +0,2 -0,3 -0,4 
Should the baseline rate of growth be 
2,3 
they become 
3,4 
2,5 
2,7 
2,6 2,7 
2,3 2,3 
For multipliers mj,t (in percentage points), the problem does 
not exist and they may be added to or subtracted from the 
relevant baseline levels directly. 
The baseline is the solution of the model for 198 I - 84, 
recalibrated so as to reproduce the macroeconomic evolution 
contained in the Statistical annex of the 'Annual Economic 
Report and Review 1984 - 85'. 
8 Mathematically speaking, this is only an approximation of the change 
in rate of growth but, given rounding errors, the slight loss of precision 
is of no consequence. 
Multipliers 
5.2. Definition of the shocks 
As a rule, shocks are given in normalized form, when shocks 
are in monetary units. Specifically, the ex-ante amount of 
the shock is then expressed as the amount equivalent to 
I % of baseline GDP. This is a matter of pure technical 
convenience, since it makes multipliers comparable beween 
shocks, in the sense that one may appreciate their relative 
efficiency in terms of a given target (growth, inflation, unem-
ployment, etc.) without need for auxiliary computations. 9 
As a rule, shocks are sustained over a period of five years, 
to show the development of dynamic effects. 
In terms of policy setting, the basic shocks are given in the 
most general way of model work, i.e. with fixed money 
supply target (except of course when the money supply 
target itself is shocked) and floating exchange rates. The 
implications of other modes of operation will be developed 
in a specific section. 
As a final word, it should be clear from the beginning that 
what is described are the properties of a still experimental 
model on which judgment should be applied before making 
any linkage to the reactions of the real world. This qualifi-
cation should always be kept in mind when reading the 
following sections. 
5.3. Public investment shock (Table 1) 
Shocks on public investment are the most widely used in 
published material about model simulations. The general 
mechanisms are also straightforward, but for comparison 
with other shocks, it may be worthwhile repeating them 
here. 
Public investment is a component of GDP. Hence, the ex-
ante impact on GDP is necessarily strictly equal to the shock. 
This in turn feeds into the income-expenditure relations of 
the private sector. Given the lags in these relations and the 
usual leakages into savings and imports, the initial induced 
impact on GDP is very small but still positive during the 
first two years. Negative factors, however, also build up 
from the first period on. 
Given the fixed money supply target, interest rates, both 
short-term (immediately) and long-term (with a lag) in-
crease with negative feedback on expenditures and positive 
9 This is the basic distinction between sensitivity analysis (as here) and 
policy scenarios where shocks should be fixed in terms of room for 
manoeuvre and political credibility. 
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feedback on inflation. The latter is also increased initially 
by the increase of the degree of use of capacity and later on 
by the acceleration of wage inflation resulting from increases 
in labour productivity and the indexation mechanisms. 
These negative feedbacks on domestic demand and net ex-
ports become sufficiently strong after the fourth year to 
cancel the initial ex-ante impulse and bring GDP down 
towards its baseline level. 
At the level of labour demand, the initial impact is positive 
due to the induced increases in expected supply and resulting 
increases in productive capacity. Given the adjustment lags, 
this process is, however, slow and labour demand is limited 
to potential demand and below what is implied by the pure 
Keynesian effect during the first two years. Besides, the 
difference between Keynesian and potential demand acts 
negatively on the structure of unemployment where the 
Keynesian share is progressively replaced by the classical and 
frictional shares. This, combined with productivity increases, 
strongly accelerates the growth of real wage cost, bringing 
potential labour demand down. At the same time, the inter-
est-rate-induced increase in capital costs and progressive 
deterioration of domestic demand and real trade balance act 
negatively on expected supply and net investment, leading 
to further reductions in potential labour demand. 
All in all, employment ends up in the fifth year at the same 
level as in the baseline. 
At the level of the government sector, the absence of sus-
tained expansion dynamic does not enable a full resorption 
of the initial increase in the budget deficit. 
The exchange rate answer results from several conflicting 
influences: the deterioration of the current balance is a 
depreciating factor as is the inflation differential at the level 
of the capital balance. 
The interest rate differential, however, and the current bal-
ance deficit itself, 10 act in a revaluing direction on the capital 
balance. The net effect is therefore ambiguous a priori. Ex-
post, it turns out in Compact that depreciating factors are 
slightly dominant, leading to a mild depreciation of the 
ECU. 
Compared to the average EUR 4 results of Eurolink, Com-
pact gives a more pessimistic view. Leaving aside differences 
10 Acting as a proxy for active search of foreign capital inOows in order 
to finance the current deficit. 
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in parameters, two structural characteristics of Compact 
may be quoted as contributory factors: 
(i) The Gandolfo-Wymer investment function does not 
include the usual cyclical acceleration mechanism and 
is in some sense purely 'supply-sided'. It may therefore 
underestimate the cyclical reaction of investment during 
the first two or three years, before crowding-out effects 
enter significantly into play. 
(ii) The labour market approach of Compact leads to much 
lower labour demand answers than in Eurolink. All 
other things being equal, this checks the expansion of 
total wage income and keeps private consumption on 
a lower trajectory. Conversely, the progressive conver-
sion of Keynesian unemployment into classical unem-
ployment generates through the wage equation a rate 
of wage inflation in the medium term that is about as 
large or larger than in Eurolink. In other words, weaker 
domestic and foreign demand in Compact than in other 
models do not necessarily mean weaker inflationary 
pressures, provided of course that wage formation be-
haviour remains as estimated in the model. 
5.4. Public consumption 
For the time being, public consumption in real terms is 
exogenous in Compact as an aggregated whole, just like 
public investment. Furthermore, both intervene in the model 
in a similar way for GDP definition, import content, etc. 
Public consumption shocks done without any other ad hoe 
change in the model would therefore only replicate the public 
investment shock, a situation similar to the one used in US 
models where public investment as such is never disaggre-
gated and the shocks made on real expenditure, the most 
usual distinction being between military and non-military 
goods and services. 
This has little consequence at present for operational use in 
fiscal shock studies, since an expansion of public consump-
tion is somewhat unlikely in the present circumstances but 
is, of course, unsatisfactory from a methodological point of 
view and does cause conceptual problems in some simula-
tions involving wage moderation exercises (see below, Sec-
tion 9). 
For the future, therefore, it should be necessary, data permit-
ting, to separate explicitly the wage-employment com-
ponents of public expenditure from goods and services and 
rework the general structure of the model in accordance 
with it. 
Multipliers 
Table 4 
Autonomous increase in public investment, by I% of baseline GDP, sustained 1986-90 
(relative discrepancy with respect to baseline levels, in % except when noted) 
Real GDP 
Nominal GDP 
Real private consumption 
Real private investment 
Real exports 
Real imports 
GDP deflator 
Consumption deflator 
Export deflator (in ECU) 
Import deflator (in ECU) 
Real labour productivity 
Real wage-cost rate 
Total employment 
Unemployment ratel 
Budget deficit(% GDP)I 
Current balance(% GDP)I 
Long-term interest rate2 
Exchange rate (ECU/USD) 
Wage share in GDPI 
Real gross operating surplus 
I Differences in percentage points with respect to baseline level. 
2 Cumulated changes in interest rate levels, in percentage points. 
5.5. Cut in household direct taxes 
The mechanisms in action in this simulation are somewhat 
different from the public investment case. Although the ex-
ante change in the budget deficit is the same in absolute 
values, taxes as such do not appear in the GDP definition 
but in households' disposable income. The initial direct 
impact therefore only goes through the consumption func-
tion. Now all models exhibit some form of distributed lags 
on income increases, implying a short-run marginal propen-
sity to consume significantly lower than the average long-
run equilibrium propensity. The ex-ante impact on domestic 
demand of a 1 % GDP change in direct taxes is therefore 
much less powerful than a corresponding change in public 
investment. Since the tax cut is maintained, the marginal 
propensity to consume goes progressively up towards its 
long-run value and private consumption also benefits from 
induced income effects and net wealth effect as a counterpart 
to increased saving. 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
1,1 1,3 0,9 0,6 0,5 
1,3 1,6 1,8 1,9 2,2 
0,2 0,4 0,3 0,2 0,2 
0,9 1,4 1,1 0,5 -0,4 
-0,2 -0,4 -0,6 -0,7 -0,9 
1,3 1,6 1,4 1,0 0,9 
0,2 0,3 0,9 1,3 1,7 
0,2 0,4 1,0 1,4 1,8 
0,1 0,3 0,8 1,0 1,4 
0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,3 
0,8 0,9 0,6 0,5 0,4 
0,1 0,4 0,9 1,0 1,3 
0,3 0,4 0,3 0,1 0,0 
-0,3 -0,4 -0,3 -0,1 0,0 
-0,9 -0,7 -0,6 -0,6 -0,7 
-0,3 -0,6 -0,5 -0,4 -0,4 
0,4 0,7 1,2 1,7 2,2 
0,1 0,3 0,4 0,4 0,5 
-0,6 -0,5 0,3 0,5 0,9 
3,5 2,9 0,1 -1,0 -2,3 
On the whole, therefore, multipliers for GDP and its com-
ponents are initially lower than in the expenditure shock but 
increase progressively over a longer period. As a conse-
quence, the negative feedbacks coming from inflation and 
interest rates appear more progressively, the turning point 
in multipliers appearing only between the fourth and fifth 
years, rather than during the third. 
As far as investment and labour demand are concerned, the 
points raised in Section 2 also apply and the response to 
consumers' increased demand is very sluggish. This simula-
tion may therefore err somewhat on the pessimistic side but 
in any case, and thanks to the inertia of private consumption 
and its larger share in GDP, the economic position at the 
end of the fifth year is better than in the public investment 
shock, with GDP and employment still higher in level than 
in the base case, and the budget deficit less deteriorated than 
in the fifth year of the public investment shock. The main 
price to pay is at the level of the current balance, where the 
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present consumption-lead expansion brings a larger negative 
impact. 
5.6. Increase in indirect taxes 
The impact of an increase in indirect taxes corresponding to 
an ex-ante increase of public income by 1 % of GDP are the 
mirror image of the direct tax cut. Since the increase in the 
Table 5 
VAT rate is passed through into consumer prices, it causes 
an immediate fall in real disposable income and real wealth. 
As before, the reaction of investment is weak in the first 
year, but is affected by the reduction in supply afterwards. 
These reactions, however, are here again weaker than in 
models based on the accelerator principle. 
In this simulation, labour demand is determined by its Key-
nesian component which falls more than potential demand 
despite the fall in real wage costs. 
Autonomous decrease in households' direct taxes, by 1 % of baseline GDP, sustained 1986-90 
(relative discrepancy with respect to baseline levels, in % except when noted) 
Real GDP 
Nominal GDP 
Real private consumption 
Real private investment 
Real exports 
Real imports 
GDP deflator 
Consumption deflator 
Export deflator (in ECU) 
Import deflator (in ECU) 
Real labour productivity 
Real wage-cost rate 
Total employment 
Unemployment rate 1 
Budget deficit(% GDP)l 
Current balance(% GDP)l 
Long-term interest rate2 
Exchange rate (ECU/USD) 
Wage share in GDPI 
Real gross operating surplus 
I Differences in percentage points with respect to baseline level. 
Cumulated changes in interest rate levels. in percentage points. 
At the level of external trade, however, exports are less 
affected since export prices are exempted from value-added 
tax and react only partly to the increase in domestic costs. 
Imports, on the other hand, fall less than domestic demand, 
thanks to the improvement in their competitive position. 
The improvement in the current balance is therefore limited. 
The budget balance is, of course, improved, but by less than 
the ex-ante amount due to the built-in stabilizer effect, 
nominal receipts growing Jess fast than nominal expenditure. 
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1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
0,3 0,5 0,7 0,8 0,7 
0,3 0,7 1,2 1,5 1,7 
0,7 l,l 1,2 1,2 l,l 
0,1 0,4 0,9 l,l 0,8 
0,0 0,0 -0,l -0,2 -0,4 
0,5 0,9 l,l 1,2 1,0 
0,0 0,2 0,5 0,7 1,0 
0,1 0,3 0,7 0,9 1,2 
0,0 0,1 0,4 0,6 0,8 
0,0 0,1 0,1 0,2 0,2 
0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,5 
0,1 0,2 0,4 0,6 0,9 
O,I 0,2 0,3 0,3 0,2 
-0,l -0,2 -0,3 -0,3 -0,2 
-0,9 -0,8 -0,7 -0,7 -0,6 
-0,l -0,2 -0,3 -0,4 -0,4 
0,2 0,4 0,7 1,1 1,4 
0,1 0,2 0,2 0,3 0,4 
-0,l -0,1 0,0 +0,1 +0,3 
0,7 0,9 0,7 0,4 -0,9 
In the medium term, the effect of VAT increases on prices 
begins to die away from the third year on due to the negative 
pressure on wage costs brought by the increase in Keynesian 
unemployment and to the lower degree of use of capacity. 
At the level of interest rates, the constant money target tends 
to push the short-term rate initially following the increase 
in nominal GDP but this effect is reversed from the third 
year on. Long-term interest rates, on the other hand, follow 
the short-term rate and adjust also initially to the acceler-
ation of inflation. They are, however, negatively influenced 
by the improvement of the government budget position. 
Real interest rates, however, are unambiguously reduced in 
all five years. 
The exchange rate finally tends to appreciate during the first 
two years but depreciates afterwards due to the cumulative 
impact of price and interest rate differentials on the capital 
balance. 
5.7. Cuts in social security contributions 
of employers 
The social security contributions of employers represent 
about 15 % of wage costs and from the firm's point of view 
are clearly a tax on labour use. A cut in those contributions 
would therefore reduce the level of wage costs without nega-
tive side effects on household demand since net wage earn-
ings would not be affected. 
The end-result of such a measure is, however, crucially 
dependent upon public behaviour and pricing behaviour, 
Table 6 
Multipliers 
in order for it to produce its maximal effects. From the 
government side should come the assurance that the measure 
will be maintained once implemented. On the firm side, it 
should be emphasized that the ex-ante reduction in wage 
costs must be passed through into prices rather than go into 
profit margins. In that way, the positive supply-side effect 
on the wage-cost cut (notably on potential labour demand) 
will be paralleled by increases in real disposable income 
and wealth and therefore in private consumption, the most 
important component (quantitatively at least) of final de-
mand. 
In that way, the Compact simulation shows the appearance 
of a form of virtuous circle. 
At the level of factor prices, the measure will tend to modify 
the factor mix in favour of labour. This means that it 
will not, by itself, favour investment initially. However, the 
induced fall in average costs and prices will push private 
consumption and net exports from the first year on. This 
demand increase will have two favourable effects (besides 
the mechanical one on GDP growth): 
Autonomous increase in indirect taxes, by 1 % of baseline GDP, sustained 1986-90 
(relative discrepancy with respect to baseline levels, in % except when noted) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Real GDP -0,4 -1,0 -1,3 -1,3 -1,1 
Nominal GDP 0,7 0,5 0,2 -0,2 -0,3 
Real private consumption -0,6 -1,2 -1,8 -1,8 -1,6 
Real private investment -0,1 -1,0 -1,6 -2,0 -1,5 
Real exports -0,1 -0,3 -0,5 -0,5 -0,4 
Real imports -0,1 -0,6 -1,2 -1,4 -1,3 
GDP deflator 1,1 1,5 1,5 1,1 0,8 
Consumption deflator 1,4 1,8 1,8 1,3 1,1 
Export deflator (in ECU) 0,3 0,5 0,5 0.4 0,2 
Import deflator (in ECU) -0,1 -0,1 0.0 0,3 0,6 
Real labour productivity -0,3 -0,6 -0,6 -0,3 -0,2 
Real wage-cost rate -0,2 -0,4 -0,5 -0.5 -0,4 
Total employment -0,2 -0,5 -0,8 - 1.2 - 1.3 
Unemployment rate' 0,2 0,4 0.7 1,1 1.2 
Budget deficit(% GDP)' 0,9 0,8 0.6 0,5 0,4 
Current balance(% GDP) 1 0,2 0,3 0,3 0.3 0,2 
Long-term interest rate2 0,4 0,9 1,1 0,9 0,7 
Exchange rate (ECU/USD) -0,1 -0,2 0,0 0,3 0.5 
Wage share in GDP' 0,1 0,2 0.1 -0,2 -0,2 
Real gross operating surplus -0,8 -1,8 - 1.7 -0.5 -0.3 
I DiITerenccs in percentage points with respect to baseline level. 
l Cumulated changes in interest rate levels, in percentage points. 
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(i) It will cause an increase in Keynesian labour demand, 
compatible with the increase in potential demand. In-
deed, in the logic of the disequilibrium approach of the 
labour market, both should increase if one wants a 
significant acceleration of labour demand. 
(ii) It will, with a lag, increase expected supply. This in turn 
will ensure the acceleration of capital demand needed 
to sustain potential labour demand in the long run, 
once the changes in factor prices are absorbed. The 
resulting expansion of productive capacity will also help 
to contain demand-pulled inflationary pressures. 
A complex process of supply-demand interactions is in that 
way put into motion, leading to a new equilibrium position 
with higher GDP, higher employment and capital stock, a 
higher share of profits and a lower share of wages in value-
added, lower prices and interest rate levels. The major con-
straint will come from the balance of payments, which de-
teriorates due to negative terms-of-trade effects and the fact 
that the strong induced demand will cause imports to grow 
faster than exports once price differentials are stabilized. 
Exchange rates are once again submitted to conflicting influ-
ences, the improvement in price competitivity acting as a 
revaluing factor, whereas the fall in interest rates and the 
deterioration of the current balance act in a depreciating 
way. In Compact, the depreciating factors become dominant 
but changes in exchange rates are small. They contribute 
partly, however, to the stabilization of inflation at the end 
of the period. 
It may also be of interest to note that given GDP and labour 
demand growth, the simulation gives very low productivity 
gains (if any), which helps to limit claims for real wage 
increases despite the reduction in unemployment. 
For public finances, finally, the expansion of the economy 
and the fall in the unemployment rate and interest rates 
leads to a full reabsorption of the initial ex-ante cut in public 
receipts at the end of the period. 
5.8. Social security contributions of households 
In their implementation in Compact, social security contri-
butions of households are not strictly speaking an indepen-
dent instrument: the model in effect implies that a cut in 
social security contributions paid by households is totally 
allocated to households, just as employers' contributions 
were allocated to employers for decreases in wage costs, 
prices, etc. 
For households, however, it simply means (in the model) 
that net transfers to government are reduced at the level of 
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disposable income, just as in the case of a tax cut. Results 
are therefore similar to those obtained from a tax cut of the 
same magnitude and need not be repeated here. 
It also results from the fact that in Compact the social 
security sector is consolidated in the government sector. 
Given the rather complex structure of social security contri-
butions in most countries, this simplification may cause 
some distortion since cuts or increases in social security 
contributions of households are generally not neutral with 
respect to the subdivision of households into income classes 
or socio-professional groups. Since it is well-known that 
marginal propensity to consume varies across these classes 
or groups, it is important to know where the cut or increase 
is mostly supported. The degree of disaggregation needed 
for that kind of analysis is, however, considerable and im-
possible to reach in any case in Compact. 
5.9. Money expansion 
A simulation was made with money expansion in Compact, 
increasing the money target in the short-term interest rate 
equation by one percentage point with respect to baseline. 
Since then, however, the assessment of the monetary part 
has shown that the short-term interest rate equation is in 
clear need of a revision and implies notably too long a lag in 
the adjustment of the short-term rate to its new equilibrium 
value. Results in this simulation are therefore rather low 
too, and likely to be misleading. A new table will therefore 
be produced after revision. 
For the other simulations of this note, however, the problem 
is different since the critical rate is the long-term interest 
rate which, beside its linkage through a term structure with 
the short-term rate, also contains direct impacts of changes 
in inflation rates and government debt that are consistent 
with what should be its evolution. Also,' given its lag struc-
ture, the speed of reaction of the long-term rate to changes 
in its explanatory variables is faster than the reaction of the 
short-term rate. The biases introduced by the behaviour of 
the short-term rate should therefore be alleviated. 
5.10. Exchange-rate changes 
The determination of exchange rates in Compact is as de-
licate as in other models. The simulation experiments showed 
that the use of the Klein-Marwah approach for capital 
movements creates a kind of built-in stabilizer at the level 
of the exchange rate when in floating mode: any change in 
the current balance will be, all other things being equal, 
partly compensated by an opposite change in the capital 
Multipliers 
Table 7 
Autonomous decrease in employers' social security contributions by I% of baseline GDP, sustained 1986-90 
(relative discrepancy with respect to baseline levels, in % except when noted) 
Real GDP 
Nominal GDP 
Real private consumption 
Real private investment 
Real exports 
Real imports 
GDP deflator 
Consumption deflator 
Export deflator (in ECU) 
Import deflator (in ECU) 
Real labour productivity 
Real wage-cost rate 
Total employment 
Unemployment ratel 
Budget deficit(% GDP)I 
Current balance(% GDP)I 
Long-term interest rate2 
Exchange rate (ECU/USD) 
Wage share in GDPI 
Real gross operating surplus 
I Differences in percentage points with respect to baseline level. 
' 
Cumulated changes in interest rate levels, in percentage points. 
balance, dampening the fluctations of the exchange rate. 
And, indeed, although pointing at least in the right direction, 
Compact was quite unable to reproduce the deep fluctu-
ations registered in the USD/ECU rate in the recent past. 
The model, however, can also be used in fixed exchange rate 
mode with foreign reserves adjusting to the current and 
capital balance evolution. 
Since the external sector in Compact is fairly standard, 
results are similar to former ones. 
The simulation is based on a 10 % revaluation of the ECU, 
compared to the base case, against all other currencies (i.e. 
10 % in effective terms). 
The impacts show (as usual) unambiguous implications for 
prices but conflicting influences for real demand and income 
effect. 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
0,3 0,5 0,9 1,3 1,5 
-0,4 -0,7 -0,4 0,0 0,1 
0,2 0,4 0,8 1,0 1,1 
0,3 0,8 2,2 3,1 4,2 
0,3 0,7 0,9 1,1 1,2 
0,0 0,2 0,7 1,1 1,3 
-0,7 -1,2 -1,3 -1,3 -1,4 
-0,5 -1,0 -1,2 -1,2 -1.3 
-0,5 -0,9 -1,0 -1,1 -1,2 
0,0 +0.1 +0,2 +0,4 +0,5 
0,2 -0.1 -0,1 -0,1 -0,2 
-1,1 -0,6 -0,5 -0,7 -0,7 
0,1 0,6 1,0 1,4 1,7 
-0,1 -0,5 -0,9 -1,3 -1,5 
-0,9 -0,7 -0,5 -0,3 -0,1 
-0,1 -0,2 -0,3 -0,2 -0,2 
-0,2 -0,7 -0,9 -1,0 -),) 
+0,1 +0,2 +0,2 +0,3 +0,4 
-1,0 -0,4 -0,4 -0,6 -0,5 
4,3 2,1 2.5 3,7 3,5 
As far as prices are concerned, the initial ex-ante pass-
through into import price is distributed over two years; the 
global effect, however, is smaller than the amount of the 
revaluation due to the induced inflationary effects on other 
countries and zones. 
Domestic prices and export prices in domestic currency 
follow the fall in import costs, leading also to a decrease in 
nominal wages. The latter being, however, smaller than the 
price decrease, real wage incomes are initially increased. 
Finally, long-term interest rates also follow the decrease in 
prices. 
Demand effects, on the other hand, are more mixed. At the 
level of the real trade balance, the impacts are, of course, 
negative throughout. From the third year on, however, the 
negative impact is progressively dampened through the re-
duction in price differential coming from the EC disinflation 
and from the compression of import demand. Domestic 
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components of GDP are, however, in the short run positively 
influenced since real disposable income and wealth are in-
itially increased and capital user costs fall slightly. This helps 
to explain that GDP is hardly affected in the first year but 
this conclusion may be optimistic since a better inclusion of 
rational expectations in the system should lead to the reverse 
results: given the unavoidable future loss of income associ-
ated with the evolution of the foreign sector and the substi-
tution of domestic goods by imported products, real income 
gains may rather go into cautionary savings which would 
accelerate the loss in growth. In the present formulation of 
the model, however, these negative effects have to wait for 
the second year when expected supply acts negatively on 
investment and on labour demand. Private consumption and 
inventories, however, still keep total domestic demand above 
its baseline value until the third year and it does not fall by 
much afterwards. Domestic absorption therefore helps to 
keep the cumulated loss of GDP to 0,3 % after five years. 
Table 8 
Labour demand, both Keynesian and potential, is negatively 
affected by reductions in final demand and expected supply 
and by the initial increases in real wage costs. 
The current balance in nominal terms is influenced by ]-
curve effects during the first year. Afterwards, volume effects 
become dominant, but are still dampened by price effects. 
Finally, at the level of the budget deficit, both receipts and 
expenditures fall in nominal terms. Since, however, real 
expenditures are invariant, whereas real receipts are linked 
to a level of domestic demand and income that is initially 
increased but which falls after the third year, the budget 
balance as a percentage of nominal GDP is initially slightly 
improved but becomes more negative than in the baseline 
from the third year on. 
Autonomous revaluation of the ECU by 10% with respect to baseline, sustained 1986-90 
(relative discrepancy with respect to baseline levels, in % except when noted) 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
Real GDP -0,1 -0,3 -0,5 -0,4 -0,3 
Nominal GDP -0,9 -1,5 -2,1 -2,2 -2,2 
Real private consumption 0,5 0,6 0,4 0,2 0,0 
Real private investment -0,1 -0,2 -0,5 -0,4 -0,4 
Real exports -1,5 -1,7 -1,6 -1,5 -1,3 
Real imports 1,4 2,6 2,3 2,1 1,9 
GDP deflator -0,8 -1,2 -1,6 -1,8 -1,8 
Consumption deflator -1,2 -2,0 -2,2 -2,3 -2,3 
Export deflator (in ECU) -2,3 -4,1 -5,2 -5,3 -5,3 
Import deflator (in ECU) -5,1 -6,2 -6,9 -7,1 -7,0 
Real labour productivity 0,0 0,1 -0,2 0,0 -0,1 
Real wage-cost rate 0,1 0,0 -0,1 -0,1 -0,2 
Total employment -0,1 -0,2 -0,3 -0,4 -0,3 
Unemployment ratel 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,3 
Budget deficit(% GDP)I 0,1 0,1 0,0 -0,0 -0,1 
Current balance(% GDP)I 0,0 -0,3 -0,4 -0,4 -0,3 
Long-term interest rate2 -0,5 -1,0 -1,6 -2,0 -2,2 
Exchange rate (ECU/USD) 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0 10,0 
Wage share in GDPI 0,1 0,0 0,0 -0,1 -0,1 
Real gross operating surplus -0,5 -0,3 -0,5 0,0 0,1 
I Differences in percentage points with respect to baseline level. 
' 
Cumulated changes m intcrc<;t rate levels. in percentage points. 
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5.11. Wage moderations, with and without 
nominal GDP targets 
Compact was used for income policy shocks similar in prin-
ciple to those done with Eurolink in 1984. 11 The mechanisms 
are broadly the same except that labour demand impacts 
coming from Compact are more strongly differentiated be-
tween the case of wage moderation alone and wage moder-
ation with nominal GDP target. In the former case, Keyne-
sian impacts are dominant in the short term and cause a 
larger negative impact on unemployment since potential 
labour demand is never reached due to the deficiency of 
household demand. 
When nominal GDP is maintained invariant, the medium-
term evolution becomes dominated by supply-side effects on 
investment and potential labour demand. On a five-year 
horizon, Compact leads to a larger fall in the unemployment 
rate than the EUR 4 average of Eurolink, since as in cuts 
in social security contributions, Keynesian demand is also 
strong. 
Results of these simulations may, however, be distorted by 
two factors, the first methodological, the second factual. 
(i) One of the major mechanisms of the model over its 
historical sample, i.e. the formation of wages, is in fact 
eliminated in these shocks where the dynamic trajectory 
of wages is autonomously fixed. The question may then 
be asked whether other mechanisms in the model are 
still valid, such as price formation. 
(ii) Public expenditure remains fixed in real terms since 
the wage moderation is done under the ceteris paribus 
condition. Results for global demand may therefore be 
optimistic since real public consumption should fall if 
the wage moderation is applied also in the public sector. 
As a final word, comparison of Table 9 with Table 7 shows 
clearly that demand support during wage moderation is 
critical: a cut in payroll taxes reducing wage costs without 
reducing wage earnings is definitely more efficient than a 
cut in overall wage levels, leaving social security and tax 
rates constant. 
5.12. Changes in policy settings 
As said earlier, most simulations were made in a non-accom-
modating monetary policy, floating exchange rate mode. 
11 Annual Economic Review, Chapter 9, European Economy, No 22, 
November 1984. 
Multipliers 
Combining these cases, all simulations but two should be 
repeated in four different modes, i.e. 
non-accommodating - floating, 
accommodating - floating, 
non-accommodating - fixed exchange rates, 
accommodating - fixed exchange rates. 
This, however, would result in a considerable number of 
tables, comments on which would by necessity be extremely 
dull and repetitive. 
A priori, it is quite clear that comparative results will be 
highly dependent on 
(i) the sensitivity of global demand to interest rate changes; 
(ii) the sensitivity of exchange rates to the policy context 
and their implications on real demand. 
As regards (ii), all simulations made until now reveal a rather 
weak sensitivity of exchange rates to various shocks. The 
same shocks done in a non-accommodating, fixed exchange 
rate mode should therefore not lead to very different results. 
The interest rate question, however, is more open. In prin-
ciple, the absence of interest rate feedback should have 
positive effects on private consumption and investment (and 
also on the budget deficit). It should, however, affect nega-
tively the exchange rate. 
In Compact, differences between the various cases are rather 
small, but the question should be reassessed once a new 
monetary sector is in operation. 
5.13. Conclusions 
The sensitivity analyses applied to the EC module of Com-
pact show that the inclusion of supply-side factors into a 
model, however imperfect and partial they still may be, 
certainly has important consequences for the dynamic impli-
cations of policy shocks. Simulations involving supply-side 
shocks only have, however, also showed that supply shocks 
without perspective of significant demand expansion are just 
about as worthless as demand shocks made without regard 
to their medium-term supply consequences. 
In terms of the model itself, the sensitivity analysis showed 
that 
(i) the investment function should probably be more re-
lated to cyclical fluctuations without sacrificing its long-
run properties; 
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Table 9 
Nominal wages per employee kept 5% below baseline, 1986-90, without demand support 
(relative discrepancy with respect to baseline levels, in % except when noted) 
Real GDP 
Nominal GDP 
Real private consumption 
Real private investment 
Real exports 
Real imports 
GDP dellator 
Consumption dellator 
Export dellator (in ECU) 
Import dellator (in ECU) 
Real labour productivity 
Real wage-cost rate 
Total employment 
Unemployment ratel 
Budget deficit(% GDP)I 
Current balance(% GDP)I 
Long-term interest rate2 
Exchange rate (ECU/USD) 
Wage share in GDPI 
Real gross operating surplus 
I Differences in percentage points with respect to baseline level. 
l Cumulated changes in interest rate levels, in percentage points. 
(ii) the sensitivity of the short-term interest rate to money 
supply shocks should be increased; 
(iii) exchange rate determination is a weak spot. 
Models being a simplification of reality, other points might 
be raised, but these are, I believe, the most critical, and will 
be revised in the definitive operational version of Compact. 
6. Future developments 
As mentioned in the introduction, Compact is only a proto-
type of the future multinational model of the Directorate-
General for Economic and Financial Affairs, to be based 
on national models for the EC member countries and main 
trading partners. The existence of Compact is therefore 
limited in time and, as a consequence, improvements will 
mostly be concentrated in the most critical areas. 
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1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
-1,0 -0,3 0,1 0,5 0,7 
-2,8 -3,4 -3,2 -2,9 -2,8 
-1,3 -1,3 -1,0 -0,5 -0,1 
-0,5 0,3 2,3 3,3 4,5 
0,5 1,1 1,5 1,8 1,9 
-0,6 -1,5 -0,9 -0,3 0,3 
-1,8 -3,1 -3,3 -3,4 -3,5 
-1,6 -2,9 -3,1 -3,2 -3,3 
-1,3 -2,2 -2,5 -2,7 -2,7 
-0,2 -0,3 -0,3 -0,4 -0,4 
-0,7 -0,1 -0,4 -0,7 -0,9 
-3,2 -1,9 -1,7 -1,6 -1,5 
-0,3 -0,2 0,5 1,2 1,6 
0,3 0,2 -0,4 -1,1 -1,4 
-0,3 -0,2 0,0 0,2 0,4 
0,3 0,3 0,2 0,2 0,2 
-0,6 -1,3 -1,9 -2,8 -3,0 
-0,4 -0,4 -0,5 -0,6 -0,6 
-1,9 -1,4 -1,0 -0,7 -0,6 
6,6 5,3 4,1 3,3 3,1 
The short-term interest rate equation was revised in order 
to allow a more direct influence of inflation, both domestic 
and foreign, than through the simple presence of the ex-
change rate. Replacing er by domestic inflation rates in the 
EC and the USA, one arrives at a much smaller lagged 
adjustment, the mean lag being equivalent to three months. 
The short-run effect of a discrepancy between nominal GDP 
and money supply stays at 0,206. The inflation coefficients 
are + 0,32 for EC inflation and - 0,33 for US inflation. Since 
these values are not statistically different, the individual rates 
were replaced by the inflation differential, with coefficient 
0,325. The US short-term rate becomes more significant in 
the short run with a short-run coefficient of 0,409. Finally, 
the lagged value of the short-term rate intervenes with a 
coefficient of 0, I 86. The adjustment improves significantly, 
the corrected R 2 becoming 0,934 versus 0,8 I 4 for the original 
equation. 
Future developments 
Table 10 
Nominal wages per employee kept 5% below baseline, 1986-90, with public expenditure increases so as to keep nominal GDP at baseline level 
(relative discrepancy with respect to baseline levels, in % except when noted) 
Real GDP 
Nominal GDP 
Real private consumption 
Real private investment 
Real exports 
Real imports 
GDP deflator 
Consumption deflator 
Export deflator (in ECU) 
Import deflator (in ECU) 
Real labour productivity 
Real wage-cost rate 
Total employment 
Unemployment rate 1 
Budget deficit(% GDP) 1 
Current balance(% GDP) 1 
Long-term interest rate2 
Exchange rate (ECU/USD) 
Wage share in GDP 1 
Real gross operating surplus 
I Differences in percentage points with respect to baseline level. 
' 
Cumulated changes in interest rate levels. in percentage points. 
For private investment, the problem is more substantial and 
involves more reworking. Leaving aside a better disaggre-
gation of investment (which will be done in the national 
models), the Gandolfo-Wymer approach may be refined by 
using a disequilibrium approach linked to the labour market 
developments. More specifically, the present formulation 
can be used for a determination of 'classical investment'com-
ing from supply-side conditions (discrepancy between mar-
ginal productivity and marginal costs). This could be com-
pleted by a 'Keynesian' demand using the usual accelerator-
formulation and being therefore basically demand-driven. 
Effective investment can then be determined by a convex 
combination of the two, with weights taking into account 
the degree of classical regime versus Keynesian regime on 
the labour market, in order to be consistent with the other 
parts of the model. 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 
1,3 2,0 2,9 3,2 3,4 
0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
-0,8 -0,3 0,6 1,6 2,1 
0,8 2,6 3,5 4,3 5,9 
0,6 2,0 2,4 2,5 2,5 
0,8 2,2 2,9 3,1 3,2 
-1,3 -2,0 -2,9 -3,2 -3,4 
-1,1 -1,8 -2,7 -3,0 -3,2 
-0,9 -1,4 -2,2 -2,5 -2,7 
0,1 0,2 0,4 0,5 0,6 
1,0 0,5 -0,1 -1,0 -1,1 
-3,7 -3,0 -2,1 -1,8 -1,6 
0,3 1,5 3,0 4,2 4,5 
-0,3 -1,3 -2,7 -3,8 -4,0 
-1,2 -0,6 -0,2 0,2 0,5 
-0,3 -0,6 -0,6 -0,5 -0,5 
-0,4 -1,0 -1,8 -2,2 -2,5 
0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,8 
-3,5 -2,6 -1,5 -0,6 -0,4 
15,3 12,4 10,9 6,4 5,0 
With respect to exchange rates, trials will be made with 
alternative specifications, using either a reduced-form, beha-
vioural equation for the exchange rate, with central bank 
interventions as a main policy parameter, or a generalization 
of the intertemporal balance of payments equilibrium con-
ditions as proposed notably by P. Kouri. 
More ad-hoe or limited adjustment will also be made in 
other parts of the system, namely in the introduction of 
inflation and tax wedges into the wage formation process 
and in the determination of public debt where the present 
approach proved to be cumbersome and bringing little im-
provement with respect to a more straightforward formu-
lation. 
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Appendix A: The EC module of the Compact model - Technical information 
Al - List of variables in the EC module 
AVC average cost 
Bd domestic private bonds (stock) 
Bpf foreign bonds held private sector (stock) 
Cp private consumption 
d depreciation rate (exogenous) 
DI variation in inventories 
DM final demand 
OTC direct taxes on corporations 
DTH direct taxes on households 
er spot exchange rate ECU /USO 
EX exports, goods and services 
G public consumption (exogenous) 
GD government debt (stock) 
GOD domestic public debt (stock) 
GDF foreign public debt (stock) 
HI, H2 conventional working time for labour and capi-
ta! (exogenous) 
IIP interest payments on public debt 
IM imports, goods and services 
IT indirect taxes 
itc average indirect tax rate (exogenous) 
K capital stock 
Kuc capital user's cost 
L total employment 
LK Keynesian labour demand 
LP potential labour demand 
LS labour supply 
Mo stock of notes and coins in circulation 
M2/3 money stock (M2/M3) 
MG imports of goods 
MS imports of services 
NFA net foreign assets (stock) 
NKT net capital transfers, government 
NW financial net wealth 
NWIH non-wage income 
OCFX other counterpart elements (gold revaluations 
etc.) (exogenous) 
OTG other net current expenditure 
OTX current transfer balance nie (exogenous) 
p value-added deflator 
Pa participation rate (exogenous) 
Pc private consumption deflator 
PD 
Pg 
PM 
PM$ 
Pv 
PWA 
PX 
PX$ 
R 
rex 
rdg 
rdo 
rl 
r'us 
rs 
sscr 
sshr 
STH 
STPH 
SUB 
tc 
tdh 
tw 
Ur 
Vg 
Vp 
Wen 
Wn 
Wco 
XG 
xs 
y 
YD 
YS 
Symbols 
In 
D 
02 
domestic price index 
government consumption deflator 
import prices, national currency 
dollar import price 
investment deflator 
population in working-age group (exogenous) 
export price index 
dollar export price, goods 
foreign reserves (stock) 
average unit yield, foreign bonds 
average unit yield, domestic public debt 
average unit yield, domestic private bonds 
long-term interest rate 
US long-term interest rate 
short-term interest rate 
average employers' social security rate (ex-
ogenous) 
average employees' social security rate (ex-
ogenous) 
social security transfers to households 
social security contributions, households 
subsidies (exogenous) 
average corporation tax rate (exogenous) 
average household tax rate (exogenous) 
average direct tax and social security contri-
bution rate on wages (exogenous) 
unemployment rate 
public gross domestic fixed capital 
private gross domestic fixed capital formation 
nominal wage cost 
net (after tax) wage rate 
real wage cost 
export of goods 
export of services 
GDP 
disposable income 
potential output 
natural logarithm 
first difference operator 
second difference operator 
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A2 - Analytical structure of Compact and estimation results for the EC 
1.1. Final demand 
Private consumption, 1975 prices 
(I) Cp = ao + bo YD + cO (NW) 
Pc Pc _1 
Public consumption, 1975 prices 
G = exogenous (historical period simulations) 
or G = Gv/Pg 
lnGV = a-i- + Di In "{P:Y) 
with -P:Y = nominal GDP target 
Private investment 
(2) D2 InK = a21 b2 + c2 [d2 =~ -Kuc] - D In K_ 1 I 
Vp = K - {l-d)K_1 
Public investment 
V g = exogenous 
Inventories 
(3) DI = a3 {YS - [Cp + G + Vp + Vg + EX - IM]} 
+ B3 DI_1 
Exports of goods 
er 
(4) XG = (XGcu + XGCJ + XGCR) . -----
er base 
Exports of services 
Total exports 
(6) EX = XG + XS 
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Equations and variables 1 
Eq (1) Private consumption 
Disposable income (bo) 
Financial wealth (co) 
Consumption price (do) 
Consumption lagged (eo) 
Constant (ao) 
Corrected R 2 
Autocorrelation test 
Eq (2) Private investment 
Adjustment coefficient (a2) 
Constant (b2) 
Marginal coefficient (c2) 
Productivity coefficient (di) 
Corrected R 2 
Autocorrelation test 
Eq (3) Changes in inventories 
Supply-demand discrepancy (a3) 
Lagged changes in inventories (b3) 
Corrected R2 
Autocorrelation test 
Eq (5) Exports of services 
Exports of goods 
Export of services, lagged 
Constant 
Corrected R 2 
Autocorrelation test 
Coefficients 
0,385 
0,0305 
-0,097 
0,534 
0,713 
0,997 
1,935 
0,565 
-0,103 
1,866 
0,425 
0,767 
1,618 
0,902 
0,096 
0,542 
2,533 
0,050 
0,704 
0,101 
0,905 
2,250 
Standard 
errors 
0,097 
0,009 
0,042 
0,098 
0,837 
0,107 
0,015 
0,214 
0,192 
0,267 
0,051 
0,030 
0,231 
5,386 
1 Equations are listed in the numerical order of Section A2. Equation 
numbers not present in the list are those of identities. In all equations, 
the use of Koyck lags is indicated by the presence of the dependent 
variable name in the explanatory variables list with the term 'lagged'. 
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Imports of goods 
(7) In MG = a5 + b5 In DM + c5 In (PM/PD) 
Imports of services 
(8) MS = a6 + b6 MG + c6 MS_ 1 
Total imports 
(9) IM= MG+ MS 
Final demand 
(10) OM = C + G + Vp + Vg + DI + EX 
2. Production block 
Potential supply 
YS* = A {P [LP:H1.eAll] -p 
+ (I - P) [K_l ~2 21.21]-p}~ 
p 
a= 
l+p 
Expected supply 
(II) YS = aYS* + (I-a) * YS _1 - Y_ 1 
Potential labour demand 
p 
(12) In LP = In-- + (I - cr) (A2 - "- 1) t 1-p 
Kuc 
+ crln -- + In K_ 1 
Wco 
Equations and variables Standard 
Coefficients errors 
Eq (7) Imports of goods 
Import demand (b5) 1.331 0,083 
Relation price (c5) -0,264 0,106 
Constant (a5) -4,273 0,584 
Corrected R2 0,996 
Autocorrelation test 1.910 
Eq (8) Imports of services 
Imports of goods (b6) 0,051 0,023 
Imports of services, lagged (c6) 0,547 0,349 
Constant (a6) 0,186 0,172 
Corrected R 2 0,811 
Autocorrelation test 2,048 
Eq (11) Expected supply 
Allocation coefficient (P) 0,747 0,218 
Technical progress, labour 0-1) 0,027 0,012 
Technical progress, capital (Az) 0,033 0,015 
Exponent (p) 0,034 0,008 
Elasticity of Substitution (a) 0,967 
Adjustment parameter (a) 0,812 0,087 
Scaling constant (A) 0,281 imposed 
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Keynesian labour demand 
(13) In LK = a7 + b7 {c7 ln OM + d7 In (PM/PD)} 
Kuc 
Labour supply 
-- + f7t 
Wco 
(14) In LS = a8 + b8 !n (pa.PWA) 
Effective labour demand 
(15) In L = a9 min In (LP, LK, LS) + (I - a9) In L_ 1 
Nominal wage-cost 
(16) Din Wen = a 10 Din P + (I - a 10) Din P_ 1 
+ b 10 (Din Wn_ 1 - Din Pc_1) 
2 (YL) + (c 10/Ur.Suk) .. :E wi Din 1=0 
+ (d 10/Ur.Suk) Din Wco_ 1 
(17) Wco = Wcn/P 
(18) Wn = (I - tw) Wen 
Real rental price of capital goods 
I - tc.Z (Pr ~ (19) Kuc = -p [(I - tc) rl + d] 
- tc 
-I 
1/T Z= ______ _ 
[ (I - tc)r1 + 
2.5 
~] I 1+(1-tc)c) [ ( 
I - 1/T ~] 
T=-
d 
3. Prices 
Expected average cost 
(20) A VC = (Wcn.LP + pe_Kuc.K_ 1)/YS 
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Equations and variables 
Eq (13) Keynesian labour demand 
Adjustment parameter (b7) 
Demand parameter (c7) 
Relative price (d7) 
Relative factor cost (e) 
Time trend (f7) 
Constant (a7) 
Eq (14) Labour supply 
Active population (bg) 
Constant (ag) 
Eq (15) Effective labour demand 
Adjustment parameter (ag) 
Goodness of fit for effective 
Labour demand 
Autocorrelation test 
Eq (16) Nominal wage rate 
GDP Deflator (a10) 
Real wage income, lagged (b10) 
Productivity (c10) 
Real wage cost, lagged (d10) 
Corrected R 2 
Autocorrelation test 
Standard 
Coefficients errors 
0,877 0,642 
0,881 0,015 
0,158 0,025 
0,456 0,251 
-0,020 0,005 
-1,651 0,832 
0,972 0,047 
-0,071 0,058 
0,632 0,049 
0,9532 
1,572 
0,872 0,044 
-0,390 0,152 
1,326 0,282 
0,319 0,052 
0,681 
2,241 
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Value-added deflator Equations and variables Standard 
Coefficients errors 
(21) Din P = a 11 + b 11 Din AVC 
+ c11 D2ln PM + d 11 D2ln M2/3 Eq (21) Value-added detlator 
+ e11 Din [YS/(DM - IM)] 
+ f11 (DlnAVC_1 - DlnP_1) Average cost (b11) 0,998 0,01 I Import price acceleration (c11) 0,053 0,022 
Money stock acceleration (d11) 0,184 0,099 
Degree of capacity utilization (e11) 0,252 0,127 
Error-learning term (f11) 0,722 0,117 
Constant (a11) -0,054 0,072 
Corrected R 2 0,921 
Autocorrelation test 1,902 
Consumption and investment deflators Eq (22) Consumption price 
(22) Din Pc = a 12 + b 12 Din P + c12 Din (PM/PX) + 
GDP price (b12) 0,869 0,121 
Din itc Terms of trade (c12) 0,094 0,103 Constant (a12) 0,216 0,855 
(23) Din Pv = a 13 + b13 Din P + c13 Din (PM/PX) + Corrected R 2 Din itc 0,976 
Autocorrelation test 1,743 
Eq (23) Investment price 
GDP price (b13) 0,853 0,049 
Terms of trade (c13) 0,119 0,066 
Constant (a13) -0,192 0,543 
Corrected R 2 0,966 
Autocorrelation test 2,242 
Export prices 
Eq (24) Export price 
(24) Din Px = a 14 + b14 Din P + c14 Din PW + GDP price (b14) 0,574 0,204 d 14 Din PX_ 1 Extra-EC world export price (C14) 0,310 0,099 
Export price, lagged (d14) 0,146 0,039 
Import prices Constant (a14) 0,212 0,848 
(25) PM = PM$ . (er/er base) Corrected R 2 0,977 Autocorrelation test 2,115 
3 3 Eq (25) Expected value-added price (26) Din pe = L a- Din P. + . L ~i Din M2/3_1 i=l 1 -1 1=0 Past price increases t-1 0,743 0,193 
t-2 -0,199 0,167 
Money stock growth t 0,004 0,145 
t-1 0,514 0,179 
t-2 0,047 0,165 
Corrected R 2 0,861 
4. Taxes and transfers Autocorrelation test 2,017 
Direct taxes, households 
(27) DTH = tdh. [(I - sscr + sshr).Wcn.L + NWIH] 
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Direct taxes, corporations 
(28) OTC= tdc. [(P.Y. - (IT-SUB) - Pv.d.K._1 
- Wcn.L - (STH - STPH)] 
Indirect taxes 
(29) IT = (itc/(1 + itc)/[Pc.Cp + Pv.(Vp+ Vg)] 
Social security contributions, households 
(30) STPH = sshr.Wcn.L 
Social security transfers to households 
(31) In STH = a 15 + b15 ln P.Y + c15 ln.U + 
d 15 ln STH_ 1 
Interest paid on public debt 
(32) IIP = rdg.GDD_1 + rex.er.GDF_ 1 
Other net current expenditure nie 
(33) In OTG = a 16 + B16 ln P.Y + c16 In OTG_1 
Government budget constraint 
(34) D GDF= DTH + OTC+ IT+ STPH 
+ sscr Wcn.L + DM 
- Gv + Pv.Vg + st}B + STH + IIP 
+ OTG + NKT - DGDD - er.DR 
(35) D GD = G GOD + D GDF 
5. Income and wealth 
Private sector budget constraint 
(36) D Bd = YD - Pc.Cp - D GOD - Der.Bpf 
- DM0 
Financial wealth 
(37) D NW = D Bd + Der.Bpf + D GOD 
Non-wage income 
(38) NWIH = rdg.GD0_ 1 + rdo.Bd_ 1 + rex.er.Bpf_ 1 
152 
Equations and variables Standard 
Coefficients errors 
Eq (31) Social transfers to households 
Nominal GDP (b15) 0,095 0,009 
Unemployment (C15) 0,207 0,123 
Social transfers, lagged (d15) 0,508 0,148 
Constant (a15) -28,681 54,799 
Corrected R 2 0,997 
Autocorrelation test 1,802 
Eq (33) Other net current expenditures, nie 
Nominal GDP (b16) 0,261 0,102 
Other net current 
expenditures, lagged (c16) 0,747 0,058 
Constant (a16) -0,558 0,287 
Corrected R 2 0,912 
Autocorrelation test 1,943 
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Disposable income 
(39) YD = [(I - (sshr + sscr)).Wcn.L] + NWIH 
+ STH - DTH 
Gross domestic product 
(40) Y=Cp+G+Vp+Vg+Dl+EX-IM 
6. Monetary and financial equations 
Money demand (M2/M3) 
(41) In M2/3 = a 17 + c17 In P.Y. + d 17 rl + d 17 r5 
Short-term interest rate 
(42) r5 = a 18 + b 18 [Din P.Y. - Din M2/3] 
+ c18 Din er+ d 18 r\5 + e18 rs_ 1 
Long-term interest rate 
(43) rl = a19 + b19 rs + C19 D2]n p 
D.GD 
+ d19 D-- + e19 rl_1 
P.Y 
Equations and variables 
Eq (41) Money demand (M2/M3) 
Nominal GDP (c17) 
Long-term interest rate (d17) 
Short-term interest rate (e17) 
Constant (a17) 
Corrected R 2 
Autocorrelation test 
Eq (42) Short-term interest rate 
Nominal GDP growth minus 
money stock growth (b1g) 
Spot exchange rate (C1g) 
US short-term rate (d1g) 
Short-term rate, lagged (e1g) 
Constant (a1g) 
Corrected R 2 
Autocorrelation test 
Eq (43) Long-term interest rate 
Short-term interest rate (b19) 
Acceleration of inflation (c19) 
Increase in public debt as per-
centage of GDP (d19) 
Long-term rate, lagged (e19) 
Constant (a19) 
Corrected R 2 
Autocorrelation test 
Standard 
Coefficients errors 
1,099 0,338 
-1,020 0,414 
0,181 0,639 
2,372 
0,899 
1,981 
0,226 0,174 
0,017 0,008 
0,100 0,062 
0,801 0,155 
-0,100 0,404 
0,814 
1,499 
0,478 0,077 
0,005 0,012 
0,177 0,104 
0,351 0,059 
-0,173 0,499 
0,899 
2,466 
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Domestic public debt equation 
(44) D -- = a?0 + b?0 D --(
GDD) (Mo) 
NW_1 - - GD 
+ C20 D -- + d20 --(
GDF) (GDF) 
GD -I GD -I 
GDD_ 1 
+ e20 Drl + f20 Dr us + g20 NW 
-2 
Private net foreign assets equation 
Bpf 
(45) D -- = a21 + b21 Din NFA NFA_1 
r, - r us ( r, - r' us) 
+ C21 + d21 D 
er er 
+ e21 [Diner - Din ::J 
[
(DNFA - D Bpf - D CDF)J 
+ f21 
NFA_ 1 
Total net foreign assets 
(46) D NFA = [(PX.EX - PM.IM) + rex.er.(bpf_1 
+ GDF_1) + OTX] + [D Bpf + D GDF] 
Balance-of-payments constraint 
(47) D NFA = er. [DR + OCFX] 
Bridge equations 
( 48) r dg = a22 + b22 r1 + c22 rdg_1 
(49) rdo = a23 + b23 r1 + c23 rdo_ 1 
(50) rex = a24 + b24 rus + C24 rex_, 
7. Miscellaneous 
(51) U = pa.PWA - L 
(52) ur = U/(Pa.PWA) 
LP - L 
(53) Suk = ---
LS - L 
(54) PD = (Pc.C + Pg.G + Pv (Vp + Vg) + P.DI)/ 
(Y - EX+ IM) 
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Equations and variables 
Eq (44) Domestic public debt 
Variation in the share of mon-
etary financing 
Variation in the share of for-
eign financing 
Share of foreign financing, 
lagged 
Long-term interest rate 
US long-term rate 
Domestic debt, lagged 
Constant 
Corrected R2 
Autocorrelation test 
(d20) 
(e20) 
(f20) 
(g20) 
(a20) 
Eq ( 45) Private net foreign capital flows 
Net foreign assets (b21 ) 
Interest rate differential (c21 ) 
Change in interest rate differ-
ential (d21 ) 
Purchasing power parity test (e21 ) 
Current account (f21 ) 
Constant (a21 ) 
Corrected R 2 
Autocorrelation test 
Eq ( 48) Effective yield, public debt 
Long-term interest rate 
Effective yield, lagged 
Constant 
Corrected R 2 
Autocorrelation test 
(d22) 
(c22) 
(a22) 
Eq (49) Effective yield, private bonds 
Long-term interest rate 
Effective yield, lagged 
Constant 
Corrected R2 
Autocorrelation test 
Eq (50) Effective yield, foreign assets 
US long-term interest rate 
Effective yield, lagged 
Constant 
Corrected R 2 
Autocorrelation test 
Coefficients 
- 0, 178 
0,010 
0,015 
-0,061 
0,052 
0,832 
-0,004 
0,681 
1,562 
0,481 
0,120 
0,093 
-0,112 
-0,412 
-0,029 
0,708 
2,175 
0,149 
0,792 
0,178 
0,975 
2,334 
0,187 
0,699 
0,157 
0,929 
1,708 
0,111 
0,802 
0,123 
0,901 
2,525 
Standard 
errors 
0,052 
0,006 
0,010 
0,030 
0,028 
0,176 
0,046 
0,246 
0,059 
0,056 
0,059 
0,098 
0,016 
0,065 
0,125 
0,496 
0,066 
0,148 
0,451 
0,044 
0,057 
0,236 
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A3 - Estimation techniques for the EC module 
The approach retained in the estimation of the EC module 
of Compact is, as in other models, a compromise, using 
different techniques for different blocks of equations. 
The need for a compromise results mostly from the use of 
yearly data: the maximum number of observations being 25 
(1958- 82), it is technically impossible to estimate the full 
model in one step, with a simultaneous equation estimation 
technique. 
The structure of the production block precludes out of hand 
the use of ordinary least squares (OLS). A modified form of 
the full information maximum likelihood (FIML) technique 
was therefore used for the following sub-systems: 
Sub-system I I all labour demand equations (eq (11) -(15)) investment equation (eq (2)) changes in inventories equation (eq (3)) 
Sub-system 2 { nominal wage equation (eq (16)) price equations (eq (20) - (24)) 
The other equations are estimated by OLS with correction 
of the autocorrelation of residuals when needed. A test was 
made of an FIML estimation for the monetary and financial 
equations but the data and specification problem proved to 
be particularly severe in that field (as could be expected), 
giving implausible results for some parameters, together 
with a high sensitivity to changes in sample size. For these 
equations, the OLS estimates, although not perfect, proved 
to be definitely more robust. 
The structural parameters are presented with their standard 
errors and with the usual information about the equation, 
in terms of R 2 and autocorrelation test. It should be pointed 
out that the R 2 concept is irrelevant for FIML estimates. 
What is given under that name is the ratio of the variance 
of the computed values of the endogenous variable to the 
variance of the observed ones, which is also what R 2 meas-
ures in a linear, least squares, context. 
The following paragraphs summarize the nature of these 
estimation techniques and explain the criteria used in select-
ing those actually adopted for different parts of the model. 
From a theoretical point of view (Intriligator, 1978), the 
estimation of structural parameters in a given equation must 
use all the available information about the variables and 
parameters in order to be efficient. In the context of a 
macroeconomic model, it means that the estimation of a 
behavioural equation should use information relative to 
the status (endogenous or exogenous) of the explanatory 
variables in the full model. The estimation procedure should 
also use the information available about variables that are 
included in the model but excluded from the equation under 
consideration. In other words, the entire system of simul-
taneous equations forming the model should be estimated 
as a block, in a single round of estimation giving all the 
structural parameter estimates as output. 
Such a method uses all the information quoted above about 
the explanatory variables, plus any other relevant infor-
mation available about the parameters: for example, cross-
equation restrictions in order to ensure unicity of some 
crucial parameters (e.g. the elasticity of substitution between 
labour and capital) when they appear in different equations, 
additivity restrictions, etc. It is therefore called a full-infor-
mation approach and includes two specific estimators, three-
stage least squares (3SLS) and full-information maximum 
likelihood (FIML). 
When one ignores the problem of numerical computation 
of the estimator, FIML is always better or at least as good 
as any other technique provided that the model is correctly 
specified, the variables are correctly measured and the num-
ber of observation points is large. 
The fact that FIML is not applied as a matter of course by 
model builders comes purely from operational consider-
ations. The first step in the use of FIML is the construction 
of the likelihood function of the model, i.e. a function 
incorporating the analytical formulation of all the equations 
in the model, together with the variance-covariance matrix 
of all the stochastic disturbances. 
The term maximum likelihood means that the structural 
coefficients should be estimated so as to maximize the likeli-
hood of observing the values contained in the endogenous 
variables, i.e. to maximize the likelihood of the model being 
a good formalization of the real world. 
In practice, this requires that one must obtain in a second 
step the analytical expression of the first and second deriva-
tives of the likelihood function with respect to all the struc-
tural parameters which, for non-linear functions, is particu-
larly awkward. 1 The third step involves the application of a 
numerical algorithm to solve the system. Since in most cases 
the first and second derivative formulae will be highly non-
1 Some solution techniques use a numerical approximaiion of the deriva-
tives which elimates the analytical derivation, but may increase consider-
ably the computation time. 
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linear, the algorithm must be an iterative one starting from 
given initial values for all parameters and recomputing them 
(according to a given criterion) until the difference between 
two successive values of any parameter becomes negligible. 
For complex models, these techniques may require a con-
siderable amount of computer time when one wants to be 
reasonably sure of the precision of the estimates. 
To sum up, the estimation of a full model by FIML is a 
formidable undertaking, and in fact may not always be 
possible or even desirable, for the following reasons. 
First, one must have a number of observation points larger 
than the total number of structural parameters, a condition 
that is practically never met when working with yearly data. 
It is therefore necessary, as has been done in Compact, to 
limit the application of FIML to sub-systems of equations 
where either the application of FIML is compulsory (labour 
market equations) or where simultaneity biases are critical 
(wage price nexus). 
Second, FIML is extremely sensitive to both specification 
error and measurement error since, by the very nature of 
the method, an error in one equation or in one variable will 
propagate throughout the whole system. Macroeconomic 
data and specifications being what they are, FIML should 
therefore be used with great caution. 
The other extreme is to estimate the parameters equation 
by equation, using the most 'limited information' technique 
available, i.e. single-equation ordinary least squares. In that 
case, all computational problems disappear or may be con-
siderably alleviated through the use of specific single equa-
tion techniques. Similarly, errors of specification or measure-
ment in one equation or variable are acting only on that 
particular equation or equations using effectively that par-
ticular variable. 
The OLS estimates are sometimes called 'nai"ve' estimates 
since, to take one example, the estimation of the wage 
equation will use prices but will ignore that prices in turn 
are influenced by wages, causing the appearance of what is 
called a simultaneity bias in the estimated coefficient. On 
the other hand, OLS estimates tend to exhibit both efficiency 
and insensitivity to specification errors when compared to 
more sophisticated methods. Therefore, OLS estimates 
should not always be rejected out of hand, since in empirical 
studies the data frequently exhibit such inaccuracy and/ 
or the specification of the model is so uncertain that any 
reasonable round off of results would tend to eliminate the 
differences between the rival estimation techniques. 
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To sum up, Compact contain FIML estimates for 13 behavi-
oural equations in two blocks, and OLS estimates for the 
remainder, i.e. 15 equations. 
A4 - Data sources for the EC module 
All data used for the EC module come from official EC 
publications. The methods used for aggregation of the na-
tional data into EC data are therefore always those used 
either by the Statistical Office of the European Communities 
in its Eurostat publications or by DG II services in their 
own publications. All monetary aggregates are expressed in 
billions of ECU. All indices are set equal to 1,00 in 1975. 
The dominant source is the Statistical annex of the Annual 
Economic Review 1983- 84 (November 1983), for the per-
iod 1960- 82. More specifically, the Statistical annex was 
used 
(i) for GDP and its main components both in value and 
1975 prices (Tables 6, 8, I O to 20, 26 to 33); 
(ii) for total employment, unemployment and wages 
(Tables 2, 3, 22 to 24) 
(iii) for money supply, interest rates and exchange rates 
(Tables 37 to 39, 41); 
(iv) for current receipts, total expenditure and net lending 
or borrowing, general government (Tables 45 to 47). 
All detailed public sector data were taken from the Eurostat 
national accounts for the period 1970 - 82, using the detailed 
tables by sector (namely Table 4.8 - General government). 
In the same way, disposable income comes from the house-
hold account (Table 4.3 - Households). Finally, de-
preciation is taken from the Eurostat national account ag-
gregates (fixed capital consumption Al) for the period 
1960- 82. All balance-of-payments items come from the 
Eurostat balance-of-payments data for the period 1970- 82. 
Stocks are computed by cumulation of net flows starting 
from an ad-hoe benchmark value. For fixed capital, the 
benchmark was built by assuming a capital-output ratio of 
2,5 in 1960. For government debt, the 1974 ratio of public 
debt to GDP was used (Annual Economic Review I 983 - 84, 
Chapter 5, Table 5.5). For private domestic bond holdings, 
net national income in I 970 was used as benchmark proxy. 
Due to the lack of adequate information, the benchmark 
for private foreign asset holdings is arbitrarily set equal to 
the stock of international reserves in I 960. 
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B 1 - Main parameters 
Private consumption 
United States of America: The original consumption func-
tions distinguish durables, non-durables and services, all 
linked to real disposable income, net wealth and inflation. 
The equation for durables also incorporates the unemploy-
ment rate and the real interest rate. 
The long-term values of the marginal propensity to consume 
are 0,553 on real disposable income and 0,0971 on net 
wealth. An increase in inflation by I % would cause in the 
long run a fall in .real private consumption equal to 0,8 % 
of real disposable income. For durable goods, a I % increase 
in the unemployment rate causes a fall equal to 0,2 % of 
disposable income. 
Japan: In the Japanese model, private consumption is rep-
resented by a bi-logarithmic equation, giving elasticities 
rather than marginal propensities. As regards disposable 
income, the short and long-run elasticities are 0,297 and 
0,804 respectively. The equivalent data for net worth are 
0, I 06 and 0,286. 
Investment 
United States of America: Non-residential fixed investment 
is following a standard Jorgenson ( 1967) approach, using 
distributed lags over first differences in GDP levels and real 
interest rates, plus an amortization term equal to 0,04 % of 
the capital stock at the beginning of the period. In the long 
run, a cumulative increase in GDP equal to I % would cause 
a growth in investment of 0,37 % of GDP, an increase in 
real interest rates by I % would cause a fall of investment 
by about 0,5 %. 
Japan: Here also, equations are in logarithms and are some-
what specific in their formulations since the explained vari-
able is net investment as a percentage of capital stock at the 
beginning of the period and the explanatory variables are 
wage share and import shares in final demand, with long-
run elasticities of - 3,09 and - 1,36 respectively, relative 
changes in depreciation allowances (elasticity - 0,69) and 
real interest rates with an elasticity of0,017. 
Imports 
The equations for import demand are standard with the 
usual final demand and relative price effects (plus the oil 
price shock dummies). 
United States of America: Final demand is split up between 
investment with an elasticity of 0,32 and other components 
of final demand with an elasticity of 1,33. The relative import 
price elasticity is - 0,39. 
Japan: Income elasticities are 0,47 (short-term) and I, 18 
(long-term) with a relative price elasticity of - 0,42 (short-
term) and - 0,97 (long-term). 
Employment 
United States of America: The evolution of hours worked 
per employee is given by a quadratic time trend. Total 
number of hours worked shows an elasticity of 0,51 with 
respect to present GDP growth, and 0,49 to former period 
growth, i.e. a unit elasticity in long-run equilibrium. Techni-
cal progress is introduced as a negative time trend of 
0,4 %per year. 
Labour supply is exogenous. 
Japan: The Japanese model uses a different approach with 
employment obtained from an identity, the behavioural re-
lations explaining labour supply and unemployment. Labour 
supply is linked to population in working age via the partici-
pation rate explained by GNP growth, real wage growth, 
unemployment rate and non-active population. The unem-
ployment rate is itself explained by GDP with a long run 
elasticity of - 0,68, the wage share in value-added, with a 
long run elasticity of 2,03 and non-active population (total 
population minus labour force) with an elasticity of 2,35. 
Wages 
United States of America: Nominal wages are explained 
through a standard Phillips curve, the indexation to prices 
being very long (4 years) with immediate first-year transfer 
from prices to wages of 0,45, the final impact being 0,95. 
Japan: Relative changes in nominal wage rates are related 
to relative changes in prices with a coefficient of 0,96 over 
four quarters, to the share of non-wage income in total 
income at the beginning of the period with a coefficient of 
0, 15, and to the participation rate with a coefficient of 0,04. 
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Prices 
United States of America: The domestic demand price defla-
tor is linked to labour productivity with a long-run elasticity 
of - 0,37, to wage costs with a long-run elasticity of 0,95 
and to import prices with an elasticity of 0,035. 
The export price is linked to the domestic price (elasticity 
1,14), to the world minus US export price (elasticity 0,24) 
and to the effective exchange rate (elasticity - 0,20). 
Japan: The relative changes in the domestic demand deflator 
is linked to relative changes in unit labour costs with a 
coefficient of 0,942 and in labour productivity with a coef-
ficient of - 0,40. 
Export prices are linked to domestic prices (elasticity 0,82), 
to world prices (elasticity 0, 16) and to the yen/USO exchange 
rate (elasticity 0,3 I). 
Money demand 
United States of America: Money demand (M2) in real terms 
is explained on the basis of its components with long-run 
GDP elasticities of 1,29 for currency held by the public, and 
0,70 for demand deposits. Time and saving deposits as a 
fraction of net worth have a long-run elasticity of 0,52 with 
respect to GDP over net worth. Interest rate elasticities for 
a one percentage point increase in interest rates are about 
-0,76 for note issue and -0,96 for demand deposits. As 
regards time and saving deposits, their share in net worth 
will decrease by 0,3 percentage points when the discrepancy 
between Treasury Bill rates and bank rates increases by one 
percentage point. 
Japan: The presentation is the same as in the US model, 
with M2 disaggregated into currency, demand and time 
deposits. All equations, however, express the dependent 
variable as a fraction of net worth, in logarithmic form. The 
income element is therefore always nominal GDP divided 
by net worth. All equations also include the level of net 
worth as explanatory variable, together with the interest 
rates. 
With respect to net worth (as share of GDP), the elasticities 
are 1,36 for note issue, I ,6 for demand deposits and I ,05 for 
time deposits. With respect to net worth itself, the elasticities 
are 0, I 9, 0,22 and 0,06 in -the same order. Interest rate 
elasticities2 are - 0,4 (short-term) and - 0,9 (long-term) for 
currencies and - I ,2 (short-term) and - 2,9 (long-term) for 
demand deposits. For time deposits, the equation incorpor-
ates both short-term and long-term rates with elasticities of 
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12,8 and - 9,2 respectively. In order to appreciate the exact 
meaning of these figures, one should keep in mind that they 
apply to a ratio: an elasticity of 12,8 means therefore that a 
ratio of 10 % would go to 11,28 % . In other words, the 
shares of currencies and demand deposits (equal to the share 
of MI) in net worth are practically invariant with respect to 
interest rate changes whereas M2 will show larger variations. 
Finally, the international influence is established through 
the Euro-dollar rate computed in the US model from the 
US short-term rate. Elasticities are -0,37 for currencies, 
- I, 11 for demand deposits and - 0,09 for time deposits. 
Interest rates 
United States of America: The leading rate in the model is 
the three-month Treasury Bill rate fixed by the exogenous 
discount rate and exogenous policy variables. 
The commercial bank short-term rate is itself linked to the 
Treasury Bill rate through a very long lag structure and to 
exogenous policy adjustment dummy variables. Given the 
form of the equation, this bank rate shows a considerable 
inertia since the short-term coefficient of the Treasury Bill 
rate is only 0,006 whereas the former period level of the 
bank rate itself has a coefficient of 0,989. 
The long-term interest rate (AAA corporate bonds) is itself 
linked with unit coefficient to a long moving average of 
Treasury Bill rates (over 14 quarters with linearly decreasing 
weights 14, 13, 12, etc.). It is also linked to the same moving 
average applied on the inflation rate, with coefficient 0, 11. 
Finally, it reacts by 0,14 percentage points to any contem-
poraneous change of one percentage point in the level of the 
Treasury Bill rate. 
Japan: The short-term rate (three-month bonds) is linked 
to the (exogenous) discount rate with coefficient 0,83, to 
domestic inflation with coefficient 0, 17 and to policy vari-
ables. The long-term rate is linked to lagged values of the 
short-term rate with a long-run coefficient of 0,77, to the 
ratio of GDP over net worth (coefficient 0,34) and to the 
ratio of demand and time deposits over net worth (coefficient 
-0,35). 
Balance-of-payments equation 
Due to the requirements of Amano's Flex approach (1981) 
for exchange rate determination, the number of equations 
in the non-goods balance-of-payments flows is considerable, 
but the explanatory variables are the usual ones in portfolio 
models, i.e. relative GDP, interest rate differentials, ex-
change rate movements and net worth for capital flows. 
Data on capital flows being what they are, this particular 
set of equations should be taken with caution. 
Exchange rates and foreign reserves 
For the USA, the exchange rate is given by an identity as a 
computed effective exchange rate from a weighted average 
of other countries' bilateral spot rates with respect to the 
dollar. In the Japanese model, the yen/dollar exchange rate 
solves the balance-of-payments identity, and the inter-
national reserves equation explains relative variations in the 
stock of reserves by expected spot rate changes with elasticity 
- 2,2 and the ratio of imports to the stock of reserves at the 
beginning of the period, with coefficient 0,26. The expected 
spot rate variation itself is a function of the trade balance 
as a percentage of GDP, the variation in the trade balance 
ratio and relative Japan-USA prices. The elasticities are 
- 3,38, - 1,69 and 0,093 respectively. The adjustment ex-
plains only about one half of the observed variance of 
reserves (R 2 = 0,57). 
B2 - Rest-of-world equations 
The behavioural equations for the rest-of-world module are 
described in Section 3.3. The precise numerical results are 
the following, with 
WGDP 
GDPC 
WIMG 
WPX 
WPM 
PXC 
In 
rest-of-world GDP, billions of dollars, 1975 
prices 
combined EC-USA-Japan GDP, billions of 
dollars, 1975 prices 
rest-of-world imports of goods, billions of dol-
lars, 1975 prices 
rest-of-world export prices, 1975 = 1,0 
rest-of-world import prices, 1975 = 1,0 
combined EC-USA-Japan export price, 1975 = 
1,0 
natural logarithm 
In WGDP = -0,485 + 0,391 In GDPC + 0,666 In 
WGDP_ 1 
(0,212) (0, 177) (0,234) 
Corrected R 2 
Autocorrelation test 
0,752 
1,851 
In WIMG = -0,235 + 0,327 In WGDP - 0,211 !n (WPM/ 
WPX) + 0,672 In WIMG_ 1 
(0,211) (0,106) (0, I 12) 
Corrected R 2 
Autocorrelation test 
(0,284) 
0,898 
2,21 I 
Appendix B: USA, Japan and rest-of-world modules 
In WPX = -1,016 + 0,638 In PXC 
(0,512) (0.307) 
Corrected R 2 
Autocorrelation test 
0,652 
1,574 
All data (except the combined EC-USA-Japan magnitudes) 
come from the LINK Group, Philadelphia. 
B3 - Linkage equations 
The linkage equations have the following analytical ex-
pression, with 
= exports of goods from country i to country j, 
billions of dollars, I 985 prices 
M$. 
J = imports of goods, country j, billions of dollars, 
1975 prices 
= dollar export price, country i, I 975 = I ,0 
= potential output index, country i, I 975 = 1,0 
PX$i 
IYPi 
IDUCi = degree of use of capacity index, country i, 1975 = 
1,0 
a .. IJ = market shares in 1975 = X$ij, 1975/M$j,t 975 
The bilateral data are built from bilateral import flows in 
order to ensure that 
L X$ .. = M$- for all periods Hence L· a. = I IJ J ' I IJ 
The following variables are computed: 
PM$j = Li aij PX$i = dollar import price, country j 
A YPi = Li aij IYPi = competitor~· potential output index 
on market J 
ADUC = Li aij IDUCi = competitors' degree of use of ca-
J pacity on market j 
The analytical form is 
X$ .. = a. M$ + b X$ 1975 (PX$ - PM$) + c X$. 1975 IJ IJ J J IJ, I J J IJ. 
(IYPi -A YP} + di X$ij. 1975 [(IDUCi - ADUCi) -
e- (IDUC - ADUC) 1] + e- (X$ - a M$) 1 J I J - J IJ IJ J -
Given the definitions of aij, PM$1, A YP1, ADUCi and the fact that Li aij = I one checks easily that 
L· X$ .. = M$. I IJ J 
The linkage equations are therefore automatically additive 
and ensure world consistency of trade flows. 
Defined as the percentage change in the dependent variable caused by a 
one percentage point change in interest rates. 
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Results are 
Import, Market j b; CJ d; <; Corrected R2 
EC -0,053 0,093 -1,030 0,879 0,986 
(0,030) (0,027) (0,433) (0,096) 
USA -0,128 0,131 -1,208 0,830 0,987 
(0, 127) (0, 100) (0,770) (0,087) 
Japan -0,136 0,010 -1,104 0,757 0,969 
(0,084) (0,200) (0,488) (0,092) 
Rest of world -0,494 0,083 -0,902 0,600 0,854 
(0,300) (0,399) (0,900) (0, 147) 
Potential output and degree of use of capacity are derived for the USA, Japan and the rest-of-world module from the 
discrepancy between effective real GDP and its exponential trend value computed over the 1973-85 period. 
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